Rorke v. Toyota

399 F.Supp.3d 258

Kim RORKE, Plaintiff,

v.Aubrey Alexander TOYOTA and Michael Andretta, Defendants.

No. 4:16-CV-00219

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed July 10, 2019

W. Charles Sipio, Kolman Law P.C., Penndel, PA, Wayne A. Ely, Richboro, PA, for Plaintiff.

Dean F. Piermattei, Todd J. Shill, John Richard Martin, Lindsey E. Snavely, Pillar Aught LLC, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Matthew W. Brann, United States District Judge

I. BACKGROUND

When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, President Lyndon B. Johnson said at its signing: "This Civil Rights Act is a challenge to all of us to go to work in our communities and our States, in our homes and in our hearts, to eliminate the last vestiges of injustice in our beloved country." The purpose of "Title VII is [ ] to help ensure equality in the workplace by removing barriers that have yielded systematic inequality in that setting."¹ Fifty-five years after Title VII was enacted, this Court is faced with a high-level manager who was making near daily gratuitous sexual and misogynistic comments to his underlings at the auto dealership location he managed, and business owners who, a jury may well find, allowed him to continue these acts unheeded.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, Kim Rorke, hereinafter "Rorke," has invoked her rights under Title VII by filing a three-count employment discrimination complaint against her former employer, Aubrey Alexander Toyota, and against the general manager of the automobile dealership, Michael Andretta, hereinafter "Andretta." Discovery has concluded, and Defendants jointly filed a motion for summary judgment asking that final judgment be entered in their favor on all counts. The motion is now ripe for disposition; for the reasons that follow, it is denied.

A. Standard of Review

I begin my analysis with the standard of review which undergirds summary judgment. "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose."² Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."³ "Facts that could alter the outcome are ‘material facts,’ and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct."⁴ "A defendant meets this standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff's case."⁵ "A plaintiff, on the other hand, must point to admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie case under applicable substantive law."⁶

"The inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits."⁷ Thus, "if the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented."⁸ "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."⁹ "The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks ... ‘whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ "¹⁰ The evidentiary record at trial, by rule, will typically never surpass that which was compiled during the course of discovery.

"A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."¹¹ "Regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied."¹²

Where the movant properly supports his motion, the nonmoving party, to avoid summary judgment, must answer by setting forth "genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."¹³ For movants and nonmovants alike, the assertion "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" must be supported by: (i) "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" that go beyond "mere allegations"; (ii) "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute"; or (iii) "showing ... that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."¹⁴

"When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.’ "¹⁵ Moreover, "if a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion."¹⁶ On a motion for summary judgment, "the court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record."¹⁷

Finally, "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."¹⁸ "There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party."¹⁹ "If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."²⁰

B. Undisputed Facts²¹

With that standard outlining the Court's framework for review, I now turn to the undisputed facts of this matter. Kim Rorke was employed as a sales consultant for Aubrey Alexander Toyota for almost six years.²² Rorke testified that her "job went smoothly" during the tenure of her previous manager, John Broome. During that time she "enjoyed going to work every day," "didn't feel any pressure," "didn't feel any stress," was generally "happy to go to work."²³

1. General Manager Mike Andretta

However, when Defendant Michael "Mike" Andretta became the general manager, things changed for Rorke. She had heard rumors²⁴ that Andretta would join Aubrey Alexander Toyota as the general manager and she testified that although "we didn't know was what was going to happen, [ ] he was known to be kind of a jerk in the community."²⁵ She knew him to be a "bold [ ] bully."²⁶

She further testified that "after he was there a couple months, that's when he started turning into the jerk, the power, the ego ... it was almost like he was bipolar or something."²⁷ In describing Andretta's aggressive behavior, she explained that he would use sexual language, referring to both male and female sales consultants, calling them "assclowns"²⁸ and "dickheads"²⁹ snapping at them to "grow a set of balls."³⁰ He would also frequently use expletives in his directives saying things such as: "I run this fucking place."³¹ "Which one of you fucking assclowns did this?"³² "Did I tell you [that] you could go the fuck home?"³³ "Wake the fuck up."³⁴ "What the fuck is wrong with you?"³⁵ In the presence of an African-American employee, he described an employee as "nigger rich."³⁶ He would also describe one employee's attire as "retarded."³⁷ Not only did Andretta use aggressive language, Rorke also witnessed Andretta physically "pick [another employee, Dennis Christiana] up by the shirt and just thr[o]w him out the door."³⁸

She further testified that Andretta was "obsessed" with discussing the sex lives of the male employees. She testified, "He had a thing about talking about everybody's sex life. Don't ask me why, but he loved to do that in the morning meetings."³⁹ She felt like Andretta was "trying to live" through a male employee, Rick Shover, asking the gentleman "whose house are you sleeping at tonight, your wife's or your girlfriend's?"⁴⁰

Andretta would use the acronym, ‘POTP,’ which Rorke initially did not understand.⁴¹ She testified that Andretta was the only male at the dealership who would use the phrase ‘POTP.’⁴² Rorke testified that one time she was waiting behind another sales person, Matt Burd, to talk to Andretta, who said to Burd, "Well I can tell you what's wrong down there, there's too much POTP."⁴³ At that point, Rorke didn't know the meaning, of ‘POTP,’ so she asked Andretta what it meant, and she testified that "he looked at me and said, ‘Don't worry, you have plenty of it.’ "⁴⁴ She later asked another sales person, Chad Scholl what it meant, and Scholl initially did not want to explain the meaning to her. He ultimately told her it meant ‘power of the pussy.’⁴⁵

She continued her testimony lamenting, "That was the most humiliating moment of my life ... I was embarrassed. And [Andretta] used that term quite often then afterwards."⁴⁶ After this incident, she heard him use the term ‘POTP’ several times, but she estimated it was less than ten times.⁴⁷

Andretta would often make misogynistic, inappropriate comments about or toward females, including calling them "Toots."⁴⁸ He described his own wife, and another employee, Bryan Sage's wife as "crazy bitches."⁴⁹ He told another female employee that she looked "like a hooker."⁵⁰ He...