Quiles–Santiago v. Rodriguez–Diaz

851 F.Supp.2d 411

Adalberto QUILES–SANTIAGO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Carmen G. RODRIGUEZ–DIAZ, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 11–1269 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

April 2, 2012.

Carlos Del–Valle–Cruz, Rivera & Assoc., Isabela, PR, Eileen Landron–Guardiola, Luis A. Rodriguez–Munoz, Eduardo A. Vera–Ramirez, Landron & Vera LLP, Guaynabo, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Idza Diaz–Rivera, P.R. Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendants Carmen G. Rodriguez–Diaz's (“Rodriguez–Diaz”), Cesar E. Caminero–Ramos' (“Caminero–Ramos”), Hector R. Malave–Rodriguez's (“Malave–Rodriguez”), and Pedro Vazquez–Montañez's (“Vazquez–Montañez”) motion to dismiss the case on Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity grounds, and for failure to state a claim. (Docket No. 9.) For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds but GRANTED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Background

On March 16, 2011, plaintiffs Adalberto Quiles–Santiago (“Quiles–Santiago”) and Santos Calixto–Rodriguez (“Calixto–Rodriguez”) filed a complaint alleging political discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”). They allege three constitutional violations associated with their employment: political discrimination pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, deprivation of a property interest without due process of law pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments, and the denial of equal protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 80.) They are suing defendants in their individual capacities for damages. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 81.) They are also requesting injunctive relief against defendants to order the “reinstatement of their respective career positions” and to prohibit the defendants from political discrimination. Id. In addition, plaintiffs Quiles–Santiago, Calixto–Rodriguez, and their respective spouses and conjugal partnerships assert in the complaint that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over their Commonwealth law claims. ¹

On August 29, 2011, defendants Rodriguez–Diaz, Malave–Rodriguez, and Vazquez–Montañez filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). On September 19, 2011, all plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss.² (Docket No. 9.) On November18, 2011, defendant Caminero–Ramos filed a motion to join in defendants' motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 17.) On the same date, the Court granted defendant Caminero–Ramos' motion for joinder.

II. Factual Background

In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege the following facts:

Plaintiffs Quiles–Santiago and Calixto–Rodriguez are employees of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Fire Department (“the Fire Department”). (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 1.) They both hold the rank of “Captain” and are members of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”). (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 1.) Both plaintiffs were appointed to their trust positions ³ during the PDP administration. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 16 and 49.) Plaintiff Calixto–Rodriguez returned to his career position ⁴ when the NPP administration took over the Fire Department. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 51.)

Defendant Rodriguez–Diaz is the Chief of the Fire Department. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 10.) Defendant Vazquez–Montañez is the Assistant Chief of Extinguishing at the Fire Department. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 11.) Defendant Malave–Rodriguez is the Interim Director of Human Resources of the Fire Department. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 12.) Defendant Cesar Caminero–Ramos is a Commander and the Zone Chief for the Ponce District of the Fire Department. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 13.) All of the defendants are members of the New Progressive Party (“NPP”). (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 10–13.)

A. Facts Relating to Plaintiff Quiles–Santiago

On January 13, 2010, defendant Caminero–Ramos created a position called in Spanish the “Sub–Director” ⁵ for the Ponce Special Operations area and appointed an NPP supporter, Lieutenant Roberto Irizarry–Rodriguez (“Irizarry–Rodriguez”) to assume this position. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 28–29.) This position did not exist before this date. Id. On the same date, defendant Caminero–Ramos implemented a work schedule for plaintiff Quiles–Santiago, who was the Director of the Ponce Special Operations area at the time. Id. This action was “unprecedented” for someone of Quiles–Santiago's level in the Fire Department. Id.

On March 17, 2010, defendant Caminero–Ramos started a series of actions “to persecute, discriminate, marginalize and remove the duties of Quiles–Santiago because of his political affiliation to the PDP.” (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 30.) Quiles–Santiago spoke with defendant Vazquez–Montañez about how his conditions were “substantially inferior to the norm, unreasonable and unnecessary.” (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 32.) Defendant Vazquez–Montañez replied “you should stay calm because you could lose your position.” Id. Quiles–Santiago asked him for “one reason that was not political” and defendant Vazquez–Montañez did not respond. Id.

Examples of discriminatory actions taken by defendant Caminero–Ramos include his requesting the key to the firefighter's dormitory, (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 31), his ignoring a letter that Quiles–Santiago sent regarding situations of insubordination by Lieutenant Irizarry–Rodriguez, (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 33–34), and his approving a change in schedule without consulting Quiles–Santiago, (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 36). Defendant Caminero–Ramos, along with defendant Rodriguez–Diaz, ignored Quiles–Santiago's request to meet about his letter concerning Lieutenant Irizarry–Rodriguez's insubordination. Both defendants Caminero–Ramos and Rodriguez–Diaz assigned Quiles–Santiago to cover the vacations of other employees during the summer of 2010. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 40, 42.) Furthermore, the Fire Department took away Quiles–Santiago's assigned official vehicle; he is the only Director of Special Operations that does not have an official vehicle assigned to him. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 45.)

On June 25, 2010, Quiles–Santiago was “stripped from his position and differential,” and Lieutenant Irizarry–Rodriguez was given the position instead. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 37.) On July 12, 2010, Quiles–Santiago requested a copy of his transfer letter and defendant Malave–Rodriguez, the Interim Director of Human Resources, responded via telephone and said that the document does not exist. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 43.)

B. Facts Relating to Plaintiff Calixto–Rodriguez

On June 25, 2010, defendant Rodriguez–Diaz transferred plaintiff Calixto–Rodriguez without allowing him to appeal the decision. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 53–54.) Defendant Caminero–Ramos sent training schedules directly to the secretary and did not send them to plaintiff Calixto–Rodriguez even though protocol required him to do so. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 60.) Defendant Caminero–Ramos also assigned some of plaintiff Calixto–Rodriguez's tasks to other people. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 60.) In the fall of 2010, plaintiff Calixto–Rodriguez was assigned to cover the shifts of other employees workers while they were on vacation. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 62.) Furthermore, “all communications that should be generated” by plaintiff Calixto–Rodriguez are now prepared by a different commander. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 68.)

III. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) allows the Court to dismiss a complaint when it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a “court must view the facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom ...” R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara–Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir.2006). “[A]n adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim.” Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2011). When faced with a motion to dismiss, “[a] plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action.” Id. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Any “[n]on-conclusory factual allegations[sic] in the complaint [,however,] must ... be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951). Where those factual allegations “ ‘allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). Furthermore, a court may not “attempt to forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; ‘a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if ... a recovery is very remote and unlikely’ ”. Id. at 13 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). The relevant inquiry, therefore, “focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint.” Id. at 13.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court will base its determination solely on the material submitted as part of the complaint or central to it. Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir.1988). Generally, “a court may not consider documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment.” Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001). “When ... a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to—and admittedly dependent upon—a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), [however,] that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Beddall...