People v. Ricardo P. (In re Ricardo P.)

7 Cal.5th 1113

446 P.3d 747

251 Cal.Rptr.3d 104

IN RE RICARDO P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Ricardo P., Defendant and Appellant.

S230923

Supreme Court of California.

August 15, 2019

As Modified August 28, 2019

Megan Hailey-Dunsheath, Berkeley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Nicole A. Ozer, Matthew T. Cagle, Christopher J. Conley; Peter Bibring ; David Loy, Oxnard; Lee Tien, San Francisco, Jennifer Lynch and Jamie Williams for ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties and Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

L. Richard Braucher, Richmond; East Bay Community Law Center and Kate Weisburd for Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Donna M. Provenzano and Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

In People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 ( Lent ), we held that "a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." ( Id. at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.) In this case, juvenile defendant Ricardo P. was placed on probation after admitting two counts of felony burglary. As a condition of his probation, the juvenile court required Ricardo to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices, including any electronic accounts that could be accessed through these devices. Although there was no indication Ricardo used an electronic device in connection with the burglaries, the court imposed the condition in order to monitor his compliance with separate conditions prohibiting him from using or possessing illegal drugs.

Ricardo challenged the electronics search condition as invalid under Lent and unconstitutionally overbroad. Although the Court of Appeal agreed that the condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and should be narrowed for that reason, it held the condition was permissible under Lent because it "is reasonably related to enhancing the effective supervision of a probationer" and thus serves to prevent future criminality. In so holding, the court recognized that its decision conflicted with other decisions holding identical search conditions under similar circumstances invalid under Lent .

We granted review to decide whether an electronics search condition like the one at issue here is " ‘reasonably related to future criminality.’ " ( Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.) We hold that the record here, which contains no indication that Ricardo had used or will use electronic devices in connection with drugs or any illegal activity, is insufficient to justify the substantial burdens imposed by this electronics search condition. The probation condition is not reasonably related to future criminality and is therefore invalid under Lent .

I.

In September 2014, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 seeking to declare Ricardo a ward of the court. The petition alleged that Ricardo, along with his two adult cousins, committed two felony burglaries in San Jose earlier that year. According to the petition, Ricardo and his cousins were seen entering a house; when a resident entered through the front door, they fled through the back door without taking anything. A few hours later, they entered a different house in San Jose, broke a glass door, and stole costume jewelry worth about $200.

Ricardo admitted the allegations in the petition, and the case was transferred to the Alameda County juvenile court. In December 2014, Ricardo was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation. The juvenile court imposed various probation conditions, including drug testing, prohibitions on using illegal drugs and alcohol, and prohibitions on associating with people whom Ricardo knew to use or possess illegal drugs. Ricardo objected to the drug-related conditions, noting that "there’s no indication there were any drugs associated with this crime." Dismissing the objection, the court cited the probation report, which stated that Ricardo had told a probation officer that "he wasn’t thinking" when he committed the offense and that "he stopped smoking marijuana after his arrest because he felt that [it] did not allow him to think clearly."

One of the probation conditions requires Ricardo to "[s]ubmit ... electronics including passwords under [his] control to search by Probation Officer or peace office[r] with or without a search warrant at any time of day or night." Ricardo challenged this condition, arguing that it "is not reasonably related to the crime or preventing future crime." The court said: "I think the law is very clear that [such a condition] is appropriate ... particularly [for] minors or people that are [Ricardo’s] age. I find that minors typically will brag about their marijuana usage or drug usage, particularly their marijuana usage, by posting on the Internet, showing pictures of themselves with paraphernalia, or smoking marijuana. It’s a very important part of being able to monitor drug usage and particularly marijuana usage." Based on Ricardo’s statements that "he wasn’t thinking" when he committed the offense and that smoking marijuana "did not allow him to think clearly," the court found that Ricardo "himself has made reference to the fact that marijuana was involved in the commission of this offense."

Ricardo appealed from the juvenile court’s order imposing probation, arguing among other things that the electronics search condition is unreasonable under Lent and unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court of Appeal rejected Ricardo’s argument that the condition runs afoul of Lent . The court "agree[d] with Ricardo that there is nothing in the record permitting an inference that electronics played a role in his crimes." But the court reasoned that the electronics search condition "is reasonably related to enabling the effective supervision of Ricardo’s compliance with his other probation conditions," namely, the various drug-related conditions. While the court apparently "share[d] some of Ricardo’s skepticism about the prevalence of minors’ boasting on the Internet about marijuana use," it declined to reject the juvenile court’s findings as "speculative." The court acknowledged that its decision conflicted with a recent decision by a different division of the same Court of Appeal, In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919, which held that an essentially identical electronics search condition was not "reasonably related to future criminal activity" and thus invalid under Lent . ( Erica R. , at p. 913, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919.)

At the same time, the Court of Appeal held that the electronics search condition is overbroad since it "does not limit the types of data on or accessible through his cell phone that may be searched" in light of the "juvenile court’s stated purpose ... to permit monitoring of Ricardo’s involvement with illegal drugs." Because the condition is "insufficiently tailored to its purpose of rehabilitating Ricardo in particular," the court struck the condition and remanded for the juvenile court to impose "a narrower condition if it wishes." The court suggested that a probation condition that "limit[ed] searches of Ricardo’s cell phone and other devices to electronic information that is reasonably likely to reveal whether Ricardo is boasting about his drug use or activity, such as text and voicemail messages, photographs, e-mails, and social media accounts," would be constitutional.

We granted review, limited to the question whether the electronics search condition imposed by the juvenile court satisfies Lent .

II.

"The purposes of juvenile wardship proceedings are twofold: to treat and rehabilitate the delinquent minor, and to protect the public from criminal conduct." ( In re Jose C. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 534, 555, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 674, 198 P.3d 1087.) To those ends, a juvenile court may order a ward under its jurisdiction to probation. ( Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 727, 730, subd. (a).) Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b), the court "may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." "The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions," but "[a] probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad." ( In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889, 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282 ( Sheena K. ).) "A condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court." ( In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19, 169 Cal.Rptr. 625.) On appeal, we " ‘review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.’ " ( People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 491, 376 P.3d 617 ( Moran ).) Specifically, we review a probation condition "for an indication that the condition is ‘arbitrary or capricious’ or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances." ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 384, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1 ( Olguin ).)

In Lent , we held that "a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself...