Sears v. Bradley County Gov't

44 NDLR P 17

821 F.Supp.2d 987

Brenda SEARS, Plaintiff,

v.BRADLEY COUNTY GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Case No. 1:10–CV–207.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee.

Sept. 26, 2011.

Robin R. Flores, Law Office of Robin R. Flores, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiff.

Thomas E. LeQuire, Spicer Rudstrom, PLLC, Chattanooga, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

CURTIS L. COLLIER, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Bradley County Government (“Bradley County” or “the County”), Sheriff Tim Gobble (“Sheriff Gobble”), and Sergeant J.F. Brown (“Sergeant Brown,” collectively, “Defendants”) (Court File No. 10). Plaintiff Brenda Sears has responded (Court File No. 17), and Defendants have replied (Court File No. 18). For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART the motion for summary judgment (Court File No. 10).

I. FACTS

Plaintiff is a disabled individual who suffers from a seizure disorder and requires the assistance of a service animal—a dog named O'Neal. On August 11, 2009, Plaintiff and O'Neal went to the Bradley County Criminal Justice Center because Plaintiff was to testify as a witness for a friend's son. Sergeant Brown was operating the metal detector and security check at the entrance to the courthouse. The courthouse had a general rule against allowing animals into the courthouse (Court File No. 12, ¶ 3).

As Plaintiff approached the security checkpoint, Sergeant Brown informed her dogs were not allowed in the courtroom. Plaintiff informed Sergeant Brown her dog was a service animal. Sergeant Brown, who testifies he had not experienced a service animal prior to this date ( id. at ¶ 5), told Plaintiff he would need to obtain clearance from Judge Randolph. Sergeant Brown asked Plaintiff what the nature of her disability was, and she told him she had a seizure disorder. Plaintiff's husband, who was accompanying her, gave Sergeant Brown some papers explaining what a service animal is and how they are required to be allowed in public places ( id. at ¶ 6).

Approximately 20 minutes later, which Sergeant Brown claims was the moment of earliest convenience, Sergeant Brown spoke with Judge Randolph's court officer about the situation, and showed him the papers explaining service animals. As it was almost lunch time, Judge Randolph said he would look at the papers after lunch. During lunch, the doors to the courtroom were locked ( id. at ¶ 8). Plaintiff had to wait standing up, as there was no chair for her to use. Just before court resumed after the lunch break, Judge Randolph's court officer told Plaintiff that Judge Randolph would allow the animal into the courtroom. Plaintiff and O'Neal were granted entrance to the courtroom approximately an hour and forty-five minutes after Plaintiff arrived at the courthouse (Court File No. 17–1, ¶¶ 7, 16). Plaintiff alleges that during her wait, Sergeant Brown refused to allow her to use the courthouse restroom accompanied by O'Neal. Plaintiff had to go to a Taco Bell restaurant to use the restroom.

Prior to the incident with Plaintiff, Bradley County had received no reports of disabled individuals with service animals being denied entrance into courthouses (Court File No. 13, ¶ 3). Since the incident, Bradley County has adopted a policy and held a training session addressing the needs of disabled individuals with service animals ( id. at ¶¶ 5–11). The policy provides for allowance of service animals, and is displayed in conspicuous areas of public buildings in Bradley County ( id. at ¶¶ 10–11).

Plaintiff has sued Defendants on a number of claims. She alleges: (1) a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. by all Defendants; (2) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 vis-a-vis the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection clauses by all Defendants; and (3) various state law torts, including negligence and negligence per se by all Defendants, and invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress by Sergeant Brown. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows, based on the materials in the record, “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). First, the moving party must demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir.2003). The Court views the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir.2001). However, the non-movant is not entitled to a trial based solely on its allegations, but must submit significant probative evidence to support its claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir.2000). Should the non-movant fail to provide evidence to support an essential element of its case, the movant can meet its burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact exists by pointing out such failure to the court. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989).

The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the non-movant fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element for which it bears the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In short, if the Court concludes a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record, the Court may enter summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir.1994).

III. ANALYSISA. ADA Claim

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges violations of Title II of the ADA by all Defendants.¹ She seeks compensatory damages.² As a threshold matter, it is apparent the ADA claim against Sergeant Brown in his individual capacity must be dismissed, since “there is no individual liability under Title II of the ADA.” Sagan v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 726 F.Supp.2d 868, 875 (M.D.Tenn.2010) (citing Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 396–97 (6th Cir.2002)). However, the ADA claims against the County and Sergeant Brown in his official capacity are properly brought.

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To recover compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she has a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified; and (3) she is being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program solely because of her disability.” Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir.2003). Additionally, “[c]ompensatory damages may be recovered under the ADA only if the plaintiffs prove intentional discrimination.” Tucker v. Tennessee, 443 F.Supp.2d 971, 973 (W.D.Tenn.2006). “Further, the plaintiff must show that the discrimination was intentionally directed toward him or her in particular.” Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir.2008) (emphasis added).

Failure to supervise is not a viable theory for recovery of compensatory damages in a Title II ADA claim, since such failure is necessarily not directed at a particular disabled individual. See Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir.2005) (“Acts and omissions which have a disparate impact on disabled persons in general are not specific acts of intentional discrimination against the plaintiff in particular.”) (quotation omitted); see also Scozzari v. City of Clare, 723 F.Supp.2d 945, 973 (E.D.Mich.2010) (recounting how the court earlier “denied Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to allege a claim based on the City's failure to train its officers under the ADA because pursuing such a claim would be futile”).

Here, Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot show she was intentionally discriminated against. First, any failure by the County to train its officers, including Sergeant Brown, was not a specific act of intentional discrimination against Plaintiff herself, and thus cannot support a claim for compensatory damages under the ADA against the County. Second, Defendants claim Sergeant Brown's conduct towards Plaintiff was not motivated by discriminatory intent but his genuine bewilderment at how to handle service animals. Moreover, Sergeant Brown's efforts to seek approval from Judge Randolph, including his forwarding of the papers provided by Plaintiff's husband to Judge Randolph's court officer, indicate he was not attempting to discriminate against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff, for her part, does not address Defendants' argument that the County's failure to train cannot constitute intentional discrimination against Plaintiff in particular, and she devotes only one sentence to rebutting the argument Sergeant Brown did not intentionally discriminate against Plaintiff: she states the actions of Sergeant Brown “show[ ] intent on the part of the department and Brown to prevent plaintiff from entry into the courthouse” (Court File No. 17, p. 5).

Plaintiff's argument misconstrues what the word “intentional” means when it is said a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination. See Tucker, 539 F.3d at 532. Of course Sergeant Brown “intended” to prevent Plaintiff from entry into the courthouse until he got clearance from Judge Randolph. However, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show a defendant acted voluntarily in...