People v. Gaines

2020 IL 125165

181 N.E.3d 701

450 Ill.Dec. 349

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Keith GAINES, Appellee.

Docket No. 125165

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed September 24, 2020.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Erin M. O'Connell, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Karalis, Deputy Defender, and Amber Hopkins-Reed, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following the trial court's sua sponte vacatur of defendant's negotiated guilty plea in response to several comments made by defendant, defendant was convicted of felony criminal trespass to a residence ( 720 ILCS 5/19-4(a)(2) (West 2014)) and domestic battery (id. § 12-3.2(a)(2)) at a bench trial. The appellate court reversed. Relevant here, the appellate court determined that jeopardy had attached when the circuit court of Will County accepted defendant's guilty plea and that the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the guilty plea sua sponte . Thus, the appellate court held that defendant's subsequent bench trial violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. V ), the Illinois Constitution of 1970 ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10 ), and section 3-4(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) ( 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(3) (West 2014)). Despite defendant's forfeiture of the double jeopardy challenge, the appellate court held that the error was plain and amounted to structural error. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018).

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 After a dispute at his parents' house, defendant was charged with criminal damage to property (count I) ( 720 ILCS 5/21-1(a) (West 2014)), criminal trespass to a residence (count II) (id. § 19-4(a)(2) ), misdemeanor criminal damage to property (count III) (id. § 21-1(a)(1) ), misdemeanor domestic battery (count IV) (id. § 12-3.2(a)(2)), and misdemeanor aggravated assault (count V) (id. § 12-2(c)(1)).

¶ 4 The transcript from defendant's plea hearing reveals the following:

"MS. RABENDA [(ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY)]: Your Honor, as to Mr. Gaines, the State would be recommending if the defendant were to plead to an amended Domestic Battery, Class A Misdemeanor on Count IV and Criminal Damage to Property on Count III.

THE COURT: Are those all Class A misdemeanors?

MS. RABENDA: Yes. 24 months of reporting probation, 158 days, day for day credit for time served, time considered served.

THE COURT: How many days was that, please?

MS. RABENDA: 158. I would make a motion to nolle prosequi all remaining counts and the defendant would attend an anger management program or provide proof of completion thereof.

THE COURT: Okay. If Mr. Dawson and Ms. Crawford, if you would just stand by for a minute.

Mr. Gaines, do you see that document? Is that your signature?

DEFENDANT GAINES: Yes, Sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that by pleading guilty there isn't going to be a trial of any kind in this case. These are all Class A Misdemeanors, the maximum punishment is a fine of up to $2,500 and/or up to 364 days in the Will County Jail.

By pleading guilty you are giving away your right to remain silent by admitting to me that you committed these crimes. You are also giving away your right to a jury trial where 12 people would be selected randomly from the community to determine your guilt or innocence. Once you do that, that right is gone, it's gone forever and you can't get it back.

You heard the Assistant State's Attorney tell me there was a plea agreement in your case. Is what she told me your understanding of the agreement?

DEFENDANT GAINES: Yes, Sir.

THE COURT: You understand I don't have to go along with that, that I can sentence you to anything that the law would allow once you plead guilty?

DEFENDANT GAINES: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Brief statement of facts, Ms. Rabenda?

MS. RABENDA: Your Honor, one other admonishment. I believe that the defendant is on parole for residential burglary.

THE COURT: But you're reducing this to a misdemeanor, right?

MS. RABENDA: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RABENDA: Statement of facts. If called to testify, witnesses for the State would testify that officers met with Latoya [sic ] Gaines who indicated that she had come home and discovered her son, being the defendant, in the house and that he was not welcome there. She ordered him to leave. He did not do so. She went upstairs and when she came back down he was still there. She asked him what he was doing. He grabbed her about the neck. She had difficulty breathing. She tried to call for her husband but the defendant grabbed and broke her phone.

The defendant ran outside and began throwing landscaping bricks at the house windows and screen door. The defendant's father came home and told the defendant to stop. The defendant threw bricks at him but missed. Damage was done to Lee Gaines' Chevrolet Silverado. Windows were broken on the house, the door and there were scratches on LaToya's [sic ] neck.

