People v. Fisher

177 A.D.3d 615

111 N.Y.S.3d 80

PEOPLE of State of New York, Respondent,

v.Joel FISHER, Appellant.

2017–12768

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—May 29, 2019

November 6, 2019

Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (William Kastin of counsel), for appellant.

Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Ruth E. Ross of counsel; Marielle Burnett on the brief), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JEFFREY A. COHEN, BETSY BARROS, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Deborah Dowling, J.), dated May 3, 2018. The order, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6–C.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, without costs or disbursements, and the defendant is designated a level one sex offender.

In July 2014, the defendant was convicted of sexual misconduct ( Penal Law § 130.20[2] ), upon his plea of guilty. When the defendant committed the sex offense, he was 19 years old and the victim was 13 years old. It is undisputed that the victim's lack of consent was solely by reason of inability to consent because of her age.

On the same day the defendant was sentenced, the Supreme Court conducted a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6–C; hereinafter SORA). The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (hereinafter the Board) assessed the defendant a total of 95 points, which, if accepted by the court, would have made him a presumptive level two sex offender. The court deducted the 15 points assessed under risk factor 11 for history of drug or alcohol abuse, thereby reducing the defendant's overall score to 80 points, which score did not alter the defendant's presumptive risk level. The court declined the defendant's request to downwardly depart from the presumptive risk level and designated him a level two sex offender. On appeal, the defendant's sole contention is that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in declining to downwardly depart from the presumptive risk level and designate him a level one sex offender.

A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of "(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [SORA] Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" ( People v. Wyatt, 89 A.D.3d 112, 128, 931 N.Y.S.2d 85 ; see People v. Gillotti, 23 N.Y.3d 841, 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701 ; see also Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006] [hereinafter the Guidelines] ). If the defendant makes that twofold showing, the court must exercise its discretion by weighing the mitigating factor to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of the defendant's dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism (see People v. Gillotti, 23 N.Y.3d at 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701 ; People v. Champagne, 140 A.D.3d 719, 720, 31 N.Y.S.3d 218 ).

In cases of statutory rape, the Board has long recognized that strict...