Ortiz v. Caparra Ctr. Assocs., LLC

261 F.Supp.3d 240

Margarita SANTIAGO ORTIZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CAPARRA CENTER ASSOCIATES, LLC, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 14–1914 (BJM)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 21, 2016

Richard Schell–Asad, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Marcos Valls–Sanchez, Maricarmen Almodovar–Diaz, Jorge L. Cancio–Valdivia, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BRUCE J. McGIVERIN, United States Magistrate Judge

Margarita Santiago Ortiz ("Santiago") and Jan M. Derieux Lebrón ("Derieux"), personally and on behalf of their minor daughter, J.D.S. (collectively, "plaintiffs"), sued Caparra Center Associates, LLC ("Caparra") and Capitol Security Police, Inc. ("Capitol") (collectively, "defendants"),¹ alleging a violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 – 12189, and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code ("Article 1802"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Docket No. 1. Plaintiffs seek money damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as well as for failure to state a claim, Docket Nos. 27, 33, and plaintiffs opposed, Docket No. 30. The case is before me on consent of the parties. Docket No. 20.

For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART .

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The "party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence." P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomm's Reg. Bd. of P.R. , 189 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999). When deciding whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the court follows two general rubrics: (1) when a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged, the court credits plaintiffs' factual allegations and draws reasonable inferences in his or her favor; and (2) when the defendant challenges the truth of the plaintiffs' facts and offers contrary evidence, the court weighs the evidence. Valentín v. Hospital Bella Vista , 254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, on the other hand, "an adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim." Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset , 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). The plaintiff must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary" for the action. Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court first discards any " ‘legal conclusions couched as fact’ or ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The remaining "[n]on-conclusory factual allegations" are fully credited, "even if seemingly incredible." Id.

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court engages in no fact-finding and does not "forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits." Ocasio–Hernández , 640 F.3d at 13. Rather, it presumes that the facts are as properly alleged by the plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm. , 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). Taken together, the facts pleaded must "state a plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for relief." Ocasio–Hernández , 640 F.3d at 12.

BACKGROUND²

Eight-year-old J.D.S. suffers from epilepsy, and must always be accompanied by her service dog, a two-year-old Shitzu that is trained to serve J.D.S.'s medical needs, warn her of an epilepsy attack before it occurs, assist her during an attack, and summon help. Compl. ¶¶ 11–12. The service dog accompanies J.D.S. everywhere she goes, including school; has done so for the past years; is registered as a service dog with the U.S. Service Dog Registry; and always wears a service-dog identification and vest. Id. ¶¶ 12–13.

J.D.S. and her parents are residents of Bayamon, Puerto Rico, and visited the nearby San Patricio Shopping Center ("Center") in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, on February 10, 2014. Id. ¶ 21. Caparra owns and operates the Center, and Capitol provides security services for the Center. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. During this visit, plaintiffs were "detained," though it is unclear for how long, by a Capitol security guard because they were accompanied by J.D.S.'s service dog. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Following this incident, plaintiffs drafted a letter to Caparra and Capitol, which they delivered to the security guards' office at the Center, advising them that the security guards were "violating the law by discriminating against people with an impairment." Id. Neither Caparra nor Capitol responded to the letter. Id.

J.D.S., again accompanied by her parents and service dog, returned to the Center on March 11, 2014. Id. ¶ 14. While walking through one of the Center's hallways, plaintiffs were "intercepted" by a Capitol security guard, who was identified only as "Hernandez." Id. ¶ 15. Hernandez told them that animals were not permitted in the Center, and requested that they carry J.D.S.'s service dog and leave. Id. Explaining that the service dog was identified as J.D.S.'s service animal, her parents refused to do so and told Hernandez to call his supervisor. Id. ¶ 16. Notwithstanding the explanation, Hernandez reiterated the request, this time "in a harsh manner." Id. Plaintiffs ignored that request, and entered one of the Center's department stores. Id. ¶ 17.

Later, near a different store, they again encountered Hernandez, who "stared intensively at plaintiffs." Id. Because of his intensive staring, Derieux approached Hernandez and asked him whether he had been given guidance on how to deal with service dogs. Id. ¶ 18. In a "rather hostile tone" and "threatening manner," Hernandez screamed at plaintiffs, "you don't know who I am." Id. Hernandez repeated this phrase and attempted to physically assault them, prompting another security guard, identified only as "Lopez," to restrain him. Id.

Plaintiffs told the security guards that they were going to call the police, and could sue them for their actions, to which Hernandez responded, "like the other time that you said that you were going to sue and did not do anything." Id. ¶¶ 19–20. The Puerto Rico Police arrived, took a report, and admonished Capitol's security guards that they could not interfere with plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. After this incident, plaintiffs suffered various symptoms of emotional distress, including depression, fear, and anxiety, and "became nervous for not being able to enjoy the premises of the [Center]." Id. ¶ 31. In light of these symptoms, and to avoid incidents like the one at the Center, J.D.S. has become house-ridden. Id. ¶ 32. As a result of these incidents, plaintiffs seek monetary damages and injunctive relief. Id. ¶¶ 30–36.

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that plaintiffs are not entitled to money damages, and that injunctive relief is unwarranted because the complaint fails to state an ADA violation and because there is an insufficient likelihood that the alleged injury will recur. Plaintiffs respond that they have standing to request injunctive relief, and that they are entitled to money damages.

I. The ADA

Congress enacted the ADA "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Title III of the ADA targets discrimination in privately operated places of public accommodation, stating that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) ; Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co. , 333 F.3d 299, 303 (1st Cir. 2003) ( Dudley ).

The statute defines "discrimination" to include "a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).

This statutory framework thus requires a plaintiff to make a six-part showing: (1) that she "comes within the protections of the ADA as a person with a disability"; (2) that "the defendant's establishment is subject to the mandates of Title III as a place of public accommodation"; (3) that "the defendant has a discriminatory policy or practice in effect"; (4) that she "requested a reasonable modification in that policy or practice which, if granted, would have afforded him access to the desired goods"; (5) "that the requested modification—or a modification like it—was necessary to afford that access"; and (6) "that the defendant nonetheless refused to modify the policy or practice." Dudley , 333 F.3d at 307 (citations omitted).

A. Persons Protected Under the ADA

Defendants first argue that the complaint fails to state sufficient facts alleging that each plaintiff (J.D.S., Santiago, and Derieux) comes within the ADA's protections. A "disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities"³ of an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Congress has instructed that this definition should be construed "in favor of broad coverage of individuals ... to the maximum extent permitted ...." Id. § 12102(4)(A) ; see also Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 136 F.3d 854, 861 (1st Cir. 1998) ("It is a ‘familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation,’ such as the ADA, ...