People v. Brown

14 Cal.App.5th 320

221 Cal.Rptr.3d 854

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Chester Llewell BROWN, Defendant and Appellant.

C078620

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed August 10, 2017

The Law Offices of Janelle Caywood and Janelle E. Caywood, San Francisco, Retained Counsel for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon, Peter W. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Duarte, J.

A jury found defendant Chester Llewell Brown guilty of two counts of human trafficking involving two different victims. During the trial, the jury heard evidence that defendant was essentially pimping minors, in at least one instance against their will.

Proposition 35, the Californians Against Sexual Exploitation Act (sometimes referred to as the CASE Act), adopted by the People at the 2012 General Election, was designed in part to protect trafficked minors by treating them as victims, not criminals, and ensuring they receive services to protect them from exploitation. (See In re M.D. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 993, 998-999, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 761.) Defendant's claims concern the application and certain aspects of this law.

Defendant first notes that D. Doe (D.), the named victim in count two, was treated as his coconspirator for the purpose of introducing hearsay evidence. D. was a 14-year-old prostitute who helped defendant recruit 17-year-old prostitute B. Doe (B.), the named victim in count one, to work for him. D. did not testify, but her statements and texted conversations with defendant were introduced. Defendant argues that because D. was immune from prosecution for trafficking under Proposition 35, she could not have been his coconspirator, and her out-of-court statements therefore constitute inadmissible hearsay. As we will explain, we conclude that D. was properly deemed an uncharged coconspirator for purposes of Evidence Code section 1223, and that Proposition 35 does not compel a ruling to the contrary.

Defendant next contends the human trafficking statute is void for vagueness and duplicates conduct contained in the pandering statute ( Pen. Code, § 266i, subds. (a)(6) and (b)(2) ),¹ which provides for lesser penalties. He claims these duplicative provisions allow for discriminatory enforcement. He adds that Evidence Code section 1161, subdivision (b), which excludes evidence of prior prostitution activity by victims of trafficking, violates various constitutional principles. We shall reject these contentions of error as well, and affirm the judgment.²

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts (see People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58 ), showed that defendant, using D. as his key assistant, induced B. to prostitute herself in Stockton.

Trial Evidence

Stockton Police Officer Wesley Grinder testified as an expert on prostitution. He explained that a "blade" is an area known for heavy streetwalking, and there are blades in Stockton. In addition to advertising by wearing skimpy clothing and waving at passing cars, prostitutes use many Internet sites, on some of which they post pictures of themselves. Often a prostitute is not allowed by her pimp to use phones; those are controlled either by the pimp himself, or by a so-called "bottom bitch," who stays near the working prostitute. These "bottom bitches" act as a pimp's right hand by screening clients. They are loyal, and help insulate the pimp from liability. Isolating prostitutes from the outside world and any support system they may have is a common way to facilitate their compliance.

On the late afternoon of May 25, 2014, Stockton Police Officer Terrance Washington was sent to look into a reported kidnapping, and went to a gas station near the Motel 6 on Plymouth Road. He found a teenage girl (B.) sitting on the ground amidst suitcases, dressed in "short shorts and a low cut halter top," distraught and "crying hysterically." She said she was afraid for her life, wanted to get away from "Chester," and wanted the police to call her father. Washington and other officers waited for "Chester" and arrested defendant when he soon drove by in a car with three female passengers. When stopped and asked his name, defendant said it was "Bakori Newton" and he claimed to be 17 years old. After detaining defendant, Washington spoke to D., one of the females in the car. She was wearing cut-off shorts. Condoms and many credit cards were found in the glove compartment. A book entitled "The 40 Laws of the Game: Pimpology" was found in the trunk, and some of the pages were highlighted. Nearby, Officer Robert Dominguez found a telephone by the car, which rang when Washington dialed the number B. had for defendant. Later, defendant admitted it was his telephone.

