People v. Blocker

190 Cal.App.4th 438

118 Cal.Rptr.3d 215

10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,709

2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,731

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Carlos Ray BLOCKER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. A126229.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Nov. 23, 2010.

Review Denied March 2, 2011.

Janice Wellborn, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stan Helfman, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Christopher J. Wei, Deputy Attorney General, Masha Dabiza, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

RICHMAN, J.

*440 With certain exceptions, the Penal Code ¹ authorizes a convicted felon to apply for a "certificate of rehabilitation." Carlos Ray Blocker would appear to be an ideal candidate for such a certificate except for one thing—he denies that there was any basis for convicting him in the first place. The decision whether to grant or deny such an application is entrusted to a trial court's discretion. The question presented is whether that discretion is abused with the denial of an applicant who adamantly insists on his innocence. Our answer is no, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

BACKGROUND

In May 1998, a jury found Blocker not guilty of the charge of raping his stepdaughter with a foreign object (§ 289(j)), but guilty of the lesser included charges of assault (§ 240) and battery (§ 242). The jury further found Blocker guilty of two counts of misdemeanor molestation of the stepdaughter (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1)), requiring lifetime registry as a sex offender (§ 290, subd. (c)). A sentence of 18 months in the county jail was imposed but suspended, and Blocker was admitted to three years formal probation. This court affirmed the felony judgment of conviction. ( People v. Blocker (Sept. 17, 2001, A083419) [nonpub. opn.].)

In April 2009, long after Blocker had successfully completed his term of probation, he filed a "Petition For Certificate Of Rehabilitation and Pardon." ² Blocker submitted a number of testimonials attesting to his satisfying the statutory criteria for post-conviction conduct: "The person shall live an honest and upright life, shall conduct himself ... with sobriety and industry, shall exhibit a good moral character, and shall conform to and obey the laws of the land." ( § 4852.05.)

The prosecution opposed the petition, but on a very narrow ground. They informed the trial court: "It appears that petitioner meets the minimum statutory requirements and is otherwise eligible to apply for a certificate. Additionally, the People are mindful of the opinion of the former trial prosecutor and the ... probation report ... both of which are somewhat favorable. However, ... [as] highlighted in the ... probation report and throughout Inspector Hu's investigation, petitioner steadfastly refuses to accept responsibility for having committed the ... offenses. Although he was found not guilty of the most serious offense, he was nevertheless convicted of two counts of misdemeanor child molestation as charged, and sentenced to eighteen months in county jail after trial. In light of those circumstances, we believe defendant's continued insistence on his innocence is, to say the least, troublesome.... [W]e conclude that the petition should be denied, with denial being premised on the idea that no rehabilitation (and certainly no pardon) can occur without accepting responsibility for committing the offense in the first place."

The trial court conducted a brief hearing on Blocker's petition. There was no disagreement**218 that since his conviction Blocker has led a law-abiding and virtually blameless life. The court was not impressed with the argument that the jury's verdict was somehow a compromise decision that perhaps diluted its face value. The court explained to Blocker's counsel why the petition was being denied:

"I think that everything you have said ... is correct about life history before and after this event, but you need to understand that my assumption is that he is guilty of these offenses.... [¶] I am not second guessing a jury verdict, particularly not one where they had the opportunity to deliberate. I am not going to speculate on whether they compromised or whether some imperfection in our system arose ... in a manner which was adverse to Mr. Blocker. [¶] ... And ... the appellate process further served to insure that due process was met in this case as to Mr. Blocker. [¶] So, my conclusion, my assumption today is that he is guilty of those ... charges. The next step is ... that he has steadfastly maintained his innocence. And I have concerns about granting a petition of rehabilitation, pardon, where he doesn't concede that the verdict is valid." The court stated that it agreed with the prosecution that granting the requested relief was inappropriate, given that Blocker "has never accepted responsibility for committing these offenses in the first place."

Defendant perfected this timely appeal from the minute order denying his petition.

DISCUSSION

In 1998, this court held that a petition for certificate of rehabilitation is addressed to the trial court's discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will be overturned only for manifest abuse that results in a miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Lockwood, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 222, 226-227, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 769.) We also noted that recent amendments "reflected the Legislature's obvious intent to apply stricter standards to the application process, and to make it more difficult for ex-felons to receive ... certificates of rehabilitation." ( Id. at p. 226, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 769.) Three years later, our Supreme Court agreed that abuse of discretion was the appropriate standard of review, adding that "[t]he standards for determining whether rehabilitation has occurred are high" and that "there is no circumstance under which the statutory scheme requires or guarantees issuance of a certificate of rehabilitation." ( People v. Ansell, supra, 25 Cal.4th 868, 887-888, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 24 P.3d 1174.)

