Nelson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

464 F.Supp.3d 741

Rebecca NELSON, Plaintiff,

v.STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.

2:19-cv-01382-RJC

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 3, 2020

David M. Kobylinski, Praetorian Law Group, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Mark A. Martini, Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Robert J. Colville, United States District Judge

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) filed by Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"). State Farm's Motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for statutory bad faith (Count II), promissory estoppel (Count III), and negligent misrepresentation (Count IV), and further seeks to strike several of the allegations and demands for damages set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1). This matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Plaintiff Rebecca Nelson ("Nelson") sets forth the following allegations in her Complaint (ECF No. 1):

Nelson purchased a home ("the Property") in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in November 2015, and obtained homeowner's insurance ("the Policy") for the Property through State Farm. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, ECF No. 1. In December 2018, Nelson retained a contractor to repair what she believed to be minor interior water damage near her kitchen window. Compl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 1. Nelson's contractor advised her that the damage was more extensive than Nelson had originally believed, and informed Nelson that the water damage was caused by damage to Nelson's roof which resulted in water flowing into the Property's walls as opposed to the roof's gutters. Id. at ¶ 17. As a result, Nelson's kitchen, basement, and second-floor bedroom required water remediation. Id. at ¶ 21. Nelson obtained an estimate in the amount of $8,883.66 from ServiceMaster Restore by All Pro for the necessary water remediation. Id. at ¶ 22.

Upon the advice of her contractor, Nelson hired a public adjuster to submit an insurance claim to State Farm on Nelson's behalf in December 2018. Compl. ¶¶ 18-20, ECF No. 1. Nelson's public adjuster contacted a State Farm claims adjuster to discuss the estimate for water remediation, and, during this conversation, the claims adjuster approved the estimate and instructed Nelson to proceed with the water remediation. Id. at ¶ 23. Relying on this approval, Nelson then authorized ServiceMaster Restore by All Pro to conduct the water remediation, and ServiceMaster began work on the kitchen and second-floor bedroom. Id. at ¶¶ 24-26. In April 2019, State Farm sent a contractor to inspect Nelson's roof. Id. at ¶ 27. State Farm's contractor informed Nelson's public adjustor, who was present during the inspection, that the damage to the Property was covered under the terms of the Policy. Compl. ¶ 29, ECF No. 1. Sometime subsequent to this inspection, however, State Farm rescinded its former representations, denied Nelson's insurance claim for property damage, and refused to pay for the water remediation it had previously authorized. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. As a result of this denial, Nelson cannot afford to complete the repairs to the Property. Id. at ¶ 34. Consequently, Nelson's kitchen has been rendered unusable since December 2018, the water remediation to the second-floor bedroom has not been completed, and her roof remains in its damaged state. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.

On September 26, 2019, Nelson filed a Complaint against State Farm in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County asserting claims for breach of contract (Count I), statutory bad faith pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 (Count II), promissory estoppel (Count III), negligent misrepresentation (Count IV), and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") (Count V). This action was removed to this Court on October 24, 2019. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. State Farm asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. at ¶ 10. State Farm filed its Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) and a Brief in Support (ECF No. 7) on October 29, 2019. On November 20, 2019, Nelson filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition (ECF No. 10). State Farm filed a Reply (ECF No. 11) on November 26, 2019.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz , 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will likely prevail on the merits; rather, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins , 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The Supreme Court of the United States has explained:

The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ "

Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (internal citations omitted).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that "a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps." Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp. , 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). The court explained:

First, it must "tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, it should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc. , 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.") Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Connelly , 809 F.3d at 787. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal citations omitted).

In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, a court may consider "matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case." Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman , 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994). When a document integral to or relied upon in the complaint is included, the court may also consider that document. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig. , 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

With respect to motions to strike, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that "the court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "A decision to grant or deny a motion to strike a pleading is vested in the trial court's discretion." Zaloga v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. of Am. , 671 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Snare & Triest v. Friedman , 169 F. 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1909) ; BJC Health System v. Columbia Cas. Co. , 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007) ). "The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters." Zaloga , 671 F. Supp. 2d at 633 (quoting McInerney v. Moyer Lumber & Hardware, Inc. , 244 F.Supp.2d 393, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ).

III. Discussion

A. 12(b)(6) Relief

State Farm's Motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for statutory bad faith (Count II), promissory estoppel (Count III), and negligent misrepresentation (Count IV) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

1. Bad Faith Claim (Count II)

In its Motion to Dismiss, State Farm first argues that Nelson's statutory bad faith claim should be dismissed because Nelson's Complaint fails to set forth allegations sufficient to support a claim for bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371. Br. in Supp. 4, ECF No. 7. State Farm argues that Nelson merely recites the elements of a claim for bad faith, and fails to set forth any specific allegations which, if taken as true, would entitle Nelson to relief. Id. State Farm further argues that Nelson's Complaint avers that State Farm eventually offered to pay for water remediation once Nelson retained an attorney, and that Nelson cannot recover for bad faith if State Farm offered to pay for the insurance claim at issue. Reply Br. 2, ECF No. 11 (citing Compl. ¶ 33). State Farm also argues that the third-party roofing...