Peake v. Labatad

150 Hawai‘i 363

501 P.3d 332 (Table)

Donna M. PEAKE, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Samantha K.K. LABATAD, Defendant-Appellant

NO. CAAP-17-0000923

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai‘i.

December 27, 2021

On the briefs:

Grant K. Kidani, (Kidani Law Center) for Defendant-Appellant.

Donna M. Peake, Pro Se Plaintiff-Appellee.

(By: Ginoza, C.J., and Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

In a case arising from a personal injury claim, Defendant-Appellant Samantha K.K. Labatad (Labatad ) appeals from the Judgment, entered on December 1, 2017, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (FOF/COL/Order ), entered on February 26, 2018, in the District Court of the First Circuit, Ko‘olaupoko Division (District Court ).¹

On September 29, 2017, Plaintiff-Appellee Donna M. Peake (Peake ) filed a Complaint against Labatad, alleging that Labatad punched her in the face, causing severe bruising, scratches, and other injuries.² On November 9, 2017, Labatad filed a Counterclaim, alleging "Assault; Battery; Defamation; and Comparative Fault/Negligence" and seeking a judgment against Peake in the amount of $100.

On November 17, 2017, at the conclusion of a bench trial, the District Court orally ruled in favor of Peake on the Complaint. The court also stated: "I am finding that there was no comparative negligence here and the counterclaim is invalid. I am not awarding anything to the defendant on the basis of the counterclaim."³ On December 1, 2017, the District Court entered the Judgment in favor of Peake and against Labatad in the sum of $2,660, comprising a "[p]rincipal [a]mount" of $2,581, "[s]ervice [f]ees" of $43, and "[m]ileage for [s]ervice" of $36. On February 26, 2018, the District Court entered the FOF/COL/Order, which, among other things, ordered that "[j]udgment be entered in favor of ... Peake against ... Labatad as to the counterclaim with no damages to be awarded."

On appeal, Labatad contends that the District Court erred in: (1) finding that Peake was not contributorily negligent; (2) admitting into evidence Peake's Exhibit 1B ("Work Status Report") over Labatad's hearsay objection, and awarding $600.00 in special damages for lost wages; (3) awarding $981 in special damages for medical expenses, where "Peake would be reimbursed by insurance and [thus] ... receive a double recovery[,]" and where such expenses "were not established ... to have been reasonable and necessary"; and (4) awarding $1,000 in damages for pain and suffering "because the amount is unreasonable and out of proportion to the damages sustained by Peake."⁴

After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve Labatad's contentions as follows:

(1) Labatad contends that the "trial court made no ruling on whether the plaintiff's negligence was a defense to the defendant's liability for an intentional tort." Labatad argues that, "[b]ecause Hawaii's comparative negligence statute HRS § 663-31⁵ only applies to torts of negligence, this Court should fashion a common law rule outside the statute that contributory negligence is a defense to intentional torts under pure comparative negligence principles."⁶ (Footnote added.)

We need not decide in this case whether contributory negligence is a defense to intentional torts under pure comparative negligence principles. At the conclusion of trial, the District Court "f[ound] that there was no comparative negligence here ...." The court thus necessarily found there was no contributory negligence. See supra note 6.

Labatad asserts that in the subsequent FOF/COL/Order, the Circuit Court "entered no Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law on the issue of contributory negligence." However, Labatad first raised the related issue of "Comparative Fault/Negligence" in the Counterclaim. See District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP ) Rule 8(c). Thus, it appears that at trial, the District Court addressed the issue of contributory/comparative negligence by reference to the Counterclaim. Consistent with the court's ruling at trial that "there was no comparative negligence here and the counterclaim is invalid[,]" the subsequent FOF/COL/Order includes the following FOFs and COL:

FINDINGS OF FACT

....

17. In support of her Counterclaim[,] [Labatad] testified that she was acting in self-defense when she struck [Peake] in the jaw.

18. [Labatad] testified that [Peake] had touched the back of her head and that was what caused her to turn and punch [Peake] in the jaw.

19. Morris testified on behalf of [Labatad].

20. Morris credibly testified that he did not see [Peake] touch [Labatad].

....

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

....

8. [Labatad]'s counterclaim fails due to lack of any credible evidence to support her claim.

