People v. Blair

44 N.E.3d 1073

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Che BLAIR, a/k/a Che'r Blair, Defendant–Appellant.

Nos. 4–13–0307

4–13–0308.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

June 30, 2015.

Michael J. Pelletier, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, and Alan D. Goldberg and Stephen L. Gentry, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

John Milhiser, State's Attorney, of Springfield (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Allison Paige Brooks, all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In January 2013, defendant, Che Blair, a/k/a Che'r Blair, entered an open guilty plea to the Class 4 offense of driving while license suspended or revoked (625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–3) (West 2010)) in Sangamon County case No. 12–CF–542 (docketed case No. 4–13–0307). Following a March 2013 trial, a jury convicted defendant of a separate Class 3 charge of driving while license suspended or revoked (625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–4) (West 2010)) in Sangamon County case No. 12–CF–543 (docketed case No. 4–13–0308). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of seven years in case No. 12–CF–543 and three years in case No. 12–CF–542.

¶ 2 In this consolidated appeal, defendant asserts that (1) his convictions should be reduced to Class A misdemeanors because the evidence was insufficient to support his Class 3 and Class 4 felony convictions where his driver's license had already been revoked at the time of the statutory summary suspension; (2) his 7–year sentence in case No. 12–CF–543 is excessive; and (3) he is entitled to an additional 249 days of sentencing credit in case No. 12–CF–543 for time served in an unrelated case.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On June 26, 2012—while defendant was in custody on an unrelated charge—the State charged defendant by complaint with the Class 3 felony offense of driving while license suspended or revoked (625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–4) (West 2010)) in two separate cases, i.e., case Nos. 12–CF–542 and 12–CF–543. The complaints alleged that defendant committed the offense of driving while license revoked on November 26, 2011, and March 17, 2012, respectively. The trial court ordered a $5,000 recognizance bond in both cases. On July 5, 2012, the State filed informations in both cases charging defendant with the same offenses charged in the complaints.

¶ 5 On January 8, 2013, defendant entered an open plea of guilty to driving while license suspended or revoked in Sangamon County case No. 12–CF–542. As part of the agreement, the State announced in court that it amended the information to reflect the charge was a Class 4 felony (625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–3) (West 2010)), although no formal amendment to the information is contained in the record before us. On January 31, 2013, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.

¶ 6 On March 5, 2013, defendant's jury trial for the Class 3 felony offense of driving while license suspended or revoked in Sangamon County case No. 12–CF–543 commenced.

¶ 7 Jeffrey Coker, a Springfield police officer, testified that at approximately 3 a.m. on March 17, 2012, he was on patrol when he noticed a red Ford Crown Victoria driving without its headlights. Coker initiated a traffic stop and identified defendant as the driver of the vehicle. After determining that defendant's driver's license was revoked, he issued defendant citations for driving while license revoked and driving without headlights.

¶ 8 Christopher Bax, a court liaison with the Secretary of State's office, testified regarding defendant's driving abstract, which was admitted into evidence. Bax testified that defendant was issued a statutory summary suspension after he was stopped for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) on January 22, 2007, and that on March 17, 2012, defendant's driver's license was suspended, “at least in part,” for the statutory summary suspension. On cross-examination, Bax acknowledged that respondent's statutory summary suspension was eligible “to be lifted” on October 26, 2007, but it remained in effect as of March 17, 2012. While Bax could not testify as to the reason the suspension was not lifted in this case, he agreed that suspensions may remain in effect until the required fees are paid. On re-cross-examination, Bax testified that a statutory summary suspension may also remain in effect if someone is convicted of driving on a suspended or revoked license.

¶ 9 Defendant testified on his own behalf and admitted that he was driving on March 17, 2012, at a time when he knew he did not have a valid driver's license.

¶ 10 At the close of evidence, defendant was found guilty of driving while license suspended or revoked.

