Saavedra v. Lowe's Home Centers Inc.

748 F.Supp.2d 1273

Louise B. SAAVEDRA and Robert Saavedra, Plaintiffs,

v.LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC., and Lucy Burrows, Defendants.

No. CIV 09–1218 JB/WPL.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Sept. 2, 2010.

Dennis W. Montoya, Montoya Law, Inc., Rio Rancho, NM, for Plaintiffs.Lisa Mann, Modrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Lucy Burrows' Memorandum Motion to Dismiss All Claims, filed April 29, 2010 (Doc. 9)(“Motion”). The Court held a hearing on July 8, 2010. The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs Louise B. Saavedra's and Robert Saavedra's Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–12213 (“ADA”), claim against Defendant Lucy Burrows because the ADA precludes personal capacity suits against individual supervisors or other employees; (ii) whether the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' New Mexico Human Rights Act, NMSA 1978 §§ 28–1–1 to 28–1–15 (“NMHRA”), claim against Burrows because L. Saavedra did not exhaust her administrative remedies under the NMHRA; (iii) whether the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for retaliatory discharge under New Mexico common law because Burrows was acting within the scope of her employment; (iv) whether Plaintiff R. Saavedra, L. Saavedra's husband, has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against Burrows under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 through § 2654 (“FMLA”); (v) whether the Court should dismiss L. Saavedra's claim against Burrows under the FMLA because the Plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that Burrows qualifies as an “employer” under the FMLA; and (vi) whether the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' punitive damages claims. Because the ADA precludes personal capacity suits against individuals who do not otherwise qualify as employers under the statutory definition, the Court will dismiss the Plaintiffs' ADA claim against Burrows. Because the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative remedies with the Human Rights Bureau of the New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions (“NMHRD”), the Court will dismiss the NMHRA claims against Burrows. Because Burrows was not acting outside the scope of her employment, the Court will dismiss the claim for retaliatory discharge. Because the Plaintiffs do not plead facts regarding R. Saavedra's employment relationship with Burrows, the Court will dismiss his FMLA claim against Burrows. Because the FMLA provides for individual liability in certain situations, and the Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that Burrows qualifies as an “employer” under the FMLA, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss L. Saavedra's FMLA claim against Burrows. Finally, because the FMLA does not entitle the Plaintiffs to punitive damages, the Court will dismiss the claim for punitive damages as asserted against Burrows. The Court therefore will grant the motion to dismiss in part and deny it in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the purposes of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court assumes the Plaintiffs' well-pleaded factual allegations are true. According to the allegations in the Complaint, on or about April 27, 2007, L. Saavedra began working as a cashier at Lowe's Home Improvement Store No. 1543, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. See Complaint for Wrongful Termination of Employment as the Result of Disability Discrimination in Violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the New Mexico Human Rights Act, For Retaliation Contrary to the Families [sic] and Medical Leave Act, For New Mexico Common Law Tort, and For Common Law Tort, and For Punitive Damages ¶ 13, at 4, filed March 23, 2010 (Doc. 5)(“Complaint”). Burrows “was employed in a managerial capacity” by Defendant Lowe's Home Centers (Lowe's). See Complaint ¶ 4, at 2. On April 11, 2008, L. Saavedra was scheduled to work from 1:30 p.m. until 10:30 p.m., but after working for approximately two hours, she began to experience stomach discomfort, chest pain, shortness of breath, and a severe headache. See Complaint ¶ 14, at 4. L. Saavedra approached store management and asked to be allowed to go home, but her request for emergency leave was denied. See id. When a co-worker arrived, L. Saavedra was allowed to take her lunch break. See id. ¶ 15, at 5. She went outside and sat in her vehicle, then drove herself to the hospital. See id. She was diagnosed with a Transient Ischemic Attack (“TIA”), commonly known as a “mini stroke,” and was hospitalized. Id. ¶ 15, at 5. L. Saavedra was released from the hospital on Saturday, April 12, 2008, and was scheduled to report back to work for seven continuous days, beginning on Monday, April 14, 2008. See id. ¶ 16–17, at 5. On April 16, 2008, before her scheduled work hours, L. Saavedra met with her doctor, Dr. Wagnel–Mogl, who determined that L. Saavedra needed additional medical testing. See id. ¶ 18, at 5. After conducting further tests on L. Saavedra's next scheduled days off, Dr. Wagnel–Mogl directed that she should stop working, pending treatment of her medical condition. See id. The Plaintiffs allege that L. Saavedra's medical condition required her to take leave under the FMLA and that Lowe's placed her on FMLA leave for twelve consecutive weeks, during which time her condition worsened because she developed severe depression. See id. ¶ 19, at 5–6. “Before [L. Saavedra's] twelve weeks of FMLA had expired, Burrows changed Ms. Saavedra's leave status from FMLA leave to personal leave. Ms. Burrows gave no explanation for this action.” Complaint ¶ 20, at 6. “In late July of 2008, [L. Saavedra] was released by her doctor to return to work. [L. Saavedra], however, was given a doctor's release note with an erroneous date of 2007, which Defendant Burrows refused to accept.” Id. ¶ 21, at 6. L. Saavedra returned to her doctor to obtain a corrected release note to return to work, but she was informed that her doctor was on vacation and that no other doctor would execute a new release. See id. ¶ 22, at 6. “[L.] Saavedra informed Defendant Burrows on July 28, 2008, that she could not immediately obtain a corrected medical release because her doctor was on vacation. Upon being informed of this, Burrows stated to [L. Saavedra] that her employment was terminated.” Id. ¶ 23, at 6.

