Rhodes v. Arc of Madison Cnty., Inc.

920 F.Supp.2d 1202

Sheba RHODES, Plaintiff,

v.The ARC OF MADISON COUNTY, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. CV–11–S–1215–NE.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Northeastern Division.

Jan. 25, 2013.

Michael E. Auffenorde, Auffenorde & Auffenorde PC, Huntsville, AL, for Plaintiff.

David J. Canupp, J.R. Brooks, Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

C. LYNWOOD SMITH, JR., District Judge.

Plaintiff, Sheba Rhodes, asserts claims against defendant, The Arc of Madison County, Inc., for wrongful termination in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”), and for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention in violation of state law. This action is before the court on three motions filed by defendant: i.e., a motion for summary judgment; a motion to strike portions of plaintiff's response in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment; and a motion to strike portions of the affidavit of Constance Jones.¹ Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and evidentiary submissions, the motion to strike portions of plaintiff's response will be granted in part and denied in part, the motion to strike portions of Jones's affidavit will be granted, and the motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 indicates that summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (alteration supplied).

In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

[However,] [t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable [factfinder] to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) ( en banc ) (internal citations omitted) (alterations and emphasis supplied).

II. SUMMARY OF FACTS

A. Plaintiff's Employment as an Instructor at The Arc

Plaintiff, Sheba Rhodes, was employed by defendant, The Arc of Madison County, Inc. (“The Arc”), as an instructor in a day program for adults with intellectual disabilities and developmental delays from July 12, 2006 to August 12, 2010.² Prior to her employment at The Arc, plaintiff worked at “Volunteers of America” and “Ability Plus,” two organizations that served the needs of the mentally disabled.³

During her two-year term at Volunteers of America, plaintiff was supervised by Program Director Kertrina Sharperson, who eventually left that organization and became Program Coordinator for defendant.⁴ While Sharperson testified that she voluntarily resigned from Volunteers of America because she was getting a divorce and having medical issues,⁵ plaintiff alleged that Sharperson was forced to resign because she engaged in theft and Social Security fraud.⁶ Before hiring Sharperson, defendant conducted a background check, and found no cause for concern.⁷

Regardless of Sharperson's reasons for leaving Volunteers of America, when she assumed the position of Program Coordinator for defendant, she encouraged plaintiff to apply for employment.⁸ Plaintiff submitted an application on June 16, 2006, was interviewed by Qualified Mental Retardation Professional (“QMRP”) David Lane, and hired as an aide on July 12 of the same year.⁹ Upon the recommendation of Sharperson, and with the approval of defendant's Executive Director, Susan Klingel, plaintiff was then promoted to instructor, and trained by QMRPs Lane and Ann Finley.¹⁰

While working as an instructor in defendant's day program, plaintiff's regular duties included feeding and changing the soiled undergarments of clients with intellectual disabilities and developmental delays, as well as “teaching them everyday functions of life.” ¹¹ Despite the fact that the State of Alabama generally requires a ratio of one instructor to four clients, plaintiff had eight or nine students and one or two aides at any time.¹² In any event, plaintiff was ultimately responsible for the conditions in her classroom.¹³

During her time as an instructor, plaintiff was supervised by QMRPs Lane and Finley and Program Coordinator Sharperson: Lane and Finley reported to Sharperson, who, in turn, reported to Executive Director Klingel.¹⁴ As a staff member in the day program, plaintiff also interacted with Medicaid Program Coordinator Roslyn Bridges, who ran the program and investigated allegations of client abuse, neglect, and mistreatment when assigned to do so by Klingel.¹⁵

Plaintiff and Program Coordinator Sharperson had a falling out in 2006 or 2007.¹⁶ After defendant hired plaintiff's former supervisor, Yolanda Watkins (who is no longer employed at The Arc), plaintiff alleges that Watkins developed an intimate relationship with her and also Sharperson.¹⁷ Watkins allegedly “convinced [Sharperson] somehow that [plaintiff] was a bad employee, [that she] wasn't doing what [she] was supposed to do[,] [and that she] was running behind [Sharperson].” ¹⁸

Eventually, plaintiff ended her intimate relationship with Yolanda Watkins because she knew that Watkins also was intimately involved with Program Coordinator Sharperson, and because she was hesitant to jeopardize her employment with defendant.¹⁹ Thereupon, plaintiff alleges that Watkins launched a campaign of sexual harassment against plaintiff, but that Sharperson believed that plaintiff was sexually harassing Watkins.²⁰ Sharperson then called plaintiff into her office, where she and plaintiff exchanged words, and Sharperson threatened to fire plaintiff if she did not “leave [Watkins] alone.” ²¹

As a result of their conflict over Watkins, plaintiff alleges that Program Coordinator Sharperson “harassed [her] and tried to get [her] fired.” ²² However, plaintiff did not report the harassment to either Executive Director Klingel or Medicaid Program Coordinator Bridges.²³ By way of explanation, plaintiff alleged that complaining to Klingel or Bridges was “like talking to that wall over there,” ²⁴ because “[n]othing gets done.” ²⁵ However, plaintiff admitted that she did not have any personal experience with the effectiveness of defendant's reporting processes. ²⁶

Program Coordinator Sharperson denied that she harassed plaintiff, that she believed that plaintiff should be terminated, or that she urged Executive Director Klingel to do so.²⁷ For her part, Klingel denied that she was aware of problems between Sharperson and plaintiff.²⁸

B. Plaintiff's Request for FMLA Leave and Eventual Termination

In 2008, and again in 2009, well before the events giving rise to this action, plaintiff took leaves of absence from her employment with defendant under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”), “and no one gave [her a] hard time about [it].” ²⁹

Plaintiff told Program Coordinator Kertrina Sharperson that she was planning to request FMLA leave once again in June of 2010, this time for gallbladder and hernia repair surgery.³⁰ Plaintiff submitted her third request for FMLA leave on June 30, 2010, received her FMLA request packet on July 1, 2010, and obtained a certification of having a serious health condition from her physician on July 6 of the same year.³¹ Plaintiff then faxed the paperwork and received defendant's approval on July 12, 2010 to begin her leave on August 16 of the same year.³²

During her deposition, plaintiff testified that, around the time she was gathering her paperwork to request FMLA leave, Program Coordinator Sharperson told plaintiff and plaintiff's supervisor, QMRP Ann Finley, that she did not want plaintiff to have the surgeries because “it was too many people trying to take FMLA [leave]. And [plaintiff had] already taken FMLA [leave] twice and [she] was taking it again. [Sharperson] was tired of folks asking for FMLA [leave].” ³³ Sharperson denied making those statements.³⁴

On August 5, 2010, less than two weeks before her scheduled FMLA leave, plaintiffwas suspended, pending an investigation of a coworker's allegations that she had abused a client.³⁵ One week later, defendant gave plaintiff a termination notice stating that:

Following an investigation, it has been determined that you failed to implement the approved behavior program for an individual. Your failure to comply with established behavior strategy steps was neglectful and had a detrimental effect on the individual. Your employment is terminated as of today.³⁶

C. The Job Duties of an Instructor in the Day Program

In order to understand the alleged reasons for plaintiff's termination, one must understand the job duties of an instructor in the day program.

1. The day program

Defendant is a non-profit corporation that serves individuals of all ages who have intellectual disabilities and developmental delays.³⁷ In addition to offering a residential group home, critical life skills training, and job support and supervision for individuals within the community, defendant provides a day program for adults that places clients in a classroom with a trained instructor for five hours a day, five...