Sharpe v. Westmoreland

2020 IL 124863

181 N.E.3d 673

450 Ill.Dec. 321

Matt SHARPE

v.CRYSTAL WESTMORELAND, Appellee

(Kris Fulkerson, Appellant).

Docket No. 124863

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed September 24, 2020.

Michael A. Scodro and Brett E. Legner, of Mayer Brown LLP, and John Knight and Karen Sheley, of Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., both of Chicago, for appellant.

Barbara L. Sherer and Sarah Sherer-Kohlburn, Sherer Law Offices, of Edwardsville, for appellee.

Michael G. DiDomenico, of Lake Toback DiDomenico, and Paul L. Feinstein, of Paul L. Feinstein, Ltd., both of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.

Michael L. Brody and Jacob A. Seiden, of Winston & Strawn LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae National Association of Social Workers.

OPINION

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 After A.S.'s father passed away, his civil union partner filed a petition in the circuit court of Madison County seeking visitation and an allocation of parental responsibilities as A.S.'s stepparent. The circuit court, after initially granting leave to intervene, certified two questions to the appellate court, both of which asked, in essence, whether a civil union partner is a "step-parent" as defined by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act's (Dissolution Act) ( 750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2016)) provisions that grant stepparents standing to seek visitation and parental responsibilities of their stepchildren. The appellate court answered the certified questions in the negative, and we granted leave to appeal.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The facts of this case are straightforward. Matt Sharpe and Crystal Westmoreland were married and had a child, A.S. The marriage was dissolved in January 2013, and as part of that dissolution, Sharpe and Westmoreland agreed to a joint parenting agreement. The parents shared equal parenting time, but A.S.'s legal residence was with Sharpe. In November 2013, Sharpe entered into a civil union with Kris Fulkerson. A.S. continued to reside with Sharpe, Fulkerson, and Fulkerson's three children. Sharpe passed away on January 2, 2017. After Sharpe's death, Westmoreland no longer let A.S. live with or visit Fulkerson and Fulkerson's children, so Fulkerson filed petitions seeking visitation and an allocation of parental responsibilities for A.S.

¶ 4 The circuit court granted Fulkerson leave to intervene before granting Westmoreland's motion to certify a question of law to the appellate court and staying proceedings. Ill. S. Ct. R. 308 (eff. July 1, 2017). The court certified two questions: whether a party to a civil union has standing to request visitation with her deceased partner's child as a stepparent and whether that party has standing to request parental responsibilities. The appellate court answered both questions in the negative. 2019 IL App (5th) 170321, ¶ 11, 430 Ill.Dec. 602, 126 N.E.3d 690. After initially filing its decision as a Rule 23 order ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(b) (eff. Apr. 1, 2018)), the appellate court granted Westmoreland's motion to publish. We granted leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018). We allowed the National Association of Social Workers and The Illinois Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers to file amicus curiae briefs.

¶ 5 ANALYSIS

¶ 6 This appeal is from the appellate court's answers to two questions certified pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. July 1, 2017). "By definition, certified questions are questions of law subject to de novo review." Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora , 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21, 421 Ill.Dec. 881, 102 N.E.3d 162.

¶ 7 The Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act (Civil Union Act) ( 750 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 2016)) defines a civil union as "a legal relationship between 2 persons, of either the same or opposite sex, established pursuant to this Act." Id. § 10. Individuals who are prohibited from marrying are also prohibited from entering into a civil union. Compare id. § 25, with 750 ILCS 5/212 (West 2016). Westmoreland does not dispute that Sharpe and Fulkerson validly entered into a civil union pursuant to the Civil Union Act. She likewise does not dispute that they remained civilly united at Sharpe's death. Rather, she argues that a party to a civil union is not married to her partner and cannot be a stepparent as defined by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) ( 750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2016)). Therefore, Westmoreland argues, Fulkerson lacks standing under the Dissolution Act to petition for visitation and allocation of parental responsibilities.

