P.W. v. N.G. (Ex parte N.G.)

321 So.3d 655

EX PARTE N.G., Jr.; B.J.U.; and the N.G., Jr. Special Needs Trust

(In re: P.W.

v.N.G., Jr., and B.J.U., individually and as guardian for N.G., Jr.)

1190390

Supreme Court of Alabama.

September 4, 2020

Elizabeth L. Blair of Blair Law, LLC, Birmingham; and G. Alicia Jett of Sanders & Williams, LLC, Birmingham, for petitioners.

Submitted on mandamus petition only.

SELLERS, Justice.

N.G., Jr. ("the father"); B.J.U., the father's legal guardian; and the N.G., Jr. Special Needs Trust ("the special-needs trust") petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Russell Juvenile Court to vacate an order transferring to the Russell Circuit Court a claim asserted by P.W. ("the mother") alleging the fraudulent transfer of the father's assets in a case she filed seeking past-due child support from the father. We deny the petition.

In 2005, the father was involved in an automobile accident and was rendered permanently disabled. His mother, B.J.U., was appointed as his guardian. Through B.J.U., the father commenced a personal-injury action seeking to recover compensation for injuries he sustained in the accident. The personal-injury action settled, and, in 2013, the settlement proceeds were placed in the special-needs trust. Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that B.J.U. may be the trustee of the special-needs trust.

In August 2019, the mother filed a petition in the Russell Juvenile Court seeking to recover approximately $70,000 in past-due child support allegedly owed by the father. The mother also named B.J.U., in her individual capacity and as the father's guardian, as a defendant and alleged that she had secreted the father's assets. In an amended petition, the mother asserted a claim alleging a fraudulent transfer under § 8-9A-4(a), Ala. Code 1975, which provides that "[a] transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made, if the debtor made the transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." The mother asserted that placing the proceeds of the father's personal-injury settlement in the special-needs trust was a fraudulent transfer. She also added the special-needs trust as a defendant.

The father, B.J.U., and the special-needs trust (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the petitioners") moved to dismiss the fraudulent-transfer claim, asserting that the juvenile court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over it. The juvenile court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction but, instead of dismissing the fraudulent-transfer claim, severed it from the child-support claim and transferred it to the Russell Circuit Court. The petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which denied the petition by order. Ex parte N.G., Jr. (No. 2190337, Jan. 29, 2020), ––– So. 3d –––– (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (table). The petitioners then filed a mandamus petition with this Court.

"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and will be granted only when there is ‘(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought, (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so, (3) the lack of another adequate remedy, and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991)."

Ex parte Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Ala. 2003). A petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate means of challenging the allegedly improper transfer of a case from one court to another. See Ex parte MedPartners, Inc., 820 So. 2d 815, 821 (Ala. 2001) (considering the improper transfer of a case that allegedly had been filed in the wrong venue and stating that "[t]he aggrieved party's sole remedy in such a case is a petition for writ of mandamus directed to the transferor court"); Ex parte N.B., 204 So. 3d 887, 891 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (considering the transfer of a case from a juvenile court to a circuit court and noting that a petition for a writ of mandamus is a proper means of challenging such a transfer).

Normally, if a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, it must dismiss the case. See Ex parte Rankin, 284 So. 3d 933, 936 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019). But a court can transfer a case to another court if expressly authorized to do so. Ex parte Boykin, 611 So. 2d 322, 326 (Ala. 1992). In its order denying the petitioners' mandamus petition, the Court of Civil Appeals referenced § 12-11-11, Ala. Code 1975, which provides:

"Whenever it shall appear to the court that any case filed therein should have been brought in another court in the same county, the court shall make an order transferring the case to the proper court, and the clerk or register shall forthwith certify the pleadings, process, costs and order to the court to which the case is transferred, and the case shall be docketed and proceed in the court to which it is transferred, and the costs accrued in the court in which the case was originally filed shall abide by the result of the case in the court to which transferred."

In Ex parte E.S., 205 So. 3d 1245 (Ala. 2015), this Court held that § 12-11-11 required a circuit court to transfer a dispute regarding an adoption, over which the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, to the probate court. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Shaw noted that the original version of the statute now codified at § 12-11-11 provided:

" ‘Whenever it shall appear to any court of law or equity that any cause filed therein should have been brought in another court of like jurisdiction in the same county, the court shall make an order transferring the cause to the proper court....’

"Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 13, § 156."

205 So. 3d at 1250 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Shaw noted that the original statute was enacted as part of a legislative act dealing with the transfer of cases erroneously filed on the law "side" of the circuit court to the equity "side" of the circuit court, and vice versa. Id. In addition, in counties in which the circuit court sits in multiple divisions, the original version of the statute was used to transfer cases from one division to another. Id. As Justice Shaw noted, however, when the original statute was incorporated into the Code of Alabama 1975 as § 12-11-11, the language referring to "law or equity" and "like jurisdiction" was removed. Id. ¹

The Court of Civil Appeals, in denying the petitioners' mandamus petition in the present case, cited Ex parte N.B., supra. In that case, Judge Donaldson authored an opinion, in which Judge Pittman concurred, citing E.S. and § 12-11-11 as support for the conclusion that a juvenile court had the power to transfer a child-custody dispute, over which the juvenile court had no jurisdiction, to the circuit court. Judge Donaldson wrote:

"[ Section] 12–11–11 authorizes ‘the court’ in a given county to transfer a case to another court in the same county, without further limitation. Predecessors to § 12–11–11 appear to have authorized only transfers between divisions of the circuit court and between the law and equity ‘sides’ of the circuit court. See Ex parte E.S., 205 So. 3d at 1250 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Section 12–11–11, however, contains no such limitation and, when read literally, provides the authority for the transfer in this case. Here, the juvenile court transferred a case that ‘should have been brought in another court in the same county’ to the appropriate court, i.e., the circuit court."

204 So. 3d at 893.

"Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect."

IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992). As Judge Donaldson concluded in N.B.: "[W]hen read literally, [ § 12-11-11 ] provides the authority for the transfer in this case." 204 So. 3d at 893.

In arguing that N.B. was incorrectly decided, the petitioners point out that § 12-11-11 is set out in Chapter 22, Title 11, Ala. Code 1975, which is entitled "Circuit Courts." Thus, they assert, § 12-11-11 authorizes only circuit courts to transfer cases. They do not, however, cite any controlling legal authority for the proposition that the title of Chapter 22 governs over the otherwise plain language of § 12-11-11, which is not limited to circuit courts.

The petitioners also point to Ex parte Boykin, 611 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1992), and Hughes v. Branton, 141 So. 3d 1021 (Ala. 2013). Boykin involved the transfer of cases filed in the circuit court for the 10th Judicial Circuit to the "equity division" of that circuit. This Court held that "the creation and maintenance of the equity division is not authorized by Alabama law" and that the transfers were improper. 611 So. 2d at 324. Boykin made no mention of § 12-11-11. Hughes held that a probate court did not have the power to transfer to the circuit court an action to set aside a deed. Like Boykin, Hughes did not discuss the applicability of § 12-11-11.

Promoting judicial economy, § 12-11-11 allows courts lacking subject-matter jurisdiction to transfer claims to an appropriate court within the same county rather than dismissing those claims to the detriment of the parties. Under § 12-11-11, courts within the same county have the authority to transfer cases both "horizontally" to courts of like jurisdiction and "vertically" to "lower" and "higher" courts. In the present case, the juvenile court appropriately severed the fraudulent-transfer claim from the child-support claim and transferred the former claim to a court with subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim.

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and the petitioners have...