Schroeder v. Minn. Sec'y of State Steve Simon, A20-0272

950 N.W.2d 70

Jennifer SCHROEDER, et al., Respondents,

v.MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON, Respondent,Minnesota Voters Alliance, applicant for intervention, Appellant.

A20-0272

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed September 8, 2020

Review Dismissed November 25, 2020

Michael M. Sawers, Craig S. Coleman, Tom Pryor, Kirsten L. Elfstrand, Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Teresa J. Nelson, David P. McKinney, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Schroeder, et al.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Allen Cook Barr, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Secretary of State)

Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Florey, Judge.

JESSON, Judge

Appellant Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) sought to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota's statutory scheme governing the restoration of the right to vote after a felony conviction. According to MVA, respondent Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon—through representation provided by the Minnesota Attorney General's Office—failed to assert a defense that would result in dismissal of the action. But the district court denied MVA's motion to intervene. Because MVA lacks the necessary interest in the subject of the action, we affirm the district court's denial of its request to intervene as a matter of right.

FACTS

This appeal requires us to decide whether appellant Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) is entitled to intervene in a lawsuit challenging Minnesota's statutory scheme for restoring the right to vote after a felony conviction. In order to resolve this question, we begin by explaining the underlying lawsuit, before turning to MVA's interest in intervening.

In Minnesota, a felony conviction renders an individual ineligible to vote until his or her civil rights are restored. Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1 ; see also Minn. Stat. § 201.014, subd. 2(1) (2018). And before restoration of civil rights can occur, an individual must be "discharge[d]." Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1 (2018). But "discharge" is not synonymous with being released from incarceration. Id. , subd. 2 (2018). Rather, "discharge" requires a court order or the expiration of an individual's sentence. Id. In other words, an individual convicted of a felony must complete his or her entire sentence—including probation, parole, or supervised release—before the right to vote is restored.

Respondents Jennifer Schroeder, Elizer Eugene Darris, Christopher James Jecevicus-Varner, and Tierre Davon Caldwell (collectively, plaintiffs) are each citizens of Minnesota who have been convicted of a felony. Although each individual completed any required incarceration, they remain on parole, probation, or another form of supervised release. As a result, they are ineligible to vote.¹

This scheme for restoring an individual's right to vote after a felony conviction, plaintiffs allege, is unconstitutional. Through the underlying lawsuit, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including restoration of the right to vote. Respondent Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon (the secretary), through representation provided by the Minnesota Attorney General's Office, answered the complaint. In doing so, the secretary asserted affirmative defenses and sought dismissal of the complaint.

Six days later, MVA filed a notice expressing its intent to seek limited intervention in the case. MVA characterizes itself as "a nonprofit organization with members who seek to ensure ... public confidence in the integrity of Minnesota's elections ... and that public officials act in accordance with the law in exercising their obligations to the people of the State of Minnesota." Both the plaintiffs and the secretary objected to MVA's noticed intervention. MVA then moved for limited intervention as a matter of right, or, in the alternative, permissive intervention. According to MVA, it sought to intervene to assert a particular defense: the "lack of private cause of action." This defense, which is based on MVA's assertion that there is no private cause of action under the Minnesota Constitution, would result in dismissal of the case, MVA argued. And, as a taxpayer, MVA maintained that it had an interest in the attorney general's office asserting that defense to avoid unnecessary litigation and wasting taxpayer resources.

After a hearing, the district court denied MVA's motion to intervene. Although the court determined that MVA's motion was timely, it concluded that MVA did not have a sufficient interest related to the subject of the action. As a result, it was unnecessary for MVA to intervene to protect any interest. Nor, according to the district court, did MVA establish that the secretary did not adequately represent its alleged interest. MVA appeals.²

ISSUES

I. Is this appeal moot?

II. Is MVA entitled to intervene as a matter of right under rule 24.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure ?

ANALYSIS

I. This appeal is not moot.

Before evaluating MVA's arguments, we must decide whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot, as plaintiffs argue. We consider de novo whether an appeal is moot. Verhein v. Piper , 917 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. App. 2018).

According to plaintiffs, the procedural posture of the underlying action renders this appeal moot. MVA did not move to stay the case in district court during this appeal. At the time of oral argument before this court, the parties were awaiting a decision from the district court regarding summary-judgment motions from each side. During the pendency of this appeal, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the secretary and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Though plaintiffs contended that the appeal was moot before the summary-judgment decision, they assert that the district court's order further cements their argument.

An appeal is "moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible." Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). Mootness is "a flexible discretionary doctrine" and "not a mechanical rule" that we invoke automatically. Id. at 4 (quotation omitted). Here, MVA seeks to intervene to argue a specific defense: that there is no private cause of action under the Minnesota Constitution. And it desires to do so based on its claimed interest in ensuring that the attorney general's office uniformly asserts the defense to prevent "meritless litigation." No current party has argued this defense. Further, while summary judgement has now been granted, the time to appeal that decision has not lapsed. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (describing the time frame for an appeal). This context supports the determination that this appeal is not moot. In short, it is possible in the future span of this case, that we could grant the relief MVA desires: intervention to argue its identified defense. See Dean , 868 N.W.2d at 5. Accordingly, this appeal is not moot.³

II. MVA does not satisfy the requirements under rule 24.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene as a matter of right.

MVA argues that the district court erroneously denied its motion to intervene as a matter of right. "Orders concerning intervention as a matter of right ... are subject to de novo review and are independently assessed on appeal." State Fund Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead , 691 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Minn. App. 2005).

Rule 24.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure governs intervention as a matter of right. It states:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.01. Under this rule, a proposed intervenor must satisfy four requirements to intervene as a matter of right. League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie , 819 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Minn. 2012). Those requirements are "(1) a timely application; (2) an interest in the subject of the action; (3) an inability to protect that interest unless the applicant is a party to the action; and (4) the applicant's interest is not adequately represented by existing parties." Id. Each requirement must be met. See id.

Here, the parties agree—as do we—that the first requirement is met. MVA filed its notice of intervention less than a week after the secretary filed his answer and filed its motion to intervene about a month later. Nothing suggests that MVA's request to intervene was untimely.

We turn then to the second requirement: establishment of "an interest in the subject of the action." Id. To evaluate whether this requirement has been satisfied, we examine "the pleadings and, absent sham or frivolity," we "accept the allegations in the pleadings as true." Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Minn. State Bd. of Pharmacy , 301 Minn. 28, 221 N.W.2d 162, 164 (1974). But when deciding a motion to intervene as a matter of right, "the merits of the proposed complaint are not to be determined." Id.

Not every alleged interest in a lawsuit supports intervention as a matter of right. For instance, in general, personal or familial interests are insufficient to warrant intervention as a matter of right. See Valentine v. Lutz , 512 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1994). And if a judgment will not affect a proposed intervenor's legal rights, the proposed intervenor is generally not entitled to intervene as a matter of right. See Koski v. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. , 386 N.W.2d 282, 284-85 (Minn. App. 1986).

At the district court, MVA described its interest as twofold: (1) an...