¶ 11 On March 6, 2013, defendant filed a motion for acquittal or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial in case No. 12–CF–543. On March 19, 2013, the trial court denied defendant's motion and proceeded to sentencing in both cases. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of seven years in case No. 12–CF–543 and three years in case No. 12–CF–542. Defendant was awarded 16 days of sentence credit for the period from March 4, 2013, through March 19, 2013. On March 20, 2013, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence in both cases, which the court denied on April 11, 2013. Also on April 11, 2013, the court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in case No. 12–CF–542. On May 2, 2013, defendant filed a motion to amend the sentencing judgment, asserting that he was entitled to a total of 266 days of credit for time served in custody for the period of June 19, 2012, through March 19, 2013. Defendant's motion to amend the sentencing judgment was filed after his April 18, 2013, notice of appeal and was not ruled on in the trial court.

¶ 12 This appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 In this consolidated appeal, defendant asserts that (1) his convictions should be reduced to Class A misdemeanors because the evidence was insufficient to support his Class 3 and Class 4 felony convictions where his driver's license had already been revoked at the time he was assessed a statutory summary suspension; (2) his 7–year sentence in case No. 12–CF–543 is excessive; and (3) he is entitled to an additional 249 days of sentencing credit in case No. 12–CF–543 for time spent in custody in an unrelated case.

¶ 15 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 16 Defendant first asserts that his Class 3 and Class 4 felony convictions for driving while license suspended or revoked should be reduced to Class A misdemeanors (see 625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2010)) and the causes remanded for resentencing. He argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for the enhanced Class 3 and Class 4 felonies of driving while license suspended or revoked (625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–3), (d–4) (West 2010)) because his driver's license was already revoked at the time he was assessed the statutory summary suspension. According to defendant, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “revocation” supports the conclusion that a license can be revoked only once—a conclusion he contends makes the statutory summary suspension assessed on his license a nullity that cannot support the sentence enhancements in this case.

¶ 17 Resolution of this issue requires us to determine whether the statute under which defendant was convicted allows for a statutory summary suspension to be assessed against a revoked driver's license. As the issue is one of statutory construction, our review is de novo. People v. Heritsch, 2012 IL App (2d) 090719, ¶ 7, 361 Ill.Dec. 820, 972 N.E.2d 305 ; People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 121164, ¶ 8, 376 Ill.Dec. 634, 999 N.E.2d 809 (noting that the issue on appeal, i.e., whether driving privileges that have been revoked are subject to a later statutory summary suspension, is principally one of statutory construction). “When construing a statute, our goal is to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent, best indicated by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] This court will not depart from the statute's plain language by reading in exceptions, limitations, or conditions in conflict with the legislature's intent. [Citation.]” In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill.2d 33, 40, 342 Ill.Dec. 555, 932 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (2010).

¶ 18 The statutes under which defendant was convicted provide, in relevant part, as follows:

“Any person convicted of a fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, or ninth violation of this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony and must serve a minimum term of imprisonment of 180 days if the revocation or suspension for a violation of Section 11–401 or 11–501 of this Code, * * * or a statutory summary suspension or revocation under Section 11–501.1 of this Code.” 625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–3) (West 2010).

“Any person convicted of a tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, or fourteenth violation of this Section is guilty of a Class 3 felony, and is not eligible for probation or conditional discharge, if the revocation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11–401 or 11–501 of this Code, * * * or a statutory summary suspension or revocation under Section 11–501.1 of this Code.” 625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–4) (West 2010).

¶ 19 Initially, we note the State argues defendant cannot challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence against him in case No. 12–CF–542 because he pleaded guilty. See People v. Hunter, 331 Ill.App.3d 1017, 1025, 265 Ill.Dec. 342, 772 N.E.2d 380, 386–87 (2002) (a defendant may not question the legal sufficiency of the evidence against him following a guilty plea). Defendant counters that “both he and his attorney made it clear that [he] was only pleading guilty to driving, not to the sentencing enhancement.” To support his contention, defendant points to discussions that occurred with ...