Nichols v. State

858 N.W.2d 773

Joan M. NICHOLS, Appellant

v.STATE of Minnesota, Office of the Secretary of State, et al., Respondents.

No. A13–0529.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 4, 2015.

Robert M. McClay, McClay–Alton, P.L.L.P., Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Goodwin, Alethea M. Huyser, Assistant Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondents.

Jenneane L. Jansen, Jansen & Palmer LLC, and Daniel J. Cragg, Eckland & Blando LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

The issue presented by this case is whether the State of Minnesota may be sued in tort under Minn.Stat. §§ 181.64 and 181.65 (2014). Because we conclude that the Legislature did not plainly, clearly, and unmistakably waive sovereign immunity for claims brought under sections 181.64 and 181.65, see Minn.Stat. § 645.27 (2014), we hold that Nichols may not sue the State under those provisions.

In October 2011 Joan Nichols, then living in Ohio, responded to an online posting for the position of communications director at the Minnesota Office of the Secretary of State (OSS). Nichols was invited to interview for the position. At the interview in November 2011, Nichols met with then-Secretary of State Mark Ritchie and then-Director of Governmental Affairs Beth Fraser. Nichols claims that the online job posting and statements made by Secretary Ritchie and Fraser during the interview included knowingly false representations about the duties of the position. Nichols alleges that these false representations were intended to induce her to resign her position in Ohio and accept the position at OSS. Nichols accepted the position at OSS but states she would not have done so had she known the representations were false.

Nichols began working at OSS on January 4, 2012, and her employment ended on February 19, 2012, when her contract was not renewed at the end of her probationary period. On September 19, 2012, Nichols sued respondents State of Minnesota, OSS, Secretary Ritchie, and Fraser, in Ramsey County District Court. In addition to common-law tort claims, Nichols alleged statutory claims for “false statements as inducement to entering employment” under Minn.Stat. §§ 181.64 and 181.65.¹

Respondents moved to dismiss all claims. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). They argued that claims against the State² under Minn.Stat. §§ 181.64 and 181.65 are barred by sovereign immunity because these sections neither name the State nor plainly, clearly, and unmistakably apply to the State, as required by Minn.Stat. § 645.27. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the common-law and statutory claims in part,³ concluding as to the statutory claims that the broad language of sections 181.64 and 181.65 encompasses all private and governmental entities and therefore demonstrates the Legislature's intent to waive sovereign immunity. Respondents filed an interlocutory appeal with respect to Nichols's statutory claims, and the court of appeals reversed. Nichols v. State, 842 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn.App.2014). The court of appeals concluded that the broad language of Minn.Stat. §§ 181.64 and 181.65 is insufficient by itself to subject the State to suit. Nichols, 842 N.W.2d at 27 (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.27 ).

We granted review on the issue of whether the State is immune from claims brought under Minn.Stat. §§ 181.64 and 181.65.

I.

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we presume all of the facts contained in the complaint are true. Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 746 (Minn.2000). Because the facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal, and the question is one of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Oslund v. Johnson, 578 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn.1998). The application of sovereign immunity is also a question of law, which we review de novo. Sletten v. Ramsey Cnty., 675 N.W.2d 291, 299 (Minn.2004).

“Our primary objective in interpreting statutory language is to give effect to the legislature's intent as expressed in the language of the statute.” Pususta v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 632 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Minn.2001) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2014) ).

The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which precludes litigation against the state unless the state has consented to suit, developed from the principle that “the King can do no wrong.”⁴ Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 125, 235 N.W.2d 597, 599 (1975) ; see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) ; Janklow v. Minn. Bd. of Examiners for Nursing Home Adm'rs, 552 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn.1996). Sovereign immunity in Minnesota originated in common law. Nieting, 306 Minn. at 125, 235 N.W.2d at 600 ; see St. Paul & Chi. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 24 Minn. 517, 574 (1877) (“The exemption of the state from actions by its citizens is not based on any constitutional provision, but merely on grounds of public policy.... There can be no doubt that the legislature may waive such exemption....”). The doctrine serves to protect the fiscal stability of government. See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 867 (Minn.1988). Although we have abolished sovereign immunity with regard to common-law tort claims, see Nieting, 306 Minn. at 132, 235 N.W.2d at 603, the doctrine remains effective in many forms, including immunity from liability created by statute, which is, of course, subject to waiver by the Legislature.

