Shapiro & Duncan, Inc. v. Payne

215 Md.App. 674

84 A.3d 149

SHAPIRO AND DUNCAN, INC., et al.

v.Nicholas L. PAYNE.

No. 0961, Sept. Term, 2012.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 29, 2014.

Andrew T. Nichols (Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, LLC, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Samuel Lynn (Jonathan S. Beiser, Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP, on the brief), Rockville, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: MEREDITH, KEHOE, RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

THIEME, J.

On June 19, 2012, following a one-day bench trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the circuit court affirmed the September 7, 2011 determination of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission, concluding that Appellee, Nicholas L. Payne, was entitled to receive compensation from his employer, Shapiro and Duncan, Inc.,¹ for a work-related injury that occurred in Washington, D.C., on October 20, 2010. In their timely filed appeal, the Appellants raise a single question for our review:

Did the circuit court err when it affirmed the Commission's finding that appellee was a covered employee under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act for the injuries he suffered outside the State of Maryland?

Discerning no error, we shall affirm the determinations of the circuit court.

I.

Appellee, Nicholas L. Payne, a resident of Madison, Virginia, was employed as a plumber by Appellant, Shapiro and Duncan, Inc., a construction company incorporated in Maryland.² In the course of his employment with Shapiro and Duncan, Inc. in 2010,³ Payne worked at one job site in Maryland and two job sites in Virginia. ⁴ Payne also attended meetings in Maryland in the course of his employment.

On October 20, 2010, Payne and his supervisor were passing through Washington, D.C., on their way from their work site in Virginia to a meeting at Shapiro and Duncan, Inc.'s fabrication plant in Landover, Maryland. Payne's supervisor was driving the company-owned vehicle when he accidentally collided with another vehicle. Payne suffered an injury to his back in the collision.

Payne filed a claim against Shapiro and Duncan, Inc. with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission. On September 7, 2011, the Commission authorized a compensation award in Payne's favor, concluding that Payne had sustained an accidental injury in the course of his employment with Shapiro and Duncan, Inc.⁵

The Appellants jointly petitioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for judicial review of the Commission's determination. Following a de novo bench trial on June 19, 2012, the circuit court also found in favor of Payne, concluding that jurisdiction over Payne's claim was appropriate in Maryland. On July 13, 2012, the Appellants timely filed a joint notice of the instant appeal.

II.

Appellants contend that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in determining that Maryland had jurisdiction over Payne's compensation claim. Appellants assert that Payne was not “regularly employed” in Maryland, and therefore, is not a “covered employee” as that term is defined in the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellants also contend that Payne's compensation claim would have been more appropriately filed in Virginia, but assert that the provisions of the Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act were not relevant to the question of whether appellant was a covered employee under the Maryland law, and therefore, the court's consideration of the Virginia Act at trial constituted an abuse of the court's discretion.

Payne responds, asserting that the circuit court's conclusion that appellant was a “covered employee” who was entitled to compensation for his work related injury from his Maryland employer was legally correct and fully supported by the admissible evidence presented at trial. Payne further asserts that because there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determinations, even without reference to Virginia law, any error in the trial court's consideration of Virginia's compensation statutes was harmless.

III.

We find the Court of Appeals' opinion in Pro–Football, Inc. v. McCants, 428 Md. 270, 51 A.3d 586 (2012), to be helpful in succinctly stating the applicable law and standard of review to which we must adhere in the instant appeal:

“When an individual seeks to secure workers' compensation coverage for an injury sustained on the job, the first question to be resolved is whether he or she is a ‘covered employee.’ ” W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 414 Md. 195, 206 [994 A.2d 956] (2010). This is because the Commission has jurisdiction to hear only those claims brought by a “covered employee” as that term is employed in the Workers' Compensation Act. See generally§§ 9–709 through 9–711. Whether an individual is a “covered employee” depends on whether the individual is an employee of the employer, § 9–202(a); and on the site of the employment. See§ 9–203; ⁶see also McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek, 375 Md. 574, 581 [826 A.2d 474] (2003). As to the site of employment, “an individual who is employed wholly outside of this State is not a covered employee,” § 9–203(c), and an individual whose work takes place entirely “in this State” is a covered employee. § 9–203(a)(1).