Because "rehabilitation logically assumes guilt" ( State in Interest of A.L. (App.Div.1994) 271 N.J.Super. 192, 638 A.2d 814, 823), numerous state and federal jurisdictions accept that "a court may properly consider a defendant's refusal to acknowledge guilt when evaluating the defendant's rehabilitation potential because acknowledgement of guilt is a critical first step towards rehabilitation." ( State v. Kellis (App.2010) 148 Idaho 812, 229 P.3d l174, 1177; accord, McComb v. State (2004) 32 Kan.App.2d 1037, 94 P.3d 715, 722 ["[t]he admission of guilt is a necessary step towards rehabilitation"]; State v. Greer (La.App.1990) 572 So.2d 1166, 1171; State v. Warren (1998) 125 Ohio App.3d 298, 708 N.E.2d 288, 295; State v. Tiernan (R.I.1994) 645 A.2d 482, 486; State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz (1998) 219 Wis.2d 615, 579 N.W.2d 698, 715 ["admission of guilt [is] a necessary 'first step towards rehabilitation' of sex offenders"]; Drinkwater v. State (1976) 73 Wis.2d 674, 245 N.W.2d 664, 668 ["recognition of guilt is the first step toward rehabilitation"]; United States v. Derrick (6th Cir.1975) 519 F.2d 1, 4; Gollaher v. United States (9th Cir.1969) 419 F.2d 520, 530) A natural corollary is that "A refusal to admit guilt may be relevant to the question of rehabilitation." ( In re Personal Restraint of Dyer (2008) 164 Wash.2d 274, 189 P.3d 759, 773; accord, People v. Ripley (1997) 291 Ill.App.3d 565, 226 Ill.Dec. 259, 685 N.E.2d 362, 366-367; State v. Bragg (Iowa App.1986) 388 N.W.2d 187, 192; State v. Clegg (S.D.2001) 635 N.W.2d 578, 581; see State v. Amidon (2008) 185 Vt. 1, 967 A.2d 1126, 1137 ["a defendant may ... [seek] to demonstrate his amenability to swift rehabilitation by owning up to guilt and by taking responsibility for his actions"]; State v. Wood (Mo.Ct.App.1984) 668 S.W.2d 172, 175 ["defendant's refusal to admit her guilt bodes ill for her rehabilitation"].)

" 'A pardon proceeds, not upon the theory of innocence, but implies guilt. If there was no guilt, ... there would no basis for pardon.' " ( Lyons v. Goldstein (1943) 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425, 430, quoting Roberts v. State (1899) 160 N.Y. 217, 54 N.E. 678, 679.) Guilt as the predicate for pardon is virtually a judicial truism, one commanding wide acceptance. (E.g., People v. Biggs (1937) 9 Cal.2d 508, 513, 71 P.2d 214; Slater v. Olson (1941) 230 Iowa 1005, 299 N.W. 879, 883; State v. Stern (1941) 210 Minn. 107, 297 N.W. 321, 323; Scott v. Raines (Okla.Crim.App.1962) 373 P.2d 267, 270; Commonwealth v. Smith (1936) 324 Pa. 73, 187 A. 387, 389; State v. Edelstein (1927) 146 Wash. 221, 262 P. 622, 631; Perito v. County of Brooke (2004) 215 W.Va. 178, 597 S.E.2d 311, 320; see Burdick v. United States (1915) 236 U.S. 79, 94, 35 S.Ct. 267, 59 L.Ed. 476 ["a pardon ... carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it"]; State v. Cullen (1942) 14 Wash.2d 105, 127 P.2d 257, 259 [" 'The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong' "]; Williston, Does A Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 Harv. L.Rev. 647, 648 ["Everybody knows that the word 'pardon' naturally connotes guilt as a matter of English."].)

No court has ever dissented from Chief Justice Marshall's statement that "A pardon is an act of grace." ( United States v. Wilson (1833) 32 U.S. 150, 160, 7 Pet. 150, 8 L.Ed. 640; 59 Am.Jur.2d (2002) Pardons and Parole, § 12, p. 19; 67A C.J.S. (2002) Pardons and Parole § 2, p. 5.) A pardon is an act of individual clemency, in the gift of the Governor, to which no person has an entitlement.³ (See **220 Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat (1981) 452 U.S. 458, 465, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158.)

*444 The question of whether to grant Blocker's petition was submitted for the trial court's discretion. The standard test for ascertaining an abuse of that discretion is whether the court's decision exceeded the bounds of reason. (E.g.,...