¶ 8 We start by looking at the relevant statutory provisions. The Dissolution Act strictly limits who may file a petition for visitation or allocation of parental responsibilities for a child. Stepparents are treated somewhat preferentially in relation to other persons who are not the natural parent of the child in that they may seek an allocation of parental responsibilities under certain circumstances if the parent to whom he or she was married dies or becomes disabled. Id. § 601.2(b)(4). They may also seek visitation—a right granted to only three other classes of nonparents: grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings—if one of the listed circumstances are present. Id. § 602.9(c)(1). The Dissolution Act defines a "stepparent" as "a person married to a child's parent, including a person married to the child's parent immediately prior to the parent's death." Id. §§ 600(l ), 602.9(a)(3).

¶ 9 A party to a civil union is "a person who has established a civil union pursuant to [the Civil Union] Act." 750 ILCS 75/10 (West 2016). "[A]ny definition or use of the terms ‘spouse’, ‘family’, ‘immediate family’, ‘dependent’, ‘next of kin’, and other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout the law," includes a " ‘[p]arty to a civil union.’ " Id. "A party to a civil union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law." Id. § 20. The Civil Union Act is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes," which expressly include providing civil union partners with those obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits. Id. § 5.

¶ 10 To answer both certified questions, we must answer the same question of law: whether the legislature intended for a person civilly united to a parent to fit within the definition of a "step-parent" under the Dissolution Act. To do this, of course, we look to the statutory language, which, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the most reliable indicator of the legislative intent. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum , 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479, 203 Ill.Dec. 463, 639 N.E.2d 1282 (1994). We give the words of a statute their plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning unless doing so would defeat the legislative intent. Accettura v. Vacationland, Inc. , 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11, 440 Ill.Dec. 636, 155 N.E.3d 406.

¶ 11 In this case, the legislature expressly stated the purposes of the Civil Union Act, one of which is to "provide persons entering into a civil union with the obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses." 750 ILCS 75/5 (West 2016). It expressed its intent that the Civil Union Act be liberally construed to promote that purpose. Id. It declared that the "legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits" to which a party to a civil union was entitled could "derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law." Id. § 20. The legislative intent is thus clear and unambiguous: the General Assembly intended to create an alternative to marriage that was equal in all respects and, important at that time, open to two persons of the same sex. By way of the Civil Union Act, it changed the definition of the word "spouse" and any "other terms that denote the spousal relationship" throughout the Illinois Compiled Statutes to include a party to a civil union. Id. § 10.

¶ 12 Westmoreland argues that the Civil Union Act only refers to "obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits" of partners vis-à-vis each other. She argues that the legislative intent of the language equating civil union partners to spouses was that they be deemed equivalent only for purposes of their own relationships. She points to certain provisions in the Dissolution Act that reference civil union partners, all of which, she claims, address the partners' rights in relation to one another.

¶ 13 Westmoreland does not cite any statutory provision in either act that expressly excludes a civil union partner from any obligation, responsibility, protection, or benefit to which a spouse is entitled. Rather, she relies on express references to the Civil Union Act in other provisions of the Dissolution Act and statements during a legislative debate of the Illinois House of Representatives. "When the drafters' intent can be ascertained from the statutory language, it must be given effect without resort to other aids for construction." Illinois Graphics , 159 Ill. 2d at 479, 203 Ill.Dec. 463, 639 N.E.2d 1282. We find the language of the Civil Union Act clear and thus do not consider Westmoreland's arguments about the legislative history.

¶ 14 Moreover, she asks us to read a limitation into the statute. A "person married to a child's parent" ( 750 ILCS 5/600(l ) (West 2016); id. § 602.9(a)(3)) is the parent's spouse. The Civil Union Act entitles a partner to a civil union to the "same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits" as a spouse ( 750 ILCS 75/20 (West 2016) ), even when the statute uses "other terms that denote the...