Sanchez-Perez v. Sanchez-Gonzalez

717 F.Supp.2d 187

Roxana SANCHEZ-PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Jose SANCHEZ-GONZALEZ, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 06-1035 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 15, 2010.

Opinion Denying Reconsideration July 2, 2010.

Edgardo L. Rivera-Rivera, Jose L. Lugo-Mercado, Rivera & Fernandez Reboredo PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Francisco A. Ojeda-Diez, Lumy Mangual-Mangual, P.R. Department of Justice, Francisco R. Gonzalez-Colon, Francisco J. Gonzalez-Magaz, F.R. Gonzalez Law Office, Charles A. Rodriguez-Colon, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are the respective motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs and defendants. (Docket Nos. 77 & 79.) Having considered the arguments contained in the parties' motions for summary judgment and the responses to those motions the Court GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment and DENIES plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Background ¹

On January 12, 2006, Roxana Sanchez-Perez ("Sanchez-Perez") and her husband, Ivan Laurido ("Laurido"), (collectively "plaintiffs") filed a complaint alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"), the Puerto Rico Constitution, and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141, against: (1) Jose Sanchez-Gonzalez ("Sanchez-Gonzalez"); (2) Heriberto Rodriguez-Adorno ("Rodriguez-Adorno"); (3) Hector Diaz ("Diaz"); the (4) the Municipality of Morovis ("Municipality"); and the (4) Consorcio Dorado-Manati ("Consorcio") ². (Docket No. 1.) The complaint bases its section 1983 claims on violations of Sanchez-Perez's First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights stemming from her dismissal from employment with the Consorcio allegedly based on political affiliation. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 5.2.) Sanchez-Perez alleges that she was harassed and dismissed from employment because of her political involvement with the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP") by individuals within the management of the Consorcio who belonged to the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), including the individual named defendants. (Docket No. 1 at 4.1-4.19.) On June 1, 2007, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging additional violations of Sanchez-Perez's First Amendment rights based on interference with her current employment in retaliation for filing the complaint in this case. (Docket No. 75-2 at 4.20-4.23.)

On May 17, 2007, the Court ordered that all parties file simultaneous motions for summary judgment no later than June 18, 2007, addressing the following issues: (1) whether plaintiffs' allegations are time-barred; and (2) whether Sanchez-Perez's position at the Consorcio was a trust or regular position, which bears on the possibility of reinstatement to positions she previously held. (Docket No. 74.) The Court provided that any responses were to be filed no later than July 9, 2007. Id. On June 18, 2007, defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that: (1) Sanchez-Perez's section 1983 claims related to harassment and her dismissalfrom employment with the Consorcio were not filed within the applicable statute of limitations; (2) defendants did not act under color of state law; (3) Sanchez-Perez had no property interest in her employment; (4) Sanchez-Perez was a trust employee, rather than a regular employee, thus precluding her reinstatement to her former position; and (5) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Sanchez-Perez's dismissal. ( See Docket No. 77.)

On the same date, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgement arguing that: (1) an administrative determination precludes defendants from litigating the issue of whether the nature of Sanchez-Perez's employment with the Consorcio was that of a trust or regular position; and (2) Sanchez-Perez's section 1983 claims related to harassment and her dismissal from employment with the Consorcio were filed within the time period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. (Docket No. 79.) All parties filed responses to their respective counterparts' motions for summary judgment on July 9, 2007.

II. Legal Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The Court's discretion to grant summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states, in pertinent part, that a court may grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once a properly supported motion has been presented, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the Court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000).

In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be "material" and the dispute must be "genuine." Material means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. The issue is genuine when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is well settled that "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. It is therefore necessary that "a party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994).

In making this assessment, the Court "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). The court may safely ignore, however, "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupportedspeculation." Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

B. Plaintiff Ivan Laurido's Section 1983 Claims

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Laurido, despite being included as a plaintiff in the section 1983 claims based on defendants' alleged interference with his wife's employment, cannot maintain those claims regardless of the Court's decision on the applicable statute of limitations. ( See Docket No. 75-2.) It is clear that Laurido has no standing to pursue any of the section 1983 claims, because those claims are based not on a violation of his constitutional rights, but rather the violation of his spouse's constitutional rights related to her employment. See Sanchez-Nuñez, 509 F.Supp.2d at 151 (holding that a wife lacked standing to sue under section 1983 for violations to her husband's constitutional rights); (Docket No. 75-2.) Given that all allegations of constitutional violations in the complaint relate to interference with Sanchez-Perez's employment, any section 1983 claims brought by Laurido are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.³

C. Statute of Limitations for Sanchez-Perez's Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 does not set forth a limitations period, but instead borrows the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-241, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Rosario Rivera v. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. of P.R., 472 F.Supp.2d 165, 170 (D.P.R.2007) ( citing Wilson v. García, 471 U.S. 261, 276-278, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); López-González v. Municipality of Comerío, 404 F.3d 548, 551 (1st Cir.2005); Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir.1997)). Under Puerto Rico law, the applicable limitations period for personal injury actions is one year. See P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298 (2006); Carreras-Rosa, 127 F.3d at 174. Accordingly, the one-year term applies for section 1983 actions in Puerto Rico. Torres v. Superintendent of the Police of P.R., 893 F.2d 404, 406 (1st Cir.1990). "The underlying premise for the limitations period is to protect both the defendants from having to defend from distant events as well as those affected individuals who timely prosecute their claims." Del Carmen Rodriguez v. Trujillo, 507 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.P.R.2007) ( citing Vistamar, Inc. v. Fagundo-Fagundo, 430 F.3d 66, 70-71 (1st Cir.2005); Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 750 (1st Cir.1994)).

"Although the limitations period is determined by state law, the date of accrual is a federal law question." Carreras-Rosa, 127 F.3d at 174. The accrual period " 'ordinarily starts when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know of the injury on which the action is based.' " Id. (quoting Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 353 (1st Cir.1992)). Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations for actions brought under section 1983 "begins running one day after the date of accrual, which is the date plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury". Gonzalez Garcia v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 214 F.Supp.2d 194, 200; Benitez-Pons v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.1998).

"In employment discrimination cases involving wrongful discharges, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff learns of the decision to terminate his employment (even if...