In 1941 the Legislature enacted Minn.Stat. § 645.27, which describes under what circumstances the Legislature intends to waive sovereign immunity for statutory claims: “The state is not bound by the passage of a law [1] unless named therein, or [2] unless the words of the act are so plain, clear, and unmistakable as to leave no doubt as to the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.27.⁵ In other words, sovereign immunity is waived only if the statute demonstrates the Legislature's express intent to allow suit against the State. See Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 727 (Minn.1999) ; State v. Bentley, 224 Minn. 244, 247, 28 N.W.2d 770, 771 (1947) ; see also F.A.A. v. Cooper, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012) (“[A] waiver of sovereign immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.”). Respondents, incorrectly, refer to section 645.27 as a codification of sovereign immunity from statutory claims; we have referred to section 645.27 as a “rule of construction.” See Lienhard, 431 N.W.2d at 864. Chapter 645 is titled “Interpretation of Statutes and Rules,” and section 645.27 is located in the subsection “Construction of Laws.” And although we stated in Lund v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 783 N.W.2d 142, 143 (Minn.2010), that Minn.Stat. § 645.27 “codified ... common-law immunity,” we did not suggest that section 645.27 is a source of immunity. Rather, section 645.27 provides a framework for interpreting whether a separate statutory provision waives sovereign immunity.

II.

Nichols concedes that Minn.Stat. §§ 181.64 and 181.65 do not waive sovereign immunity by explicitly naming the State. The issue then is whether the second prong of Minn.Stat. § 645.27 applies; in other words, whether the provisions “leave no doubt” as to the Legislature's “plain, clear, and unmistakable” intent to bind the State. Section 181.64 provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, company, corporation, association, or organization of any kind, doing business in this state, ... to induce, influence, persuade, or engage any person ... to change from any place in any state, territory, or country to any place in this state, to work in any branch of labor through or by means of knowingly false representations, whether spoken, written, or advertised in printed form, concerning the kind or character of such work.... Any such unlawful acts shall be deemed a false advertisement or misrepresentation for the purposes of this section and section 181.65.

A violation of section 181.64 is penalized by section 181.65 :

Any person, firm, association, or corporation violating any provision of section 181.64 and this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person who shall be influenced, induced, or persuaded to enter or change employment or change a place of employment through or by means of any of the things prohibited in section 181.64, shall have a right of action for the recovery of all damages sustained in consequence of the false or deceptive representations, false advertising, or false pretenses used to induce the person to enter into or change a place of employment, against any person, firm, association, or corporation directly or indirectly causing such damage; and, in addition to all such actual damages such person may have sustained, shall have the right to recover such reasonable attorney fees as the court shall fix, to be taxed as costs in any judgment recovered.⁶

We begin by examining the language of the statutes. See Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (2014). Nichols argues that the language of sections 181.64 and 181.65 demonstrates a plain, clear, and unmistakable intent to allow claims against the State. In particular, Nichols points to the phrase “organization of any kind” in section 181.64, asserting that the breadth of the phrase necessarily includes the State. Arguing that a governmental entity is an “organization,” Nichols also contends that the phrase “organization of any kind” encompasses all public entities, including OSS or the State. Respondents, in contrast, argue that the general terms used in sections 181.64 and 181.65 do not plainly, clearly, and unmistakably demonstrate an intent to include the State.

We conclude that the broad categories of entities listed in Minn.Stat. §§ 181.64 and 181.65 do not waive the State's immunity from suit under those provisions. Nichols urges us to construe the word “organization” according to its “common and approved usage,” see Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1), which she argues could be any “body of persons formed for a...