The question is a closer one when an individual's employment necessitates work both inside and outside of Maryland. Under § 9–203(a)(2), an individual working across state lines may qualify as a covered employee if the individual works “regularly” in Maryland and on a “casual, incidental, or occasional basis” outside of the state. An individual who only works “intermittently or temporarily” in Maryland is not a covered employee if five other conditions, not pertinent here, are met. See§ 9–203(b)(i)–(v).

* * *

The parties' dispute requires us to determine whether [the employee] was “regularly employ[ed]” in Maryland such that, in this case, his activity in Virginia is “ca[su]al, incidental, or occasional” within the meaning of § 9–203(a)(2). When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain legislative intent. W.M. Schlosser Co., 414 Md. at 203 [994 A.2d 956]. Construction of a statute begins and ends with the plain meaning, when that meaning is clear and unambiguous. Id. at 203–04 . Moreover, when we set out to interpret a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, we construe its provisions “liberally, where possible, in order to effectuate the broad remedial purpose of the statutory scheme.” Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Danner, 388 Md. 649, 659 [882 A.2d 271] (2005).

We bear in mind, too, that the posture of the instant appeal requires our review of a Commission decision first reviewed by the Circuit Court during a de novo trial proceeding. See § 9–745(d); see also General Motors Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md.App. 68, 73 [555 A.2d 542] (1989) (noting that “an appeal to the circuit court from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is totally different” from an appeal taken generally from an administrative decision under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act). We are not tasked, however, with review of the Commission's or Circuit Court's factual findings, to which we would owe deference. W.M. Schlosser Co., 414 Md. at 205 [994 A.2d 956] (quoting Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571 [873 A.2d 1145] (2005)). Instead, we are called upon to determine whether each respective tribunal was legally correct in its construction and application of § 9–203. Cosby v. Dep't of Human Res., 425 Md. 629, 638 [42 A.3d 596] (2012) (quotation marks omitted).

In that mode, we do not interpret the Workers' Compensation Act in a vacuum; rather, we review the Commission's interpretation of a statute it enforces. We “determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” W.M. Schlosser Co., 414 Md. at 204 [994 A.2d 956] (quoting Md. Aviation Admin., 386 Md. at 571 [873 A.2d 1145] ). That determination is not made de novo, substituting our judgment for that of the Commission. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Carpenter, 424 Md. 401, 413 [36 A.3d 439] (2012). We recognize the Commission's expertise in the field of workers' compensation and consequently grant a degree of deference to the Commission's interpretation. Id. “We are under no constraint, however, to affirm an agency decision premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Thomas v. State Ret. & Pension Sys., 420 Md. 45, 54–55 [21 A.3d 1042] (2011) (quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 280, 282–83, 51 A.3d 586 (parallel citations omitted).

The parties agree that at the time of the accident, Payne was an employee of Shapiro and Duncan, Inc. The parties further agree that Payne worked neither wholly inside nor wholly outside of Maryland. The parties' dispute centers on whether Payne's interstate employment qualifies him as a “covered employee” under L.E. § 9–203(a)(2). The parties specifically dispute whether Payne's work on a single job in Maryland and attendance at meetings in Maryland constitutes regular employment in the State; and whether the substantial time Payne spent in Virginia may be characterized as “casual, incidental, or occasional” under L.E. § 9–203(a)(2).

Accordingly, our analysis in this case turns upon whether Payne was correctly classified by the Commission, and subsequently by the circuit court, as a “covered employee,” i.e., an employee who was “regularly” employed in Maryland and who works outside of this State on only “a casual, incidental, or occasional basis.” L.E. § 9–203(a)(2). In deciding whether an employee works regularly in Maryland, we consider the facts and circumstances presented in each case, including: 1) the nature of the employer's work; 2) the scope and purpose of the claimant's hiring; 3) the actual and intended duration of the claimant's employment; and, 4) whether the claimant's work was occasional, incidental, accidental, or a usual part of the employer's business. Pohopek, 375 Md. at 586–87, 826 A.2d 474;see also McCants, 428 Md. at 283–84, 51 A.3d 586 (quoting Pohopek, also...