Schneider v. Ford Motor Co.

441 F.Supp.3d 909

Kimberly D. SCHNEIDER, Plaintiff,

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 5:19-cv-05545-EJD

United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division.

Signed March 2, 2020

Tionna Grace Dolin, Anh X. Nguyen, Jacob William Cutler, Strategic Legal Practices, APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Charles Frederick Harlow, Jr., Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 17

EDWARD J. DAVILA, United States District Judge

Plaintiff filed a state-court action asserting various state-law causes of actions against Defendants Ford Motor Company and Chino Hills Ford ("Chino Hills"). Defendants removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds. Plaintiff argues that this Court should remand the action because the amount in controversy is less than $75,000. The Court agrees. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for remand is GRANTED and the Clerk is DIRECTED to REMAND this case to Santa Clara County Superior Court and close the file.¹

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On or about June 2, 2013, Plaintiff purchased a 2013 Ford Escape vehicle ("the Vehicle") from Defendant Chino Hills. Complaint for Violations of Statutory Obligations ("Compl.") ¶ 8, Dkt. 1-2, Ex. B. Plaintiffs received an express written warranty with this purchase. Id. ¶ 9. During the warranty period, the Vehicle contained or developed defects, which substantially impaired the use, value, or safety of the Vehicle. Id. ¶ 10. After Defendants were unable to service or repair the Vehicle, Plaintiff filed this action. Plaintiff claims Defendant Ford Motor Co. breached express and implied warranties related to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. See id. ¶¶ 12–34. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Chino Hills breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Id. ¶¶ 30–34.

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered damages in a sum "not less than $25,001.00." Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff also alleges that she is entitled to a civil penalty of two times her actual damages pursuant to California Civil Code Section 1794. Id. ¶¶ 15–16, 22, 25, 29, and Prayer. Plaintiff seeks actual, consequential, punitive and incidental damages, prejudgment interest, and attorneys' fees and costs. Id. at Prayer.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Santa Clara County Superior Court on January 10, 2019. Compl. at 10. Defendants removed the action to this Court on September 3, 2019, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Dkt. 1. On December 17, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. Motion to Remand ("Mot."), Dkt. 17. Defendant filed an opposition on December 31, 2019. Opposition/Response re Motion to Remand ("Opp."), Dkt. 19. On January 7, 2020, Plaintiffs submitted a reply. Reply re Motion to Remand ("Reply"), Dkt. 20.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc. , 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). A defendant sued in state court may remove the action to federal court only if the action could have been brought in federal court in the first instance. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The Court strictly construes the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. Id. Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co. , 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979). Federal courts are "particularly skeptical of cases removed from state court." Warner v. Select Portfolio Servicing , 193 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Gaus , 980 F.2d at 566 ).

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions with diverse parties and where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

A. Diversity of Citizenship

Plaintiff concedes that the Parties are diverse. See Mot. at 6; Opp. at 8. Plaintiff is a California resident, see Compl. ¶ 2, while Defendant Chino Hills is domiciled in Nevada, see Notice of Removal ¶ 20, and Defendant Ford Motor Co. is domiciled in Michigan and Delaware, see id. ¶ 19. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff and Defendants are completely diverse as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

B. Amount in Controversy

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not satisfied their amount-in-controversy burden. See Mot. at 2. If a defendant removes a case from state court to federal court, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the amount in controversy is satisfied. See Chajon v. Ford Motor Co. , 2019 WL 994019, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019). The allegations in the complaint dictate the defendant's burden. For instance, when a complaint filed in state court alleges on its face an amount in controversy sufficient to meet the federal jurisdictional threshold, the amount-in-controversy requirement is presumptively satisfied unless it appears to a "legal certainty" that the plaintiff cannot actually recover that amount. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co. , 102 F.3d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1996) ; see also Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc. , 752 F. Supp. 753, 755–56 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (noting that when a complaint is originally filed in state court, it is highly unlikely that the plaintiff inflated her damages solely to obtain federal jurisdiction). If, however, the plaintiff's state-court complaint does not specify a particular amount of damages, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing by a "preponderance of the evidence" that it is "more likely than not" that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Sanchez , 102 F.3d at 404 ; Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp. , 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007).

1. Legal Certainty Test

Defendants argue the Complaint "clearly" shows that more than $75,000 is in controversy and that the "legal certainty" standard applies. Opp. at 3, 5. Defendants contend that because the Complaint alleges damages of at least $25,001 and a penalty of twice the amount of damages, i.e. $50,002, the damages plainly amount to $75,003. Id. As support, Defendants cite Bernstein v. BMW of N. Am., LLC , 2018 WL 2210683 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018) and McDonald v. BMW of N. Am., LLC , 2017 WL 5843385 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017). Neither case, however, supports Defendants' position that more than $75,000 is "clearly" in issue. Bernstein , for instance, involved a complaint that alleged "[t]he amount in controversy exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), exclusive of interest and costs....[and] Plaintiff seeks damages...for incidental, consequential, exemplary, and actual damages." 2018 WL 2210683 at *2 (first emphasis added). Likewise, in McDonald , the complaint stated that the plaintiff's damages "exceed[ed] $25,000" and prayed for "actual damages, statutory penalties of two times actual damages, attorney's fees and punitive damages." 2017 WL 5843385 at *1.

Here, however, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered damages "in a sum to be proven at trial in an amount that is not less than $25,001.00." Compl. ¶ 11 (emphasis added). Hence, while Plaintiff seeks restitution for the value of the car, civil penalties, and attorneys' fees and costs, it is unclear whether all these damages are subsumed within the request for $25,001. Compare id. (stating that Plaintiff suffered "damages "), with Bernstein , 2018 WL 2210683 at *2 (plaintiff claimed the amount in controversy exceeded $25,000 and sought actual, incidental, and exemplary damages "in addition" to the $25,000). Thus, unlike the Bernstein and McDonald courts, this Court cannot readily determine what is included in Plaintiff's claimed damages. Accordingly, the amount in controversy is unclear from the face of Plaintiff's Complaint and the Court must determine if Defendants have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Guglielmino , 506 F.3d at 699 ; see also Gaus , 980 F.2d at 566 (noting that removal jurisdiction must be strictly construed against removal).

2. Preponderance of the Evidence Test

Defendants argue that "it is more likely than not" that the damages and penalties pled in Plaintiff's complaint exceed $75,000. The Court disagrees.

Defendants' rely on the same argument analyzed above. They argue that the $25,001 refers to actual damages and, after doubling that amount for civil penalties, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. But, as held above, it is too speculative to say that the "$25,001" amounts to actual damages. Plaintiff's Complaint does not offer, and Defendant fails to produce, any facts that would allow the Court to determine that the $25,001 refers only to actual damages. See supra III.B.1. Indeed, the Court could just as easily infer that the $25,001 refers to Plaintiff's total damages. This lack of clarity forecloses Defendants' argument that the $25,001 "more likely than not" satisfies the federal-jurisdictional amount. Moreover, it ignores the fact that removal jurisdiction is strictly construed against removal. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co. , 2016 WL 6583585, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016). Accordingly, because the Court cannot rest its jurisdictional findings on speculation, Defendant's first argument is rejected.

Defendants next support their removal with Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees and costs. Courts must include future attorneys' fees recoverable by statute or contract when assessing whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met. Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Az., LLC , 899 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2018). The "mere futurity" of attorneys' fees and costs does not preclude them from being part of the amount in controversy. Id. (quoting Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. , 888 F.3d 413, 418 (9th Cir. 2018) ); but see Chajon , 2019 WL 994019 at *2 (holding that prospective attorneys' fees were too speculative to be included in...