THE COURT: And you're reducing these to misdemeanors?

MS. RABENDA: Yes, Your Honor. I have had a number of conversations with the named victims in this matter and that was part of their request.

THE COURT: Is that what happened, Mr. Gaines?

DEFENDANT GAINES: Not—no, but I don't want to be in here fighting it. I'd rather—

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me ask you this. If you don't agree that that's what happened, do you think that's what the witnesses would say if they were here?

DEFENDANT GAINES: Yeah.

THE COURT: Show the Court finds that defendant's plea of guilty and his waiver of his right to remain silent and his waiver of his right to a jury trial to be knowing and intelligently entered into and executed in writing, accepted by the Court.

Prior criminal history?

MS. RABENDA: Your Honor, the defendant has a residential burglary from 2012 that he was given four years in [the Department of Corrections]. He's on parole. I believe he has less than a week left on that parole. He has a DUI from 2013 that he received conditional discharge and a theft adjudication of a delinquent minor from 2011. It was a misdemeanor.

THE COURT: Is that accurate, Mr. Phillips?

MR. PHILLIPS [(DEFENSE ATTORNEY)]: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Sir, you have the right to make a statement. Anything you say, I'll take it into account. If on the other hand you don't want to say anything, you don't have to. If you don't say anything I won't hold it against you. Is there anything you want to say?

DEFENDANT GAINES: I know this looks bad—

THE COURT: I'm sorry, what did you say?

DEFENDANT GAINES: I want to say I know it sounds bad in the statement that was given, but if it was to go to trial no one would be coming to court. Or if they did they would say that—

THE COURT: Okay. The plea is rejected. The felonies are reinstated. What day do you want to set this for trial? I won't participate in any 402 conferences in this case."

¶ 5 Defendant did not object.

¶ 6 At the conclusion of defendant's bench trial, defendant was found guilty of felony criminal trespass to a residence (count II) and misdemeanor domestic battery (count IV). The trial court merged the convictions, entered judgment on the criminal trespass count, and imposed a sentence of five years' imprisonment. Defendant did not raise a double jeopardy argument in his posttrial motion.

¶ 7 On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal trespass to a residence and, for the first time, that the trial court's sua sponte vacatur of his guilty plea and subsequent trial on all five counts violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. V ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10 ).

¶ 8 The appellate court determined that the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal trespass to a residence and vacated the conviction. 2019 IL App (3d) 160494, ¶ 22, 433 Ill.Dec. 18, 130 N.E.3d 583. The appellate court also concluded that, because defendant never pled guilty to counts I, II, and V, jeopardy did not attach to those nol-prossed charges and no double jeopardy violation occurred. Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 9 A majority of the appellate court did, however, opt to review whether jeopardy attached to defendant's guilty plea for second-prong plain error. Id. ¶ 27. First, the appellate majority concluded that jeopardy had attached because the trial court had unequivocally accepted defendant's guilty plea. Id. ¶ 30.

¶ 10 Next, the appellate majority considered whether the trial court had improperly terminated the guilty plea proceedings and thus subjected defendant to reprosecution in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Id. ¶ 31. The appellate majority turned to People v. Cabrera , wherein the appellate court explained that, " ‘just as a jury or bench trial may terminate properly, allowing for retrial when, for example, "manifest necessity" compels such an outcome [citation], by implication, if the original guilty plea hearing is terminated properly under Illinois law, a successive prosecution is not barred under section 3-4(a)(3).’ " Id. ¶ 32 (quoting People v. Cabrera , 402 Ill. App. 3d 440, 449, 342 Ill.Dec. 401, 932 N.E.2d 528 (2010) ). The appellate majority then considered when a trial court may sua sponte withdraw its acceptance of a defendant's guilty plea and properly terminate the guilty plea proceeding. Id. ¶ 33. The appellate majority looked to the following passage from this court's decision in People v. Hancasky for guidance:

" ‘[W]e believe it follows that a court may set aside or withdraw a plea of guilty, on its own motion and without the consent of a defendant, in cases where the evidence shows that the defendant is insane, or under some

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