Quint v. Comm'r of Corr.

211 Conn.App. 27

271 A.3d 681

Richard QUINT

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 44162

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 16, 2021

Officially released March 1, 2022

Justine F. Miller, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state's attorney, and Cornelius Kelly, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Prescott, Suarez and Bishop, Js.

BISHOP, J.

In this certified appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner, Richard Quint, claims that the court improperly concluded that his trial counsel rendered effective assistance. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the record establishes that his counsel failed (1) to meaningfully communicate the state's plea offer and (2) to ensure that the petitioner would receive presentence jail credit for the time that he was incarcerated between his March 17, 2017 sentencing in the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden (Meriden) and his April 10, 2017 sentencing in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield (Bridgeport).¹ We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On February 10, 2017, in the Superior Court in Bridgeport, the petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine² to multiple criminal charges, including (1) one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a, (2) one count of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of General Statutes § 54-252, and (3) two counts of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a) (1). During the plea canvass, the court questioned the petitioner and his counsel, Attorney Michael Hillis, as to the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of the petitioner's pleas.³ The court informed the petitioner that if he was convicted after a trial, he faced a possible maximum sentence of seven and one-half years of imprisonment, followed by five years of probation and potential fines.

The court found that the petitioner's pleas were knowing and voluntary, accepted the pleas, and scheduled his sentencing for March 3, 2017. The sentencing date was postponed to March 17, 2017, to allow for a hearing concerning the state's seizure of the petitioner's money as a result of the criminal charges.

On March 3, 2017, the petitioner entered a plea under the Alford doctrine in the Superior Court in Meriden on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a).⁴ The court imposed a total effective sentence of one year to serve, and the court stayed the execution of the sentence until March 17, 2017—the scheduled sentencing date for the petitioner's matters in the Superior Court in Bridgeport. On March 17, 2017, the Superior Court in Meriden lifted the stay, imposing the mandatory minimum sentence of one year to serve; however, the petitioner was not sentenced for the matters in the Superior Court in Bridgeport on this date as originally scheduled because Hillis had requested that the sentencing be continued until April 10, 2017.⁵

The sentencing hearing in the Superior Court in Bridgeport took place on April 10, 2017. At the hearing, the state and the petitioner agreed to split the seized money, each taking $434. With respect to the charge of failure to register as a sex offender, the court imposed a sentence of five years of incarceration, execution suspended after one year and three years of probation.

With respect to each of the two charges of possession of narcotics, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of one year of incarceration. With respect to the charge of operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of six months of incarceration. The total effective sentence imposed was five years of incarceration, execution suspended after one year, with three years of probation. Hillis requested that the court indicate on the mittimus that the petitioner should be entitled to jail credit on his sentences dating back to December 22, 2016, the date he was incarcerated for these charges.

Immediately as the court began to announce the sentence, the petitioner indicated for the first time that he thought that the offense of operating under the influence had been nolled at the plea proceeding on February 10. The court and Hillis indicated that the petitioner was incorrect as that charge was not nolled. Hillis twice asked the petitioner whether the petitioner wanted him to ask the court to vacate the plea and the sentence, to which the petitioner declined.

On May 2, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland. On December 14, 2018, the petitioner filed an amended petition asserting claims related to the Bridgeport convictions, that Hillis (1) failed to meaningfully explain the plea offer to the petitioner, (2) failed to adequately advise the petitioner of the charges encompassed in the plea offer, (3) failed to ensure that the petitioner understood the consequences of the guilty plea, (4) failed to seek a sentencing date that would minimize or eliminate the petitioner's "dead time,"⁶ (5) failed to adequately request jail credit at sentencing, and (6) improperly pressured the petitioner to accept the plea offer. After an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance in the underlying criminal proceedings constituted deficient performance or that he suffered prejudice and denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court's ruling, which the court granted on February 28, 2020. This appeal followed.

In this certified appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in concluding that he had failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We are not persuaded.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review and decisional law that guide our analysis of the petitioner's claims. "When reviewing the decision of a habeas court, the facts found by the habeas court may not be disturbed unless the findings were clearly erroneous. ... The issue, however, of [w]hether the representation [that] a defendant received at trial was constitutionally inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington , [466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) ]. As such, that question requires plenary review by this court unfettered by the clearly erroneous standard. ... Under the Strickland test, when a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, he must establish that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance. ... Furthermore, because a successful petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, failure to satisfy either prong is fatal to a habeas petition. ...

"To satisfy the first prong, that his counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner must establish that his counsel made errors so serious that [counsel] was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the [petitioner] by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. ... The petitioner must thus show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering all of the circumstances. ... [A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. [ Id. at] 689 . Furthermore, the right to counsel is not the right to perfect counsel." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peterson v. Commissioner of Correction , 142 Conn. App. 267, 271–72, 67 A.3d 293 (2013).

I

The petitioner first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to meaningfully explain the state's plea offer. Specifically, the petitioner claims that his trial counsel should have advised him of the strength of the state's evidence, the elements of the offenses, potential defenses, the chances of acquittal, and the petitioner's total effective exposure had he proceeded to trial. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, contends that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and argues that the petitioner's challenge to the habeas court's ruling is based on the erroneous premise that the court credited the petitioner's own testimony in support of each of his claims. The record supports the respondent's argument.

"To determine whether trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether the petitioner was therefore prejudiced, we must consider the nature of the underlying claim. ... Although there had been some debate about whether the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel applies to the rejection of a plea offer by the government, it is now well settled that a criminal defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the acceptance or rejection of a plea offer." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Peterson v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 142 Conn. App. at 272, 67 A.3d 293.

"[C]ounsel must communicate to the defendant the terms of the plea offer ... and should usually inform the...