People v. Mauricio

2021 IL App (2d) 190619

186 N.E.3d 547

452 Ill.Dec. 823

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Hector M. MAURICIO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-19-0619

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Opinion filed August 6, 2021

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Vicki P. Kouros, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Jamie L. Mosser, State's Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Miles J. Keleher, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 After pleading guilty to two counts of first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2010)) defendant, Hector M. Mauricio, was sentenced to 55 years in prison. Defendant directly appeals from his sentence, arguing that his 55-year sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and, alternatively, that his sentence is excessive. We determine that it is neither unconstitutional nor excessive. Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In the early morning hours of May 29, 2007, defendant, then age 20, was arrested outside the home of the 83-year-old victim, Roscoe Ebey.¹ After entering the home, police discovered Ebey's body on the floor of his bedroom. An autopsy report later identified that Ebey sustained 79 total injuries, including 74 knife wounds and a postmortem burn.

¶ 4 On September 9, 2010, several days before his trial was scheduled to begin, defendant pled guilty, unconditionally, to two charges of first degree murder. In the subsequent sentencing hearing, the circuit court declined to impose natural life or an extended-term sentence and instead sentenced defendant to 60 years in prison.

¶ 5 On appeal, we determined that the circuit court based the 60-year sentence, in part, on Ebey's personal traits, which was an improper aggravating factor. People v. Mauricio , 2014 IL App (2d) 121340, ¶ 20, 380 Ill.Dec. 20, 7 N.E.3d 883. We held that the record did not demonstrate that the trial court's consideration of this improper factor did not lead to a greater sentence. Id. ¶ 21. Thus, we vacated the 60-year sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing, with all proper factors to be weighed anew. Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 6 At a multi-day resentencing hearing, the State presented evidence in aggravation, including testimony from 15 witnesses and transcripts of 3 witnesses who had testified at the previous sentencing hearing. Defense counsel presented evidence in mitigation, including testimony from seven witnesses and transcripts of two witnesses from the previous sentencing hearing.

¶ 7 Dr. James Garbarino, an expert in developmental psychology who had been retained for defendant's original sentencing hearing, was again retained for the resentencing hearing. After interviewing defendant and reviewing defendant's personal and criminal history, Dr. Garbarino prepared a report for the court and testified for the defense at the resentencing hearing. Dr. Garbarino particularly focused on defendant's traumatic childhood experiences and how those experiences may have impacted defendant.

¶ 8 The court heard defendant's statement in allocution and arguments from both sides as to whether defendant's acts constituted "exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty," which would make him eligible for a natural life or extended-term sentence. In closing arguments, the State asserted that defendant's history of prior delinquency was an aggravating factor, noting that it was "not a minor history" and that "two prior sentences to the Illinois Department of Corrections [were] not enough to get [defendant] to change his ways." The State further argued that there was no evidence to support the contention that "the character and attitudes of the [d]efendant indicate that he's unlikely to commit another crime." Defense counsel emphasized defendant's relative youth and rehabilitative potential, referring to him several times as a "20-year-old boy" at the time of the offense and arguing that he could someday become a productive member of society.

¶ 9 Before sentencing defendant, the court stated:

"[T]he Court has considered all of the admitted exhibits, testimony and evidence heard during this multi-day sentencing hearing including the written transcripts ***. The Court has considered all of the information contained in the PSI and its attachments, including the victim impact statements of [Ebey's family]. The Court has considered [defendant's] statement in allocution and the arguments made by Counsel and the case law relied upon by Counsel. The Court has considered the financial impact and cost of incarceration.

The Court finds no applicable statutory factors in mitigation. Nonstatutory factors in mitigation the Court finds applicable are that [defendant] was raised in what Dr. Garbarino terms an urban war zone with an alcoholic mother and with no father or male role model present. His father is a convicted murderer, the eldest brother being the victim of the father, and [defendant's] older brother is a convicted violent felon. Further, this Court finds mitigating [defendant's] alcohol abuse, that he has admitted his guilt and has expressed remorse in this case, that he has obtained his GED and that he appears to be continuing to work on himself while he has been incarcerated.

The Court finds that the statutory factors in aggravation that apply are Paragraphs 3 [defendant's prior delinquency or criminal activity], 7 [the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime] and 8 [defendant committed the offense against a person 60 years of age or older].

Further, the Court finds that [defendant's] acts constitute exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty with 79 overall injuries to Mr. [Ebey] coupled with the lack of provocation and total senseless nature of this murder."

The court then identified the sentencing range before sentencing defendant to 55 years in prison, with credit for all the time he already served.

¶ 10 Following the resentencing, defendant filed a motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment and/or reconsider his sentence. The circuit court denied the motion, and defendant timely appealed. This court summarily remanded the appeal for a valid Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) certificate. Following the remand, defendant filed an amended motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment and/or reconsider his sentence. The circuit court denied that motion, stating that the judge who had issued the 55 year sentence had "properly considered both aggravating and mitigating factors, statutory and nonstatutory, when sentencing *** defendant" and that it found "no basis to reconsider *** defendant's sentence." Defendant's appeal of this decision is before us now.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Defendant raises two issues in the present appeal. First, defendant argues that his sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Second, and alternatively, he argues that his sentence is excessive. We address each issue in turn.

¶ 13 A. Defendant's Constitutional Challenges

¶ 14 Defendant first contends that his sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him. An as-applied constitutional challenge to a sentence is a legal question that is reviewed de novo. People v. Johnson , 2018 IL App (1st) 140725, ¶ 97, 423 Ill.Dec. 452, 105 N.E.3d 860.

¶ 15 In People v. Harris , 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 38, 427 Ill.Dec. 833, 120 N.E.3d 900, our supreme court explained that an as-applied challenge requires a showing that the law is unconstitutional as it applies to the specific facts and circumstances of the challenging party. "All as-applied constitutional challenges are, by definition, dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of the person raising the challenge." Id. ¶ 39. It is therefore paramount that the record is sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review. Id.

¶ 16 Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise these constitutional challenges in the court below, but he argues that, in the interests of judicial economy, this court should waive forfeiture of the claims because there is a sufficiently developed record. In addition, defendant notes that his amended motion to reconsider the sentence argued that the 55-year sentence "did not reflect a consideration of [defendant's] rehabilitative potential," which "makes the same basic point" as his constitutional challenges. In response, the State initially argues that this court should decline to consider the as-applied constitutional challenge because defendant did not raise the challenge in the circuit court. In the alternative, the State argues that the record on appeal is sufficiently developed for this court to reject the constitutional challenges outright. Because the record before us is sufficiently developed with the necessary facts and circumstances for our review, we will waive forfeiture and address the merits of defendant's claims.

¶ 17 Defendant first argues that his sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, as construed by Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). He specifically argues that recent changes to statutes and case law support his position that a young adult may challenge a sentence under Miller . We disagree.

¶ 18 In Miller , the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for offenders who were under the age of 18 at...