B. reported that defendant forced her to create an account on an Internet site; the account showed her in an advertisement for an "escort," gave her location, and had photographs that displayed her breasts and genitalia. Washington researched defendant's telephone number on the Internet and discovered the number was associated with several different websites bearing similar ads. A photograph on one site resembled another one of the females who had been found in defendant's car when it was stopped. B. was 17, and D. was 14. The other girls in the car with defendant were 16 and 14.

Detective Michael George spoke with D. on May 27, 2014, at juvenile hall. On her telephone he found Internet escort advertisements associated with the numbers of D.'s and defendant's telephones. He obtained a warrant to search defendant's telephone. The search revealed photographs—including of B.—depicting prostitution-related activities, such as young females in suggestive poses with telephone numbers to call to arrange meetings.

B. testified she was 17 on May 23, 2014, and had met defendant that March in Antioch. They texted each other and visited once at her cousin's apartment. Defendant told her he was a pimp and told her "how much money you could make, and stuff like that. Kind of persuasive." He assured her he could protect her, but she just considered him a casual friend.

Trial exhibit 56 consisted of 79 pages of mostly redacted texts taken from defendant's telephone—with the subscriber name of "Bakori Brown"—beginning before and lasting until the end of the charged offenses. At times B. was flirtatious with defendant in these texts, and when he asked for naked pictures of her, she complied. On May 12, 2014, he proposed taking her to Stockton over a weekend, to work as a "ho." In further texts, she said she was scared, but he told her it was easy and he would protect her and teach her the trade. Later texts, sent while the two were in Stockton, discussed prices for sexual acts, and the need for B. to keep in touch with defendant when she was on a "date."

On May 23, 2014 (Friday), B. texted defendant, who knew she was only 17, because she had had an argument with her mother and wanted to talk to him. She left her mother's home to go with defendant, who drove her to Stockton. D. was in the car. The three eventually went to a motel. There, while the girls were alone, D. told B. they would walk "the blade" and she would take pictures of B. to post on an Internet escort site.³ B. protested that that was not why she had come with defendant to Stockton, but then defendant came in and said it was a " ‘money weekend’ " and "ya'll going to do this, ya'll going to do that." D. took "exotic pictures" of B. and they were posted on "a call girl website," along with her telephone number. Because nobody called, they got dressed and went out to the streets. Defendant drove both girls to a "ho stroll" at about 9:00 p.m., and during this time D. told B. "what type of person" defendant was, and B. recorded D. on her telephone describing defendant.

Soon a man picked B. up, they had sex in a house, and he paid her $60, the amount defendant had told her to ask for. She gave that money to defendant. She was terrified and felt she had no choice but to comply. After she and D. returned to the motel, defendant accused B. of having had a customer she had not told him about. He told her he should kill her, and that he needed to know everything she was doing at all times. B. and D. strolled again for about an hour, then defendant took them back to a motel. Defendant saw the recording on B.'s telephone, in which D. had described (in apparently negative terms) defendant's "demeanor and what he's about" to B. He and D. argued, and he beat and choked her in front of B. He made D. strip naked and told her to leave that way, claiming everything she had belonged to him. D. left, but returned shortly and stayed.

The next morning (Saturday) the girls got dressed to return to the "blade." B. had another customer, and when it was over again gave defendant the money. That night, while D. was with a customer, defendant forced B. to fellate defendant. He told her that if she told anyone he would beat her worse than he had beaten D. On Sunday morning defendant again asked B. to fellate him, which she did.

When B. asked to go home, defendant's reply was " ‘Some money need[s] to be made before anybody can go anywhere.’ " Another time he said he would "beat [her] ass," and "don't play with me." Two other girls were with them and were depicted in photographs introduced at trial; an officer testified these were the two other girls found in defendant's car.

An incident where a customer offered $200 to let him rape B. caused her particular distress about her situation, although the rape did not occur. Eventually B. called 911. According to the 911 transcript in the record, the accuracy of which the parties do not dispute, B. reported that she had been kidnapped, but then hung up. The dispatcher called back and then B. spoke as if she were speaking to...