People v. Haggray

172 A.D.3d 1825

99 N.Y.S.3d 721 (Mem)

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Trevaughn HAGGRAY, Appellant.

109188

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: April 22, 2019

Decided and Entered: May 30, 2019

Salvatore Adamo, Albany, for appellant.

Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Mulvey, Devine, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Mulvey, J.Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Sypniewski, J.), rendered December 8, 2016, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in full satisfaction of a 10–count indictment and waived the right to appeal. Prior to sentencing, defendant made an oral motion to withdraw his plea citing ineffective assistance of counsel. County Court denied the motion and sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to nine years in prison, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.

We affirm. Initially, we reject defendant's contention that his waiver of the right to appeal was invalid. The record reflects that County Court advised defendant that an appeal waiver was a condition of the plea agreement and adequately explained the separate and distinct nature of the right to appeal. Defendant also signed a written waiver in open court after discussing it with counsel, and he assured County Court that he understood its ramifications. Under these circumstances, we conclude that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the right to appeal (see People v. Bridge, 166 A.D.3d 1168, 1168–1169, 86 N.Y.S.3d 345 [2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1124, 93 N.Y.S.3d 262, 117 N.E.3d 821 [2018] ; People v. Garcia, 164 A.D.3d 958, 958–959, 77 N.Y.S.3d 912 [2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1003, 86 N.Y.S.3d 762, 111 N.E.3d 1118 [2018] ). As such, defendant's contention that the sentence is harsh and excessive is precluded (see People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006] ; People v. Watkins, 166 A.D.3d 1239, 1240, 88 N.Y.S.3d 281 [2018], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 955, 100 N.Y.S.3d 179, 123 N.E.3d 838 [2019] ).

Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective. "In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation when he or she receives an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt upon the apparent effectiveness of counsel" ( People v. Beekman, 134 A.D.3d 1355, 1356–1357, 22 N.Y.S.3d 619 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 992, 38 N.Y.S.3d 102, 59 N.E.3d 1214 [2016] ; see People v. Griffin, 165 A.D.3d 1316, 1318, 84 N.Y.S.3d 601 [2018] ). Here, the record reflects that counsel pursued appropriate pretrial motions and negotiated an advantageous plea on defendant's behalf that reduced his sentencing exposure. Further, nothing in the record casts doubt upon counsel's effectiveness. Under these circumstances, we find that defendant received meaningful representation (see People v. Beekman, 134 A.D.3d at 1357, 22 N.Y.S.3d 619 ...