San Diego Hous. Comm'n v. Pub. Emp't Relations Bd.

246 Cal.App.4th 1

200 Cal.Rptr.3d 629

SAN DIEGO HOUSING COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant and Appellant;

Service Employees International Union, Local 221, Real Party in Interest and Respondent

D066237

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed March 30, 2016

J. Felix De La Torre, Wendi L. Ross, Ronald R. Pearson and Jonathan I. Levy, Sacramento, for Defendant and Appellant Public Employment Relations Board.

Christensen & Spath, Charles B. Christensen, Walter F. Spath III and Joel B. Mason, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Appellant San Diego Housing Commission.

Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai, Timothy G. Yeung, San Francisco, and Erich W. Shiners, Sacramento, for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant San Diego Housing Commission.

McCONNELL, P.J.

INTRODUCTION

This appeal requires us to decide whether the provisions in the Meyers–Milias–Brown Act (Act) (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq. )¹ for impasse resolution through advisory factfinding (factfinding provisions) apply to impasses arising during the negotiation of any bargainable matter or only to impasses arising during the negotiation of a comprehensive memorandum of understanding (MOU).² We conclude the factfinding provisions apply to impasses arising during the negotiation of any bargainable matter. As the trial court determined otherwise, we reverse the court's judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with our decision.

BACKGROUND

The San Diego Housing Commission (Commission) is a local public agency subject to the Act. (§ 3501, subd. (c).) Service Employees International Union, Local 221 (Union) is an employee organization and the exclusive representative of certain Commission employees. The Public Employment Relations Board (Board) is a quasi-judicial administrative agency modeled after the National Labor Relations Board and administers the Act. (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 916, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 481, 301 P.3d 1102 (County of Los Angeles ); §§ 3501, subd. (f), 3509, subd. (a), 3541, subd. (g).)

After the Commission and the Union reached an impasse in their negotiations over the effects of the Commission's decision to lay off two employees represented by the Union, the Union made a written request to the Board for the parties' dispute to be submitted to a factfinding panel under section 3505.4, subdivision (a).³ When the Board granted the request over the Commission's objection, the Commission filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandate prohibiting the Board from ordering the use of factfinding procedures in this case, determining the use of factfinding procedures is not permitted under the circumstances of this case, and restraining the parties from using factfinding procedures on matters unrelated to the negotiation of an MOU.⁴

The Commission subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the Commission was entitled to a declaratory judgment and writ of mandate as a matter of law because the Act's factfinding provisions applied only to an impasse arising during the negotiation of a comprehensive MOU, not to an impasse arising during the negotiation of a discrete, bargainable issue. The court agreed with the Commission's interpretation of the Act and granted the Commission's motion. The court then issued a judgment declaring the Act's factfinding provisions only apply to an impasse arising from the negotiation of a new or successor MOU and do not apply to an impasse arising from any other negotiations. The court also issued a writ of mandate commanding the Board to dismiss the factfinding proceedings requested by the Union, to rescind any requirement for the Commission to participate in factfinding proceedings for impasses not involving the negotiation of a new or successor MOU, and to reject any requests for the Commission to participate in factfinding proceedings for impasses not involving the negotiation of a new or successor MOU. The court later denied the Commission's motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

DISCUSSION

I

The resolution of this appeal turns on the proper interpretation of the Act's factfinding provisions. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we review independently. (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 189, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 220, 361 P.3d 319 ; Santa Clara County Correctional Peace Officers' Assn., Inc. v. County of Santa Clara (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1026, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 228 (Santa Clara ).)

" ‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature's intent in order to effectuate the law's purpose. [Citation.] We must look to the statute's words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ [Citations.] If the words in the statute do not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative intent, ‘[s]tatutory ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context in which the language appears and adopting the construction which best serves to harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ "Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute ...; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed [citation]." [Citations.]’ [Citation.] If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute's purpose, and public policy." (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 195 P.3d 103.)

II

A

The Act imposes a duty on a public agency to "meet and confer in good faith" with a recognized union, "regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ... prior to arriving at a determination of policy or course of action." (§ 3505.) The duty to bargain applies to a decision "directly defining the employment relationship, such as wages, workplace rules, and the order of succession of layoffs and recalls." (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL–CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 272, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 245 P.3d 845 (Fire Fighters 188 ).) The duty to bargain also applies to a fundamental management or policy decision if the decision directly affects employment and " ‘the employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about’ " the decision. (Id. at pp. 273, 274, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 245 P.3d 845 ; Claremont Police Officers Assn. v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th 623, 638, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 139 P.3d 532.) Thus, the duty to bargain extends to matters beyond what might typically be incorporated into a comprehensive MOU, including, as here, the implementation and effects of a decision to lay off employees. (Fire Fighters 188, supra, at p. 277.)

B

Before the passage of AB 646, if a public agency and a union reached an impasse in their negotiations, the Act permitted the parties to mutually agree to engage in mediation (§ 3505.2), but did not require the parties to engage in factfinding or any other impasse procedure. (Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach (1976) 18 Cal.3d 22, 25–26, 132 Cal.Rptr. 668, 553 P.2d 1140 ; Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 614, fn. 4, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971.) If there was no impasse procedure applicable by local law or by the parties' agreement, the public agency could unilaterally impose its last, best and final offer. (Santa Clara, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1034, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 228.)

C

The absence of mandatory impasse procedures in the Act prompted the introduction of AB 646. (Santa Clara, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1035, fn. 5, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 228.) With AB 646's passage, if a public agency and a union reach an impasse in their negotiations, the union may now require the public agency to participate in one type of impasse procedure—submission of the parties' differences to a factfinding panel for advisory findings and recommendations—before the public agency may unilaterally impose its last, best, and final offer. (§§ 3505.4, subd. (a), 3505.5, subd. (a), 3505.7.)⁵

Upon submission of the parties' differences to a factfinding panel, the panel must meet with the parties "and may make inquiries and investigations, hold hearings, and take any other steps it deems appropriate." (§ 3505.4, subd. (c).) In arriving at its findings and recommendations, the panel must consider, weigh, and be guided by several criteria, including "[t]he interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the agency"; a "[c]omparison of the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the employees involved in the factfinding proceeding with the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar services in comparable public agencies"; "[t]he consumer price index for goods and services, commonly known as the cost of living"; and "[t]he overall compensation presently received by the employees, including direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays, and other excused time, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and stability of employment, and all other benefits received." (§ 3505.4, subd. (d)(4)-(7).)⁶

If the parties do not settle their dispute within a specified or agreed upon period, the factfinding panel must make advisory findings and recommendations, which the public agency must make publicly available within a specified time after their receipt. (§ 3505.5, subd. (a).) Provided the public agency is not subject to interest...