People v. Killich (In re Killich)

319 Mich.App. 331

900 N.W.2d 692

IN RE Taylor Anne KILLICH.

People of the State of Michigan, Petitioner–Appellee,

v.Taylor Anne Killich, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 329941

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted January 13, 2017, at Lansing

Decided April 20, 2017, 9:00 a.m.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark Kneisel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Juvenile Justice Clinic (by Frank E. Vandervort and William Nolan (under MCR 8.120(D)(3))) for Taylor A. Killich.

Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Stephens and O'Brien, JJ.

Stephens, J.

Respondent, minor Taylor Anne Killich, appeals as of right the trial court order dismissing a petition against her for poisoning food, drink, medicine, or water supply, MCL 750.436(2)(a), an offense punishable by imprisonment for 15 years, a fine of $10,000, or both, and denying her motion to waive a previously ordered $100 probation supervision fee. We vacate and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed a delinquency-proceedings petition against respondent for violating MCL 750.436(2)(a) after an incident on June 5, 2014. On May 6, 2015, respondent pleaded no contest before a referee. A probationary order was prepared, and respondent was placed on probation for a period of three months. She was ordered to complete 20 hours of community service by August 1, 2015, to participate in a "Victim Awareness" class, and to submit urine screens if requested by her probation officer. Under the proposed order, respondent's probation officer could also impose an additional 20 hours of community service at his or her discretion. The court denied respondent's motion to waive a $100 probation supervision fee.

At the sentencing hearing before the referee, respondent's counsel agreed that probation was an appropriate remedy but objected to the $100 probation supervision fee, citing People v. Juntikka , 310 Mich.App. 306, 871 N.W.2d 555 (2015). Counsel's argument was unsuccessful, and he requested a review hearing before the trial court.

At the September 23, 2015 review hearing, respondent's counsel asserted that respondent completed all probation and community service requirements, but again objected to the $100 probation supervision fee. Respondent's counsel argued that the court did not have statutory authority under the juvenile code, MCL 712A.1 et seq ., to impose a predetermined flat rate fee and that the juvenile code only permitted the court to be reimbursed for individualized costs of probation supervision services extended to individual juveniles.

Petitioner argued that three statutory provisions allowed for the imposition of a probation supervision fee: MCL 712A.18(1)(b), MCL 712A.18(3), and MCL 712A.18(12). Petitioner argued that MCL 712A.18(1)(b) required a juvenile under supervision or probation to pay the minimum state costs prescribed by statute and that as a probationer, respondent was at least required to pay a statutory minimum of $68. Petitioner also argued that MCL 712A.18(3) authorized orders of disposition placing a juvenile in the juvenile's own home to contain a provision for reimbursement by the juvenile to the court for the cost of service. Lastly, petitioner argued that MCL 712A.18(12) stated that if a court entered an order of disposition for a juvenile offense, the court "shall order" the juvenile to pay a statutory assessment defined under MCL 780.905, which, in respondent's case, was a fee of $130. Petitioner maintains the same on appeal.

Petitioner also distinguished Juntikka , arguing the probation fee in that case was impermissible because it was used to purchase general probation department supplies, whereas in the present case, the $100 probation supervision fee went directly to the Washtenaw County General Fund. The court called Donna White, a probation supervisor in the juvenile court, who testified that the probation office charges the same $100 probation supervision fee to all juveniles on probation and that the funds go to the county's General Fund. The court acknowledged that the fee may go to the general fund but affirmed its imposition, stating:

So I do think, because of the mechanism of funding and the allocation it is actually a reimbursement, whether or not the fact it goes to the general fund, whether or not the fact it is a flat albeit extremely minimal fee compared to the true cost; you may be right in that legal analysis. I will leave that to the Court of Appeals to direct us as to where we go but at this stage the motion is denied.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves the interpretation of multiple statutes contained in the juvenile code, MCL 712A.1 et seq . Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo on appeal. In re Tiemann , 297 Mich.App. 250, 257, 823 N.W.2d 440 (2012).

III. ISSUE PRESERVATION

To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be raised before, addressed by, and decided by the lower court. In re TK , 306 Mich.App. 698, 703, 859 N.W.2d 208 (2014). Respondent filed a challenge to the $100 fee and argued against its imposition at the subsequent motion hearing. The court disagreed. Because this issue was raised before, addressed, and decided by the trial court, it is preserved for review.

