Parrish v. ARC of Morris Cnty., LLC

193 F.Supp.3d 425

Cynthia D. PARRISH, Plaintiff,

v.The ARC OF MORRIS COUNTY, LLC, the ARC/Morris County Chapter, Inc., Robert Artis, Gloria Skarzynski-Burt, John Does 1-10, and ABC Corp. 1-10, Said Names Being Fictitious, Defendants.

Civil No.: 15-6395 (KSH) (CLW)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed June 30, 2016

Ronald J. Wronko, Florham Park, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Thomas F. Doherty, McCarter & English, LLP, Newark, NJ, for Defendants.

OPINION

Katharine S. Hayden, United States District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of a motion to remand brought by plaintiff Cynthia Parrish. (D.E. 2.) Originally, she sued the ARC/Morris County Chapter, New Jersey, Inc. (the "ARC"), Robert Artis, Gloria Skarzynksi-Burt, and unnamed individuals and corporations (collectively, "defendants"), in New Jersey state court. Artis removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 8-10.) One month later, Parrish filed this motion, seeking a remand back to state court and attorneys' fees. The Arc/Morris County Chapter, New Jersey, Inc. was improperly pleaded as "The ARC of Morris County, LLC" and "The ARC/Morris County Chapter, Inc." Skarzynski-Burt was added by way of amended complaint in the state court several days after the complaint was filed. (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 1-2.)

I. Background

According to the amended state court complaint filed in Essex County, Parrish began working for the ARC as a skill instructor in the Randolph Group Home in February, 2011. (D.E. 1-1 ("Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 4, 7.) In 2013, she was promoted to assistant manager, and then to manager. (Compl. ¶ 4.) She received favorable performance reviews and was never disciplined. (Id. ) In January 2014, Parrish took medical leave under the federal Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. , because she suffered a hernia and contracted a serious infection. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Parrish alleges that Robert Artis, her immediate supervisor, was upset about the increased workload while she was out, and that he wanted her to truncate her leave and to do work while she was on leave. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) Parrish reported this to the personnel department, which allegedly instructed Artis to stop. (Id. )

The of plaintiff's contentions about the illegality of her termination appears in paragraphs 11 through 13 of the amended complaint:

11. Upon her return from leave, Mr. Artis told her that she need to complete and sign an Individual Health Plan (IHP) for a consumer. Plaintiff had not attended the IHP meeting. Plaintiff initially objected to performing this task to Mr. Artis as she believed that it would have given the false appearance that she had attended the IHP meeting. She believed in good faith that this would have constituted a false representation in violation of N.J.A.C. 10:44A-4.3. However, it was a condition of continued employment that she perform this task, so she was forced to perform.

12. Plaintiff further objected to being forced to complete and execute the IHP document to Executive Director by e-mail. Plaintiff also reported to the Executive Director that Mr. Artis was imposing upon her unreasonable work expectations in light of her return from her temporary disability.

13. Mr. Artis was angry with plaintiff that she reported him to the Executive Director, who was Mr. Artis' immediate supervisor. Mr. Artis subsequently acted on his retaliatory intent with the assistance and approval of Ms. Skarzynski-Burt and terminated plaintiff for a pretextual reason.¹

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13.)

The official reason given for Parrish's termination arose out of an injury to a resident of the Randolph Group Home on May 27, 2014, about which the complaint goes into detail. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-22.) A member of the night staff called her that night to advise that a resident had fallen down, but was not hurt or bleeding. Parrish directed the staff member to complete an incident report, and she called back twice to check on the individual involved. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) When Parrish returned to work after the Memorial Day holiday, she noticed that the resident had a black eye, and she arranged for medical attention. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18.) Parrish was suspended and then terminated based on the allegedly pretextual reason that she should have advised the night staff to call 911 immediately. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Parrish alleges there were other instances where individuals in ARC group homes fell and were injured, the managers did not call 911, and these managers were not terminated. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.)

Parrish filed suit in state court on May 28, 2015, alleging four causes of action—three under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et. seq. (the "NJLAD"), and one under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq. ("CEPA"). Count one alleges retaliation under the NJLAD (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-27); count two alleges discrimination under the NJLAD (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-31); count three alleges "aiding and abettor liability under the [NJLAD]" (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-35); and count four alleges retaliation in violation of CEPA (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-40). Parrish amended her complaint on June 1, 2015, adding Skarzynski-Burt as an additional defendant, but she did not otherwise alter her claims. Defendants removed to federal court on August 28, 2015, and Parrish filed the pending motion to remand. (D.E. 1-2.) The matter has been fully briefed, and the Court decides the motion on the papers. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b).

II. Legal Standard

This Court's removal jurisdiction is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 : "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant[ (s) ] ... to the district court of the United States[.]" Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This provision conferring federal question jurisdiction must be strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction. Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 772 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir.2014), aff'd , 194 U.S. 671, 136 S.Ct. 1562, 1575, 194 L.Ed.2d 671 (2016) ; Toney v. LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass'n , 36 F.Supp.3d 657, 661–62 (D.S.C.2014) ("Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and removal implicates serious federalism concerns, removal restriction is strictly construed in favor of state court jurisdiction—i.e. ‘[i]f federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.’ ") (quoting Mulc a hey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co. , 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.1994) ). To determine whether a claim arises under federal law, "we examine the ‘well pleaded’ allegations of the complaint and ignore potential defenses.' " Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003).

Generally, an action arises under federal law for purposes of § 1331"when federal law creates the cause of action asserted." Gunn v. Minton , ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013). Federal jurisdiction may exist where the complaint alleges only state law claims if "federal law completely preempts a state law claim or where a state law claim raises a substantial embedded federal issue that can be addressed by the federal courts without disturbing congressional intent." MHA LLC v. HealthFirst, Inc. , 629 Fed.Appx. 409, 411 (3d Cir.2015) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. , 545 U.S. 308, 313–14, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005) (narrow exception for certain embedded federal issues)).

In determining whether there is an embedded federal issue, courts must apply all facets of the four-pronged Grable test: " ‘[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.’ " Manning , 772 F.3d at 163 (quoting Gunn , 133 S.Ct. at 1065 ). "For a federal issue to be necessarily raised [under prong 1], ‘vindication of a right under state law [must] necessarily turn[ ] on some construction of federal law.’ " Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal. , 463 U.S. 1, 9, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) ). This typically requires "a determination of federal law as an essential element of the plaintiff's state law claim." Id. The Third Circuit has recently explained that "[o]nly a ‘slim category’ of cases satisfy the Grable test." Id. (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh , 547 U.S. 677, 701, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006) ).

III. Discussion

Parrish raises only state law claims. Recognizing this in his removal petition, Artis claims that Parrish effectively invoked her rights under the FMLA based on the following portions of her amended complaint:

• "In January 2014, plaintiff took a medical leave of absence under the Federal Family [and] Medical Leave Act because she suffered from a hernia and, subsequently, contracted a serious infection that spread throughout her body."

• "Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Robert Artis, was upset regarding the increased workload he suffered because plaintiff took a medical leave of absence on account of her disability."

• "Mr. Artis called her constantly while she was out on leave and harassed her to return from her leave and/or to perform work while she was on her leave," purportedly prompting Plaintiff to complain to the personnel department about such harassment.

• Plaintiff further contends that, "[u]pon her return from leave," she was subjected to retaliation, including that Defendant Artis allegedly "was imposing upon her unreasonable work expectations."

(D.E. 1 ("Notice of Removal") ¶ 8 (emphasis in original).) The Notice of Removal asserts that the...