People v. Legoo

2020 IL 124965

178 N.E.3d 1110

449 Ill.Dec. 259

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Patrick A. LEGOO, Appellant.

Docket No. 124965

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed June 18, 2020

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona and Thomas A. Karalis, Deputy Defenders, and Jay Wiegman, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Patrick A. Legoo, was convicted of being a child sex offender in a public park in violation of section 11-9.4-1(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) ( 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b) (West 2016)). On appeal, defendant contended his conviction must be reversed because an exception to criminal liability contained in section 11-9.3(a-10) of the Code ( 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a-10) (West 2016)), allowing a child sex offender to be present in a public park when accompanied by his own child, should be read into section 11-9.4-1(b). The appellate court rejected defendant's contention and affirmed his conviction. 2019 IL App (3d) 160667, 431 Ill.Dec. 621, 127 N.E.3d 1154. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged in the circuit court of La Salle County with the misdemeanor offense of being a child sex offender in a public park ( 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b) (West 2016)). At his bench trial, Mendota Police Department detective sergeant David Lawson testified that he was attending his grandson's T-ball game at Strouss Park in Mendota when he saw defendant in the park. Lawson was familiar with defendant from prior contacts and believed he was a registered sex offender. After observing defendant ride his bicycle through an area between three baseball diamonds, Lawson called the Mendota Police Department to report defendant's presence in the park.

¶ 4 Officer Kevin Corrigan testified that he went to defendant's residence later that night. When asked about his presence in the park, defendant stated he went there to look for his son. The State also submitted a certified copy of defendant's 2006 conviction of criminal sexual abuse.

¶ 5 After the State rested, defendant's son, C.G., testified that he was watching a baseball game in the park when defendant arrived and told him to go home. C.G. testified that he refused to leave because he wanted to watch the rest of the baseball game. Defendant then left the park.

¶ 6 Defendant testified that he rode his bicycle to the park looking for C.G. Defendant found him sitting on the bleachers watching a baseball game with a girl. Defendant told C.G. to come home because it was getting late. C.G. replied that he would come home after the game. After telling C.G. that he would be in trouble if he did not come home, defendant left the park. Defendant testified that his fiancée was out of town and no one else was available to retrieve C.G. from the park that night. Defendant testified that he spent less than five minutes in the park.

¶ 7 Following the close of evidence, defendant's attorney argued that it was a necessity for defendant to go into the park to get his son. Counsel argued no one else was available to retrieve defendant's son that night. Defense counsel also claimed that the statutes prohibiting the presence of child sex offenders in public parks were in conflict because section 11-9.4-1(b) did not include the exception to criminal liability contained in section 11-9.3(a-10).

¶ 8 The trial court rejected defendant's necessity defense, stating it was not applicable to these facts. The court then observed that section 11-9.3(a-10) of the Code ( 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a-10) (West 2016)), providing for a felony offense, permits a child sex offender to be present in a public park and communicate with a child under 18 years of age if the offender's minor child is also present in the park. The misdemeanor statutory provision at issue, however, strictly forbids child sex offenders from being present in public parks. The trial court commented, "[a]pparently, one, you just can't be in the park. The second one, if you want to get away from the felony, you can approach, but only if it's a kid. That's ridiculous, but it's the way it is." The trial court, therefore, found defendant guilty of the charged offense. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 30 days in jail and 2 years' conditional discharge. The trial court stayed execution of the sentence pending appeal.

¶ 9 On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction should be reversed because the exception contained in section 11-9.3(a-10) must be read into section 11-9.4-1(b). 2019 IL App (3d) 160667, ¶ 8, 431 Ill.Dec. 621, 127 N.E.3d 1154. The appellate court acknowledged a certain amount of "overlap" between the two statutes but maintained that they also have important differences, including in the offenders they apply to, the conduct prohibited, and the applicable penalties. 2019 IL App (3d) 160667, ¶ 13, 431 Ill.Dec. 621, 127 N.E.3d 1154. The appellate court concluded that, "[w]hile this statutory scheme may not be the cleanest means of achieving its desired end, there is no reason to read the exception from section 11-9.3(a-10) into section 11-9.4-1(b) as [defendant] requests." 2019 IL App (3d) 160667, ¶ 13, 431 Ill.Dec. 621, 127 N.E.3d 1154. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed defendant's conviction. 2019 IL App (3d) 160667, ¶ 16, 431 Ill.Dec. 621, 127 N.E.3d 1154.