IV. ANALYSIS

We find, as did the trial court, that local units of government share the costs for juvenile adjudication and supervision, whether in-home or otherwise within the state. Unlike the adult offender, a delinquent juvenile becomes a ward of the state, and we will look to the caselaw and statutes addressing penalties, fines, fees, and costs for adjudication of state offenses under the juvenile code. In Michigan, a court cannot impose penalties or costs in a criminal case unless specifically authorized by statute. People v. Cunningham , 496 Mich. 145, 149–151, 852 N.W.2d 118 (2014). As respondent points out, delinquency proceedings under the juvenile code are not criminal cases. However, when addressing a question implicating the juvenile code, this Court routinely looks to the adult criminal code and cases that interpret it so long as they are not in conflict or duplicative of a juvenile code provision.

In re McDaniel , 186 Mich.App. 696, 698–699, 465 N.W.2d 51 (1991) ; see also In re Carey , 241 Mich.App. 222, 227, 615 N.W.2d 742 (2000) (discussing that juvenile proceedings are not considered adversarial in nature but are still closely analogous to the adversarial criminal process).

When examining the relevant statutory provisions, this Court must interpret statutory language reasonably and in context, keeping in mind the purpose of the statute. McCahan v. Brennan , 492 Mich. 730, 739, 822 N.W.2d 747 (2012). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. People v. Gardner , 482 Mich. 41, 50, 753 N.W.2d 78 (2008). If the meaning of statutory language is clear, judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. In re Receivership of 11910 South Francis Rd. , 492 Mich. 208, 222, 821 N.W.2d 503 (2012).

Petitioner asserts here, as it did in the trial court, that there is statutory authority for upholding the fee. Petitioner first contends that the $100 probation supervision fee is authorized by MCL 712A.18(1)(b). We disagree. MCL 712A.18(1)(b) allows a court to enter an order of disposition placing a juvenile under probation or supervision. In pertinent part, MCL 712A.18(1)(b) specifically states that "[t]he court also shall order, as a condition of probation or supervision, that the juvenile shall pay the minimum state cost prescribed by section 18m of this chapter." MCL 712A.18m(1)(a) instructs that

[i]f a juvenile is within the court's jurisdiction ... and is ordered to pay any combination of fines, costs, restitution, assessments, or payments arising out of the same juvenile proceeding, the court shall order the juvenile to pay costs of not less than ... $68.00, if the juvenile is found to be within the court's jurisdiction for a felony.

MCL 712A.18m(5)(a) defines felony as "a violation of a penal law of this state for which the offender may be punished by imprisonment for more than 1 year or an offense expressly designated by law to be a felony."

The language of MCL 712A.18(1)(b) is plain, and the intent is clear. It authorizes the court to order a juvenile within its jurisdiction to pay the minimum state cost of not less than $68 for a felony. The offense of which respondent was found guilty, MCL 750.436(2)(a), was a felony under MCL 712A.18m(5)(a) because it carried with it a term of imprisonment for more than one year. Accordingly, respondent must pay the minimum state cost of $68; however, contrary to petitioner's understanding, MCL 712A.18(1)(b) does not authorize the $100 probation supervision fee.

Petitioner next contends that the $100 probation supervision fee is authorized by MCL 712A.18(12). Again, we disagree. MCL 712A.18(12) states that "[i]f the court enters an order of disposition based on an act that is a juvenile offense as defined in section 1 of 1989 PA 196, MCL 780.901, the court shall order the juvenile to pay the assessment as provided in that act." MCL 780.901(f) defines juvenile offense as "an offense committed by a juvenile under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court or the family division of circuit court ... that if committed by an adult would be a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation...." Again, respondent stands convicted of an offense that would be an adult felony. Therefore, the lower court was required to order respondent to pay the assessment provided in MCL 780.905(3).

MCL 780.905(3) states: "The court shall order each juvenile for whom the court enters an order of disposition for a juvenile offense to pay an assessment of $25.00.

The court shall order a juvenile to pay only 1 assessment under this subsection per case." This $25 assessment "shall be used to pay for crime victim's rights services." MCL 780.905(4)....