Santiago v. Municipality of Adjuntas

741 F.Supp.2d 364

Myrta Torres SANTIAGO, et als., Plaintiffs,

v.MUNICIPALITY OF ADJUNTAS, et als., Defendants.

CIV. No. 06–1116 (PG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Sept. 7, 2010.

Jose Martinez–Custodio, Martinez Custodio Law Office, Utuado, PR, Kenneth Colon, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.Patricia R. Limeres–Vargas, Luis R. Perez–Giusti, Adsuar Muniz Goyco Seda & Perez Ochoa PSC, Christian E. Pagan–Cordoliani, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Yadhira Ramirez–Toro, Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Maria Del Mar Quinones–Alos, P.R. Department of Justice—Federal Litigation, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PEREZ–GIMENEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are defendants' motion for attorney fees (Docket No. 209) and plaintiffs' opposition (Docket No. 211). After close examination of the record and the applicable statutory and case law, the Court GRANTS IN PART defendants' motion for attorney fees, for the reasons explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 30, 2006, plaintiffs Myrta Torres Santiago (“Torres”), Migdalia Rodriguez Rivera (“Rodriguez”) and Jose Rivera del Valle (“Rivera”) (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) filed this action for injunctive relief and money damages against defendants the Municipality of Adjuntas (“the Municipality”); its mayor, Jaime H. Barlucea (“Barlucea”); Walver Baez (“Baez”); Daniel Portela (“Portela”); and, Hernan Caraballo (“Caraballo”) (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”). This action is brought pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (“Article 1802”).

In the complaint, Plaintiffs alleged to be affiliated with the Popular Democratic Party (“PPD”) and claimed that the individual defendants were affiliated with the New Progressive Party (“NPP”). Plaintiffs alleged they were illegally demoted and transferred from their jobs because of their political party affiliation and beliefs. As a result, Plaintiffs averred they had to endure inferior and unreasonable working conditions. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' acts violated their rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and caused them damages.

On March 10, 2006, the Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' due process and equal protection claims pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court granted the Defendants' motion and thus dismissed Plaintiffs' due process and equal protection claims. See Docket No. 36. Thereafter, on November 12, 2009, the Court granted in part the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims against co-defendants Baez, Portela, and Caraballo. The Court found that the Plaintiffs were unable to establish a prima facie case as to these three co-defendants. See Docket No. 168. The case, however, continued as to co-defendant Barlucea in both his personal and official capacity as mayor of the Municipality of Adjuntas. See Docket No. 168.

After various failed settlement attempts, the case went to trial and the jury found in favor of defendant Barlucea. Specifically, the jury found that both plaintiffs Torres and Rodriguez had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Barlucea had knowledge of their political affiliation. Although plaintiff Rivera was able to establish this threshold fact, the jury found, however, that he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Rivera's political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in the employment actions as to Rivera. In addition, with regards to Plaintiffs' state law claim under Article 1802, the jury found that all Plaintiffs were unable to establish that they suffered damages caused by the fault or negligence of defendant Barlucea. See Jury Verdict, Docket No. 20.

The Defendants now request reimbursement for part of the legal representation costs incurred in the litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by arguing that they are the prevailing parties and that the present claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. See Docket No. 209. The Plaintiffs oppose their request. See Docket No. 211.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act

“Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorizing the district courts to award a reasonable attorney's fee to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). “The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure ‘effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances.” Id. Therefore, in any action enforcing the provisions of Section 1983, such as the instant one, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) governs attorney fee awards.

Section 1988(b) states that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). In adjudicating a request for attorney fees, the Court needs to determine whether: (1) a party is in fact a “prevailing party”; (2) the compensation sought is reasonable (i.e. calculation of the lodestar); and (3) there are any additional but exceptional considerations that may require to adjust upward or downward. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433–34, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Once a prevailing party comes across this threshold, the district court must then determine what fee is reasonable. See id. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933.

Notwithstanding the discretionary language of the statute, “[i]n civil rights cases, fee-shifting in favor of a prevailing plaintiff is the rule, whereas fee-shifting in favor of a prevailing defendant is the exception.” Casa Marie Hogar Geriatrico, Inc. v. Rivera–Santos, 38 F.3d 615, 618 (1st Cir.1994). However, “[a] triumphant defendant may qualify as a prevailing party for the purpose of obtaining a fee award.” Maine School Administrative Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. R., 321 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir.2003) ( quoting Weyant v. Okst, 198 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir.1999); Burke v. Guiney, 700 F.2d 767, 771 (1st Cir.1983)). “It follows inexorably that a defendant who prevails on the only claim that justifies the presence of the case in a federal court has a legitimate basis for asserting that she is the prevailing party.” Maine School, 321 F.3d at 16 ( citing Perlman v. Zell, 185 F.3d 850, 859 (7th Cir.1999)).

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, nevertheless, that in cases under § 1988, “decisions to grant defendants their fees are, and should be, rare.” Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 191 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir.1999) ( citing Tang v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Elderly Affairs, 163 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir.1998)). Accordingly, it has been found that a defendant is entitled to fees “only if [the defendant] can establish that the plaintiffs' suit was totally unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable,” Casa Marie Hogar Geriatrico, Inc., 38 F.3d at 619 (internal citations omitted), “or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). As a result, “[p]revailing defendants, under this heightened standard, have a more difficult showing to make to obtain attorney's fees than do successful plaintiffs.” Bercovitch, 191 F.3d at 10.

In applying this criteria, the Supreme Court mandates that a district court considering a fee request from a prevailing defendant should “resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because the plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 421–22, 98 S.Ct. 694. To this extent, the Supreme Court has further stated that:

This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.

Id. at 422, 98 S.Ct. 694.

The Defendants here seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 1988 asserting that they were the prevailing parties in Plaintiffs' civil rights action. In their opposition, the Plaintiffs do not contest that the Defendants are in fact the prevailing party, thus, the only question that remains is whether or not the Defendants have established that the Plaintiffs' suit was totally unfounded, frivolous or otherwise unreasonable.

Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis and some important factors to be considered include: “(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.” Sullivan v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir.1985) (internal citations omitted). “Cases where findings of “frivolity” have been sustained typically have been decided in the defendant's favor on a motion for summary judgment.... In these cases, the plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence to support their claims.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “In cases where the plaintiffs introduced evidence sufficient to support their claims, findings of frivolity typically do not stand.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Notwithstanding the foregoing, even if a prevailing defendant can establish that a plaintiff's suit was...