Schroeder v. State

946 N.W.2d 718

Duane SCHROEDER and Lynae Schroeder, parents of Brooke Schroeder, and Lynae Schroeder as Personal Representative of the Estate of Brooke Schroeder, Plaintiffs and Appellants

v.STATE of North Dakota, Defendant and Appellee

No. 20190374

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Filed July 22, 2020

Jason R. Vendsel (argued) and Rheider W. McCormick (on brief), Minot, N.D., for plaintiffs and appellants.

James E. Nicolai, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellee.

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Duane and Lynae Schroeder, parents of Brooke Schroeder, and Lynae Schroeder, as personal representative of the Estate of Brooke Schroeder, appeal from a summary judgment dismissing their action against the State of North Dakota related to a car accident, which resulted in their daughter's death. The Schroeders argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment and determining their claims were precluded because the State was immune from liability under statutory public duty and snow and ice immunities. We conclude the district court properly determined statutory immunity precluded the Schroeders’ claims. We affirm.

I

[¶2] On January 8, 2017, Brooke Schroeder was driving a vehicle eastbound on Interstate 94 in Barnes County. Before crossing an overpass at 109th Avenue Southeast, the vehicle drifted out of the eastbound passing lane, hit a snowbank adjacent to the guardrail on the overpass, and vaulted over the guardrail. Brooke Schroeder was injured in the accident and died.

[¶3] The Schroeders sued the State for economic and non-economic damages, alleging the State's negligence or gross negligence in performing its winter road maintenance and snow removal obligations caused the accident, Brooke Schroeder's injuries, and ultimately her death. They claimed the snowbank adjacent to the guardrail eliminated any safety or protection provided by the guardrail and created an unreasonably dangerous condition.

[¶4] The State moved for summary judgment, arguing various immunities apply, including the public duty and snow and ice immunities under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.2-02(3)(f) and (i), which preclude a finding of liability on the part of the State or its employees. The State claimed it may not be held liable for a claim caused by the performance or nonperformance of a public duty, in this case the duty to remove snow or ice from the roadway and adjacent guardrail. The State also claimed the narrow exception allowing claims resulting from snow or ice conditions affirmatively caused by a negligent act of a state employee did not apply because the failure to remove snow or ice is a passive omission and not an affirmative act. The Schroeders opposed the motion, arguing none of the immunities apply to this action.

[¶5] After a hearing, the district court granted the State's motion. The court ruled the facts were "not effectively in dispute." The court concluded the State has a public duty to maintain the highway system, the performance of the duty to keep the highways in good and safe condition is an act for which the State may not be held liable under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.2-02(3)(f), and if the accident was caused by the plowing of roads to maintain them after winter weather, then the State is immune to any liability because it was caused by the performance of a public duty. The court also considered whether there was immunity under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.2-02(3)(i) because the claim resulted from snow or ice conditions on a highway. The court explained:

Either: (1) the accident was caused by plowing of the snow and chemicals off the road onto the shoulder where it formed into the hardened snowbank, in which case the State (and employees) are immune as clearing the roadways [is] a public duty; or (2) the accident was caused by a negligent omission by the State in failing to remove the condition caused by the performance of that duty, in which case the snow and ice immunity applies because the danger was not created by an "affirmative" act, but rather the failure to do an act to remove the danger. It is perhaps more appropriate to state that the allegedly negligent act which led to the accident was the failure to clear the guardrail. In either case, the State is immune.

The court concluded the State was immune to liability under any viable theory of liability presented. Judgment was entered dismissing the Schroeders’ complaint with prejudice.

II

[¶6] Our standard for reviewing summary judgments is well-established:

Summary judgment is a procedural device under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c) for promptly resolving a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. The party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case is appropriate for judgment as a matter of law. In deciding whether the district court appropriately granted summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the record. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot simply rely on the pleadings or on unsupported conclusory allegations. Rather, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must present competent admissible evidence by affidavit or other comparable means that raises an issue of material fact and must, if appropriate, draw the court's attention to relevant evidence in the record raising an issue of material fact. When reasonable persons can reach only one conclusion from the evidence, a question of fact may become a matter of law for the court to decide. A district court's decision on summary judgment is a question of law that we review de novo on the record.

Devore v. Am. Eagle Energy Corp. , 2020 ND 23, ¶ 10, 937 N.W.2d 503 (quoting Brock v. Price , 2019 ND 240, ¶ 10, 934 N.W.2d 5 ). Generally, negligence actions involve questions of fact and are inappropriate for summary judgment. Bjerk v. Anderson , 2018 ND 124, ¶ 10, 911 N.W.2d 343. "Issues of fact may become issues of law if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion from the facts." Id. (quoting APM, LLLP v. TCI Ins. Agency, Inc. , 2016 ND 66, ¶ 8, 877 N.W.2d 34 ).

[¶7] Under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.2-02(3), the State and state employees may not be held liable for any of the following claims:

f. A claim relating to injury directly or indirectly caused by the performance or nonperformance of a public duty, including:

(1) Inspecting, licensing, approving, mitigating, warning, abating, or failing to so act regarding compliance with or the violation of any law, rule, regulation, or any condition affecting health or safety.

(2) Enforcing, monitoring, or failing to enforce or monitor conditions of sentencing, parole, probation, or juvenile supervision.

(3) Providing or failing to provide law enforcement services in the ordinary course of a state's law enforcement operations.

....

i. A claim resulting from snow or ice conditions, water, or debris on a highway or on a public sidewalk that does not abut a state-owned building or parking lot, except when the condition is affirmatively caused by the negligent act of a state employee.

[¶8] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal. Baker v. Autos, Inc. , 2019 ND 82, ¶ 10, 924 N.W.2d 441. The primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's intent. Id. We give words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless specifically defined or contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. Statutes are construed as a whole and harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. Baker , at ¶ 10. We give meaning to each word, phrase, and sentence. Schulke v. Panos , 2020 ND 53, ¶ 8, 940 N.W.2d 303. When we interpret statutes related to the same subject matter, we construe the statutes to give effect to both. Id. If a general provision in a statute conflicts with a special provision in the same statute or another statute, we construe the two provisions to give effect to both, if possible, but if the conflict is irreconcilable, then the special provision controls the general provision and is construed as an exception to the general provision. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07.

A

[¶9] The Schroeders argue public duty immunity under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.2-02(3)(f) does not apply because the statute defines a number of specific duties the immunity covers and nothing in the statute indicates it is intended to cover road maintenance. They also contend the immunity should be limited to those duties in which the State has a unique duty to its citizens.

[¶10] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 32-12.2-02(3)(f) states the State is not liable for a claim relating to injury directly or indirectly caused by the performance or nonperformance of a public duty, including three specifically stated public duties. It does not include any language limiting the immunity to those three defined duties; rather, it states that it includes those listed duties. The word "including" "typically indicates a partial list." Black's Law Dictionary 912 (11th ed. 2019). Section 32-12.2-02(3)(f), N.D.C.C., gives a partial list of public duties the State may not be held liable for performing, but the immunity is not limited to those public duties specifically listed.

[¶11] Section 32-12.2-02(3)(g), N.D.C.C., specifically limits the public duty immunity by stating, " ‘Public duty’ does not include action of the state or a state employee under circumstances in which a special relationship can be established between the state and the injured party." The statute provides four elements to determine whether a special relationship exists. Id. The Schroeders do not allege that a special relationship existed or that this exception to the public duty immunity applies.

[¶12] The...