Labatad does not challenge FOFs 17 through 20. The findings are therefore binding on appeal and support the District Court's mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law that there was no credible evidence to support Labatad's Counterclaim, which included her comparative negligence claim. See State v. Rapozo, 123 Hawai‘i 329, 334 n.4, 235 P.3d 325, 330 n.4 (2010) ; Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Hawai‘i 43, 63, 85 P.3d 150, 170 (2004) ; see also Tamashiro v. Control Specialist, Inc., 97 Hawai‘i 86, 92, 34 P.3d 16, 22 (2001) ("the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are within the province of the trier of fact and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal." (citing State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai‘i 87, 101, 997 P.2d 13, 27 (2000) )). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that Peake was not comparatively (or contributorily) negligent.

(2) Labatad contends that the District Court (a) improperly admitted Peake's Exhibit 1B into evidence over Labatad's hearsay objection, and (b) improperly awarded Peake $600.00 in special damages for lost wages, where such damages were not established by a preponderance of the evidence.

At trial, Peake offered into evidence Exhibit 1B, a "Work Status Report," dated November 2, 2016, purportedly authored by Peake's treating physician, Jocelyn M. Sonson, M.D. (Sonson ), stating that "[Peake] is placed off work from 11/2/2016 through 11/4/2016[.]" The District Court admitted the Work Status Report into evidence over Labatad's hearsay objection.⁷

Labatad argues that "[t]he statement in the Work Status Report was a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted by an out of court declarant[,]" and no hearsay exception applied. Indeed, the Work Status Report was offered to prove that Peake was placed "off work" for the identified time period, and cited by the District Court in FOF 11 for that purpose.⁸ Sonson did not testify at trial, and the statement at issue was hearsay. See Baker, 124 Hawai‘i at 467, 248 P.3d at 233. No hearsay exception was offered or ruled upon, and none is apparent based on Peake's testimony at trial. The District Court thus erred in admitting Exhibit 1B into evidence.

The error, however, was harmless. See DCRCP Rule 61 ; Bank of Hawaii v. Shinn, 120 Hawai‘i 1, 20, 200 P.3d 370, 389 (2008) (construing HRCP Rule 61 ). The District Court found in FOF 12 that "[Peake] credibly testified that she worked doing translation work and was paid at the rate of $200 per day for this work, and that due to the injury she was not able to work for three days and was not paid for those days." Labatad does not challenge FOF 12, which is based on independent evidence unrelated to Exhibit 1B, is binding on appeal, and supports the District Court's COL 6 awarding Peake $600 for lost wages.⁹ See Rapozo, 123 Hawai‘i at 334 n.4, 235 P.3d at 330 n.4. In these circumstances, Labatad has failed to demonstrate how the District Court's admission of Exhibit 1B affected her substantial rights. See DCRCP Rule 61.

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in awarding Peake $600.00 in special damages for lost wages.

(3) Labatad contends that the District Court improperly awarded Peake $981.00 in special damages for medical expenses, where Peake "would be reimbursed by her insurer after making the payment[,]" and where such expenses were not established to have been "reasonable and necessary."

At trial, Peake introduced into evidence a medical bill from Kaiser Permanente, and testified that the bill had not yet been paid. At the close of Peake's case, Labatad moved for judgment as a matter of law against Peake on the ground that she "ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to support her claim for damages." The District Court denied the motion. In Labatad's closing argument, she contended:

[B]ased on the evidence and credible testimony presented here, [Peake] has not established that she sustained any economic damages ....

Number one, the claimed medical bill is an insurance payment, has not been presented to the insurance company for payment. There is no evidence of copayments made by plaintiff and she has testified herself that she has not made payments on this matter.

On appeal, Labatad contends that "because [Peake] would be reimbursed by her insurer after making the payment[,] ... [t]his reimbursement was a double recovery and windfall for Peake."

Labatad's argument fails for two reasons. First, Labatad cites no evidence in the record that Peake "would be reimbursed by her insurer after making the payment." Peake testified to the contrary. Second, Labatad's argument ignores the collateral source rule.

The "collateral source rule," in general, provides that benefits or payments received on behalf of a plaintiff, from an independent source, will not diminish recovery from the wrongdoer. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (2000). "Under the collateral source rule, a ‘tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor[.]’ " Sam Teague, Ltd. v. Hawai‘i Civil Rights Comm'n, 89

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