S.M. v. City of New York

S.M., a minor, by her next friend, ALISON KING, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK and GOOD SHEPHERD SERVICES, Defendants.

No. 20-CV-5164 (JPO)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 26, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge.

S.M., a minor in the foster care system, brings suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the City of New York (“the City”) and Good Shepherd Services (“Good Shepherd”). S.M. claims her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (“AACWA”) were violated when she was held for five months in the City's custody at a Good Shepherd facility. S.M. also brings several claims under New York state law. The City and Good Shepherd move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The Court heard oral argument on the pending motions on June 17, 2021. For the reasons that follow Defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

The following facts, drawn from the operative complaint, are presumed true for the purposes of this motion. (See Dkt. No. 25 (“FAC”).)

S.M., a minor, was thirteen years old when the events at issue in this case began. (FAC ¶ 1.) The City had custody of S.M. for a portion of 2019 through the Administration for Children's Services (“ACS”), a foster services agency. (Id.) Good Shepherd, a not-for-profit corporation that contracts with ACS to offer foster care services, operates Euphrasian, the mental health facility where S.M. was held. (FAC ¶ 10.)

In April 2019, S.M. entered ACS custody following reports of sexual abuse at her home. (FAC ¶¶ 24-26.) On April 7, S.M. was transferred to Euphrasian. (FAC ¶ 29.) Euphrasian is a “diagnostic facility . . . for female adolescents requiring supervision because of mental illness, violent behavior, criminal records, or other similar issues.” (FAC ¶ 30.) Euphrasian is not intended to be a long-term housing facility, but rather is for “short-term stays of female adolescents in crisis before they are placed in an appropriate long-term situation.” (Id.) Nevertheless, due to Defendants' practice of assigning foster placements based on the availability of spots in various care settings, not based on a child's needs, S.M. was “indefinitely warehoused]” at Euphrasian. (FAC ¶ 36.) Indeed, S.M. was held at the facility for five months, four of which came after a psychological evaluation conducted by Good Shepherd staff recommended that S.M. be removed from Euphrasian and sent to a therapeutic foster home. (FAC ¶ 35.)

At Euphrasian, S.M.'s freedom of movement was limited. (FAC ¶¶ 31, 60.) Her education suffered since she was unable to attend her school in person and conditions at the facility made remote learning difficult. (FAC ¶¶ 45-49.) S.M.'s access to therapy was also interrupted and she was bullied, harassed, and threatened by other residents, to the point that she was removed from the general population on several occasions. (FAC ¶¶ 40, 55-59.) S.M. raised these various issues with her ACS caseworker and Good Shepherd staff, but her placement at Euphrasian was maintained. (FAC ¶ 41.)

S.M.'s mental health was directly damaged by her time at Euphrasian: She has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and suffers from nightmares, anxiety, and phobias related to her stay. (FAC ¶ 66-67.) Furthermore, the stay at Euphrasian created second-order stressors for S.M., as she was isolated from friends and relatives (only one friend could see her) and fell behind in school. (FAC ¶ 63-64.)

S.M. brings this action seeking damages for the harms she suffered while inappropriately placed at Euphrasian. She alleges that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, including her right to be free of unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into her emotional well-being. Additionally, S.M. alleges that Defendants deprived her of a written case plan of the type to which AACWA entitles her. Finally, S.M. alleges that she was deprived of the type of foster care to which she is entitled under New York law and that Defendants negligently placed and supervised her at Euphrasian.

II. Standard of Review

A plaintiff facing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, the Court “must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Doe v. Indyke, 457 F.Supp.3d 278, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2014)).

In reaching a decision on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider “any written instrument attached to [the complaint] as an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are integral to the complaint.” Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). However, those are the only materials outside of the complaint that the Court may consider. Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007).

III. Discussion

Defendants advance several arguments in favor of dismissing S.M.'s claims: (1) that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction in this case; (2) that the Section 1983 claims should be dismissed because no individual defendant is named; (3) that S.M. has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants had a “policy or custom” of depriving patients of their rights; (4) that Good Shepherd is not a “state actor” that can be held liable under Section 1983; (5) that the conduct S.M. alleges does not plausibly rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation; (6) that AACWA does not grant a private right of action; and (7) that the Court should either decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims or dismiss them outright. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The only federal court with jurisdiction to review state-court judgments is the Supreme Court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Therefore, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, inferior federal courts must “abstain from considering claims when four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiff's federal suit commenced.” McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2010). S.M.'s allegations do not satisfy these criteria. S.M. claims that Defendants violated her rights after the New York Family Court placed her in their care. (FAC ¶ 6.) The injuries she alleges were caused not by the court's judgment, but by those responsible for her at Euphrasian. (See, e.g., Comp. ¶¶ 22, 66.) Moreover, S.M. is not seeking a review of the judgment placing her into ACS's care, so she is not seeking district court review of a previously entered state court judgement. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable here.

B. Lack of Individual Defendants

Pursuant to Section 1983, “every person” who, acting under color of state law, violates a person's rights granted by the Constitution or federal law may be held liable.^[1] It is well settled that local governments are “persons” not “wholly immune from suit under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). Although typically Section 1983 claims are brought against individuals and government agencies together, Defendants' suggestion that individual defendants are required for such an action is unsupported by any authority. Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held that municipalities can be liable under Section 1983 even when an individual defendant is found not liable. See, e.g., Barret v. Orange Cnty. Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1999).

C. Monell Liability

Although Section 1983 allows local governments to be held liable for their employees' actions, those employees must be acting “under color of [a state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, to be viable, a Section 1983 claim must establish “(1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a . . . right.” Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). On one hand, “official policy need not be explicit; it also need not be an affirmative act.” MacIssac v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 770 F.Supp.2d 587, 596 (S.D.N.Y 2011). On the other hand, where a custom is implicit or involves a failure to act, a plaintiff attempting to prove an impermissible custom must show both a pattern of rights violations, see DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998), and the “deliberate indifference of supervisory officials” to abuse, Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2012).

Drawing all reasonable inferences in S.M.'s favor, as it must at this stage, the Court finds plausible S.M.'s claims that there is an official policy or custom of “warehousing” children in facilities ill-suited to their needs. It is true that S.M. has not alleged that this policy is in writing or that she overheard the alleged policy discussed by staff. (See Dkt. No....