¶ 10 We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018).

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal to this court, defendant renews his claim that the exception to criminal liability contained in section 11-9.3(a-10) must be read into section 11-9.4-1(b). According to defendant, the statutory scheme and history evince a legislative intent to include the exception from section 11-9.3(a-10) in section 11-9.4-1(b), despite the legislature not explicitly providing for any exception to liability in section 11-9.4-1(b). Defendant further argues that, if the exception is not included in section 11-9.4-1(b), the provision is unconstitutional because it violates the fundamental right of parents to raise and care for their children. Defendant, therefore, concludes that this court should read the exception into section 11-9.4-1(b) both as a matter of statutory construction and to avoid finding the statute unconstitutional.

¶ 13 The State responds that the plain language of section 11-9.4-1(b) does not contain any exception to criminal liability for offenders when their children are present. Rather, the plain language of the statute reflects the legislature's clear intent to impose a flat ban on the presence of child sex offenders in public parks. The legislature did not simply forget to include the exception in section 11-9.4-1(b). The State also maintains that defendant has not cited any precedent holding that the constitutional right of parents to raise and care for their children necessarily includes taking their children to a public park.

¶ 14 The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Pearse , 2017 IL 121072, ¶ 41, 417 Ill.Dec. 674, 89 N.E.3d 322. The best indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. In re Hernandez , 2020 IL 124661, ¶ 18, 443 Ill.Dec. 11, 161 N.E.3d 135. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply it as written without resort to aids of statutory construction. People v. Williams , 2016 IL 118375, ¶ 15, 400 Ill.Dec. 11, 47 N.E.3d 976. We may not depart from the plain language and meaning of a statute by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. People v. Dupree , 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 31, 429 Ill.Dec. 398, 124 N.E.3d 908. The construction of a statute is reviewed de novo . People v. Manning , 2018 IL 122081, ¶ 16, 425 Ill.Dec. 490, 115 N.E.3d 45.

¶ 15 In this case, defendant was convicted of violating section 11-9.4-1(b) of the Code. Section 11-9.4-1(b) states:

"It is unlawful for a sexual predator or a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any public park building or on real property comprising any public park." 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b) (West 2016).

An initial violation of section 11-9.4-1 is a Class A misdemeanor, and a second or subsequent violation is a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(d) (West 2016).

¶ 16 We recently construed section 11-9.4-1(b) in People v. Pepitone , 2018 IL 122034, 423 Ill.Dec. 816, 106 N.E.3d 984. In that case, the defendant was charged with violating section 11-9.4-1(b) after he was found walking his dog in a public park.

Pepitone , 2018 IL 122034, ¶ 4, 423 Ill.Dec. 816, 106 N.E.3d 984. The defendant was convicted of the offense and contended on appeal that the statute was facially unconstitutional on due process grounds. Pepitone , 2018 IL 122034, ¶ 13, 423 Ill.Dec. 816, 106 N.E.3d 984.

¶ 17 In rejecting the defendant's argument on that issue, this court construed the plain language of section 11-9-4.1(b), concluding "[t]he statute, then, completely bars sex offenders who have targeted children from public parks." Pepitone , 2018 IL 122034, ¶ 18, 423 Ill.Dec. 816, 106 N.E.3d 984. We explained that the statute "makes the status of the defendant an element of the offense" and prohibits a convicted child sex offender's knowing presence in a public park. Pepitone , 2018 IL 122034, ¶ 26, 423 Ill.Dec. 816, 106 N.E.3d 984.

¶ 18 The plain language of section 11-9.4-1(b) does not contain any express exception. Rather, as we held in Pepitone , the statutory language imposes a flat ban on certain sex offenders being present in public parks.

¶ 19 Defendant, nonetheless, contends...