On August 1, 2008, R. Saavedra, was terminated from his employment at Lowe's “for assisting his wife ... as she struggled with her disability condition.” Id. ¶ 24, at 6. L. Saavedra filed timely complaints of prohibited discrimination through the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and through the NMHRD. Id. ¶ 25, at 6–7.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against the Defendants on December 30, 2009, asserting five claims: (i) violation of the ADA; (ii) violation of the NMHRA; (iii) violation of the FMLA; (iv) retaliatory discharge; and (v) punitive damages. See Complaint ¶¶ 28–41, at 7–9. R. Saavedra brings claims solely under the FMLA and under New Mexico common law.

On April 29, 2010, Lowe's filed an Answer, admitting that it employed L. Saavedra but denying that Burrows employed her. See Answer of Defendant Lowe's Home Centers ¶ 1, at 5–6, filed April 29, 2010 (Doc. 8). On April 29, 2010, Burrows moved, pursuant to rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the claim of discrimination under the NMHRA, arguing that L. Saavedra did not name her in the charge of discrimination which she filed with the NMHRD and that she therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as the NMHRA requires. See Motion at 4–5. Burrows also moved, pursuant to rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the claim under the ADA, the claim for retaliatory discharge and the claim for punitive damages. See Motion at 1. She argues that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has long held that individual liability is not available under the ADA. See Motion at 3. Burrows also argues that there is no individual liability under the FMLA and that “individuals cannot be held liable as employers unless they fit the definition of employer under the [statute].” Motion at 3–4 (citing Isaacowitz v. Dialysis Clinic Inc., No. CIV–09–638 JCH/RHS, Memorandum Opinion and Order, at 11–12 (D.N.M. Feb. 22, 2010) (Herrera, J.)). She contends that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims under the FMLA because they did not allege that Burrows qualified as their employer under the FMLA. See Motion at 4. Burrows also argues that she is not liable under the NMHRA, because Saavedra did not name her in the Charge of Discrimination, which she filed against Lowe's with the New Mexico Department of Labor. See Motion at 4. Burrows contends that she cannot be held individually liable for wrongful discharge under New Mexico common law. See id. at 6. Finally, Burrows argues that, because the Plaintiffs have no entitlement to recover under their substantive causes of action, the Court should deny the punitive damages claim. See id. at 7.

In response, the Plaintiffs “concede that they have no claims against Burrows individually under [sic] Americans With Disabilities Act or the New Mexico Human Rights Act.” Response to Motion to Dismiss at 7, filed May 16, 2010 (Doc. 11)(“Response”). The Plaintiffs argue that individual liability exists under the FMLA and that, because Burrows exercised supervisory control over the Plaintiffs' employment, see Response at 7, she meets the FMLA's definition of “employer,” which includes: “... any person who acts directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer ...” Response at 2 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i)-(iv)). The Plaintiffs did not respond to Burrows' argument that they have no claims for retaliatory discharge or for punitive damages.

In reply, Burrows argues that individuals can be...