People v. Tacardon

14 Cal.5th 235

521 P.3d 563

302 Cal.Rptr.3d 374

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Leon William TACARDON, Defendant and Respondent.

S264219

Supreme Court of California.

December 29, 2022

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Christopher J. Rench, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Paul Kleven, Berkeley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

A sheriff's deputy patrolling after dark saw three people sitting in a legally parked car in a residential neighborhood, smoking something. He pulled up behind the car, illuminated it with a spotlight, and approached on foot. We granted review to examine the significance of the deputy's use of a spotlight in this circumstance. We conclude that shining a spotlight for illumination does not ipso facto constitute a detention under the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the proper inquiry requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the use of a spotlight.

I. BACKGROUND

Sheriff's Deputy Joel Grubb testified to the following facts at the preliminary hearing, where defendant Leon William Tacardon first moved to suppress evidence.

On a March evening, around 8:45 p.m., in a residential Stockton neighborhood, Grubb was on patrol in a marked car. The area was known for narcotics sales and weapons possession. While patrolling, Grubb had both his headlights and high beams on for "extra visibility." He drove past a BMW legally parked in front of a residence, in the vicinity of a streetlight. The car's engine and headlights were off; smoke emanated from slightly open windows. He saw three people inside and made eye contact with the occupants as he drove past them. Grubb made a U-turn, parked about 15 to 20 feet behind the BMW, and turned on his spotlight. He did not activate his siren or emergency lights or issue any commands to the car's occupants. He sat in his patrol car for 15 to 20 seconds while he informed dispatch of his location. He then approached the BMW at a walking pace. He did not draw a weapon.

As the deputy approached, a woman sitting in the backseat "jumped out" of the BMW, closing the door behind her. The deputy testified that "[i]t was very quick and kind of abrupt the way that she opened the door and quickly stepped out. I felt it was unusual." She walked towards the back of the BMW, and Grubb asked her what she was doing. She responded, "I live here." Concerned for his safety, the deputy directed the woman to stand near the sidewalk behind the BMW where he could see her. He spoke in a calm and moderate voice and did not draw a weapon. The woman complied.

Grubb continued to walk toward the car. As he came within a few feet of the BMW, he smelled marijuana smoke coming from inside. The car's rear windows were tinted. Even with the spotlight on, Grubb had to use a flashlight to illuminate the car's interior. He could see one large and two smaller clear plastic bags on the rear passenger floorboard. They contained a green leafy substance.

Tacardon sat in the driver's seat. Upon request, both he and the front seat passenger identified themselves. Only the passenger produced identification. After Grubb saw a partially burned, hand-rolled cigarette in the center console, he asked Tacardon about that item and the leafy substance in the bags. Asked whether he was on probation or parole, Tacardon said he was on probation. The discussion lasted two to three minutes.

Telling Tacardon to remain seated, Grubb returned to his patrol car. A records search confirmed that Tacardon was on probation with a search condition. After additional officers arrived, the deputy placed Tacardon in the back of the patrol car and searched the BMW. He seized the three plastic bags in the backseat and a vial containing 76 pills. A search incident to arrest revealed that Tacardon carried $1,904 in cash. Laboratory analysis confirmed that the bags contained 696 grams of marijuana, and the pills were hydrocodone. The amount of drugs, their presence in a car, and the accompanying cash were factors consistent with possession for sale.

Tacardon was charged with possession for sale of hydrocodone and marijuana. ( Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11359, subd. (b).) At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate denied Tacardon's motion to suppress the evidence ( Pen. Code, § 1538.5 ) and held him to answer. The magistrate reasoned: "it was a police contact .... [I]n other words, he didn't stop the defendant. There certainly was a point at which the defendant wasn't free to go but that still would not preclude it being characterized as a contact." The deputy's observation of a large quantity of what appeared to be marijuana in plain view in the back of the car justified further investigation.

Tacardon renewed his motion to suppress in conjunction with a motion to dismiss the information. ( Pen. Code, §§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(B), 1538.5, subds. (i), (m) ; People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 896–897, 150 Cal.Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706 ; People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 528–529, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 422.) Based on the preliminary hearing record, the superior court granted the motion and dismissed the charges. The court held that Deputy Grubb engaged in a consensual encounter when he initially pulled behind Tacardon's car and turned on his spotlight. But his detention of the female passenger effectuated a detention of Tacardon.

The Court of Appeal reversed. It agreed with the superior court that Grubb's position behind Tacardon's car, spotlight illumination, and approach on foot did not "manifest a sufficient show of police authority to constitute a detention." ( People v. Tacardon (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 89, 99, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 193 ( Tacardon ).) The court noted that the deputy did not block defendant's car, use his emergency lights, or immediately and aggressively question Tacardon. ( Id . at pp. 98–99, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 193.) It concluded: "Simply put, although a person whose vehicle is illuminated by police spotlights at night may well feel he or she is ‘the object of official scrutiny, such directed scrutiny does not amount to a detention.’ " ( Id . at pp. 99–100, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, quoting People v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1496, 260 Cal.Rptr. 172 ( Perez ).) However, it rejected the superior court's conclusion that Grubb's interaction with the female passenger transformed the encounter with Tacardon into a detention. It reasoned that there was "no evidence [Tacardon] observed the deputy's interaction with [the passenger], or that the deputy conveyed to defendant that he, like [his passenger], was required to remain." ( Tacardon , at p. 100, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 193.)

In analyzing the deputy's initial approach, the Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with People v. Kidd (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 12, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 ( Kidd ), which found an unlawful detention on similar facts. In Kidd , a patrolling officer saw two men parked on a residential street with the car's fog lights on at 1:30 in the morning. ( Id . at p. 15, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 234.) He drove past the car, made a U-turn, and parked 10 feet behind the vehicle. The officer shined two spotlights on the parked car and approached on foot. ( Id . at p. 16, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 234.) The appellate court found that Kidd, who was in the driver's seat, was detained when the officer pulled up behind the parked car and turned on the patrol car's spotlights. ( Id . at pp. 21–22, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 234.) The court observed: "motorists are trained to yield immediately when a law enforcement vehicle pulls in behind them and turns on its lights. Regardless of the color of the lights the officer turned on, a reasonable person in Kidd's circumstances ‘would expect that if he drove off, the officer would respond by following with red light on and siren sounding ....’ " ( Id . at p. 21, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 234, quoting People v. Bailey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 402, 406, 222 Cal.Rptr. 235 ( Bailey ).) The court further observed that "any ambiguity was removed when the officer more or less immediately exited his patrol vehicle and began to approach Kidd's car. Although the officer's approach was, according to record, not made in a particularly aggressive or intimidating manner, a reasonable person in Kidd's circumstances would not have felt free to leave." ( Kidd , at pp. 21–22, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 234.)

We granted review to resolve this conflict in the Courts of Appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

The outcome here turns on the distinction between a consensual encounter and a detention.

Deputy Grubb did not stop the car. It was already parked on the street when he saw it. Officers can approach people on the street and engage them in consensual conversation. ( People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 583, 353 P.3d 305 ( Brown ).) So merely walking up to someone in a parked car is not a detention. The issue presented is whether there are additional circumstances, the totality of which transformed the encounter into a detention.

"An officer may approach a person in a public place and ask if the person is willing to answer questions. If the person voluntarily answers, those responses, and the officer's observations, are admissible in a criminal prosecution. [Citations.] Such consensual encounters present no constitutional concerns and do not require justification. [Citation.] However, ‘when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,’ the officer effects a seizure of that person, which must be justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Citations.] In situations involving a show of authority, a person is seized ‘if "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free ...