People v. Steward

20 Cal.App.5th 407

228 Cal.Rptr.3d 877

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.William Jason STEWARD, Defendant and Appellant.

A148242

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Filed February 9, 2018

Jeremy Price, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Beverra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Amit A. Kurlekar and Huy T. Luong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SIMONS, J.

A person serving a prison sentence for multiple felony convictions obtains a reduction to a misdemeanor of one of those convictions pursuant to Proposition 47 ( Pen. Code, § 1170.18 ).¹ Following resentencing, the person's custody credits exceed the newly imposed term of imprisonment. May the trial court apply the excess credits to reduce the duration of the person's postrelease community supervision (PRCS)? In this case, the trial court concluded it had this authority and reduced defendant William Jason Steward's period of PRCS. We agree and affirm.²

BACKGROUND

In August 2007, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of nine years four months for felony possession of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11377 ), felony failure to appear (§ 1320.5), and enhancements.³ The sentence on the possession charge was the principal term, and the sentence on the failure to appear conviction was the subordinate term.

In February 2015, the trial court granted defendant's petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47 ( § 1170.18, subd. (a) ). The court reduced defendant's possession conviction to a misdemeanor and resentenced him to an aggregate term of eight years in state prison on the failure to appear conviction and enhancements, to run concurrently with a 180-day sentence on the possession conviction. The court exercised its discretion to waive the one-year parole term following a Proposition 47 resentencing ( § 1170.18, subd. (d) ). Because defendant had more than eight years of custody credits, he was released from prison shortly after the resentencing.

Upon his release, he was placed on PRCS. (§ 3451, subd. (a).)

In April 2015, the probation department filed a petition to revoke defendant's PRCS for failure to report to the probation department following his release. The trial court summarily revoked PRCS and issued a warrant for defendant's arrest. Defendant subsequently admitted violating the terms of his PRCS. The trial court sentenced him to time served and reinstated PRCS.

During the revocation proceedings, defendant argued that his PRCS term should be reduced by excess custody credits resulting from his Proposition 47 resentencing. The trial court agreed and reduced the three-year PRCS term by the amount of excess credits, although it rejected defendant's proposed method for calculating the credits. Defendant appealed from this order.⁴

DISCUSSION

In response to our request for briefing on this issue, the People contend the trial court erred by applying the excess custody credits resulting from defendant's Proposition 47 resentencing to reduce his PRCS period.⁵ We first determine the governing law and then consider whether that law provides that excess custody credits reduce a period of PRCS.

" ‘When construing a statute, we must "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." ’ [Citation.] ‘[W]e begin with the words of a statute and give these words their ordinary meaning.’ [Citation.] ‘If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, then we need go no further.’ [Citation.] If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, we may consider ‘a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.’ [Citation.] Using these extrinsic aids, we ‘select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ " ( People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 211–212, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 47 P.3d 629.) " ‘In interpreting a voter initiative ..., we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction.’ " ( Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951.)

I. Generally Applicable Sentencing Procedures Govern the Application of Excess Custody Credits Resulting from a Proposition 47 Resentencing to PRCS

Because Proposition 47 does not mention PRCS, we distinguish Morales and conclude generally applicable sentencing procedures guide our resolution of the issue before us.

" ‘On November 4, 2014, the voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act ....’ [Citation.] ‘Proposition 47 makes certain drug-and theft-related offenses misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by certain ineligible defendants. These offenses had previously been designated as either felonies or wobblers (crimes that can be punished as either felonies or misdemeanors).’ [Citation.] [¶] Proposition 47 also added section 1170.18, concerning persons currently serving a sentence for a conviction of a crime that the proposition reduced to a misdemeanor. It permits such a person to ‘petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing in accordance with’ specified sections that ‘have been amended or added by this act.’ ( § 1170.18, subd. (a).) If the trial court finds that the person meets the criteria of subdivision (a), it must recall the sentence and resentence the person to a misdemeanor, ‘unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’ (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).)" ( Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 404, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592.)

Defendant relies on generally applicable statutes governing presentence custody credits, primarily section 2900.5, to defend the trial court's ruling. Under section 2900.5, a defendant's presentence custody credits "shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment," which includes, as relevant here, "any period of imprisonment and parole ...." (§ 2900.5, subds. (a) & (c).) In Morales , supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 405–406, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592, our Supreme Court rejected the contention that section 2900.5 governed the application of excess custody credits resulting from a Proposition 47 resentencing to any one-year parole term imposed and based that ruling on the specific parole language in the proposition: "A person who is resentenced pursuant to [Proposition 47] shall be given credit for time served and shall be subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence , unless the court, in its discretion, as part of its resentencing order, releases the person from parole." ( § 1170.18, subd. (d), italics added.) The court noted "[t]he legislative purpose behind section 2900.5 ‘appears to have been to eliminate the unequal treatment suffered by indigent defendants who, because of their inability to post bail, served a longer overall confinement than their wealthier counterparts.’ " ( Morales, at p. 405, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592.) The court reasoned that, while the two provisions were "comparable," "section 2900.5 says far more than does section 1170.18." ( Id. at p. 405, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592.) Specifically, "section 2900.5 states two things relevant here: (1) the person is entitled to credit for time served, and (2) the credit can reduce or eliminate the period of parole. Section 1170.18, subdivision (d), states the first of these but not the second. Instead, it states the person is to receive credit for time served and is subject to parole." ( Id. at p. 406, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592.) The court concluded section 2900.5 did not govern the issue: "Because the proposition the voters were considering expressed the first part but not the second part of section 2900.5's rule, and the purpose behind that rule is irrelevant to resentencing under Proposition 47, no reason appears to assume the voters believed the proposition would include what it did not state, namely that credit for time served could reduce the period of parole." ( Morales, at p. 406, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592.) Instead, the court considered the language, purpose, and history of Proposition 47 (including a statement in the official ballot pamphlet that " ‘[o]ffenders who are resentenced would be required to be on state parole for one year, unless the judge chooses to remove that requirement’ ") to conclude that custody credits resulting from a Proposition 47 resentencing do not reduce the one-year period of parole required by the proposition. ( Id . at pp. 406–408, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592.)

Unlike the one-year parole term at issue in Morales , which is expressly provided for in Proposition 47 ( § 1170.18, subd. (d) ), the proposition makes no mention of PRCS. Indeed, following many Proposition 47 resentencings, a defendant will not be subject to PRCS because "PRCS applies only to felony convictions. (§§ 3450, subd. (b)(5), 3451, subd. (a).) There is no PRCS for misdemeanors." ( People v. Elizalde (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1065, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 811 ; accord, People v. Pinon (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 956, 965, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 787 ( Pinon ) ["misdemeanor offenders do not serve parole or PRCS after completing a term in jail"].) Thus, courts have found PRCS inapplicable for defendants who had a felony sentence reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47. ( Elizalde, at p. 1065, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 811 ["once [the defendant's] Proposition 47 petition is...