Sigui v. M + M Commc'ns, Inc.

484 F.Supp.3d 29

Juan SIGUI, Jose Sigui, Jose Cipriano, Joseph Mendez, Jose L. Santos, Jerome Johnson, Nelkin Ramirez, and Adalberto Molina, Plaintiffs,

v.M + M COMMUNICATIONS, INC. alias, M & M Corporation LA Inc., Defendants.

C.A. No. 1:14-CV-00442-MSM-LDA

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

Signed September 3, 2020

Richard A. Sinapi, Sinapi Law Associates, Ltd., Chloe A. Davis, Sinapi Law Associates, Warwick, RI, for Plaintiffs.

Dean J. Wagner, Shechtman Halperin Savage LLP, Pawtucket, RI, James G. Atchison, DarrowEverett LLP, Providence, RI, for Defendant M+M Communications Inc.

Michael D. Chittick, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Providence, RI, Annette A. Idalski, Pro Hac Vice, Chamberlain Hrdlicka White Williams & Aughtry, Peter N. Hall, Pro Hac Vice, Chamberlain Hrdlicka, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Cox Rhode Island Telcom, LLC, CoxCom, LLC.

Dean J. Wagner, Shechtman Halperin Savage LLP, Pawtucket, RI, for Defendant William Dowling.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.

The plaintiffs, Juan Sigui, Jose Sigui, Jose Cipriano, Joseph Mendez, Jose L. Santos, Jerome Johnson, and Adalberto Molina, each worked as Field Service Technicians for defendants M + M Communications, Inc. and M & M Corporation LA, Inc.¹ (collectively "M + M") between 2011 and 2014 for the purpose of performing installation, maintenance, and construction services on cable television, internet, and telephone lines equipment for Cox Communications ("Cox"). The plaintiffs have brought this action asserting that M + M had at times misclassified them as independent contractors rather than employees, failed to pay them wages for all hours worked, and failed to pay overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in any one workweek.

The plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment as to liability on three claims:

1. That M + M has misclassified the plaintiffs as independent contractors for periods of time in violation of R.I.G.L. § 28-14-19.1 ;

2. That M + M failed to pay the plaintiffs wages for all hours worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and/or the Rhode Island Payment of Wages Act ("RIPWA"), R.I.G.L. § 28-12-1 et seq. and § 28-14-1 et seq. ; and

3. That M + M has failed to pay the plaintiffs overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek in violation of the FLSA and the RIPWA.

M + M has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the same issues.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 132) and DENIES M + M's Cross-Motion (ECF No. 138).

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

The plaintiffs were hired and paid by M + M as Field Service Technicians ("Technicians") to perform on-site installation, maintenance, and/or construction work on cable television, internet, and/or telephone lines and equipment for customers of Cox in and around the State of Rhode Island. Throughout their tenure with M + M, each plaintiff, except plaintiff Johnson, was paid as an IRS Form W-2 employee for a certain amount of time and as an IRS Form 1099 independent contractor for other periods of time.² (ECF No. 132-2 ¶¶ 91-95, 97-101.) The work that plaintiffs performed for M + M and the terms and conditions of employment to which they were subject remained the same whether they were paid as W-2 employees or as independent contractors.

A. Hiring and Training

Each year, M +M signed a Field Service Agreement ("FSA") with Cox that dictated the terms, conditions, and manner in which M + M provided services for Cox. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Pursuant to those FSAs, Technicians hired by M + M had to complete background checks and were evaluated by M + M's General Manager to determine if they met certain standards that qualified them to work for M + M. Id. ¶¶ 7, 85. Once hired, Technicians were required to, among other things, successfully complete the requirements prescribed in the "Qualified Cox Contractor Requirements Program" to work on Cox customer accounts through M + M. Id. ¶¶ 22-24. Technicians were then required to attend weekly mandatory meetings every Thursday morning to receive ongoing training. Id. ¶¶ 30. The training included reviewing training materials and handouts provided by Cox detailing minimum standards on how Technicians were required to properly perform their work. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 30-31.

B. Assignment of Work

After a Cox customer requested a service to be performed, Cox would generate a work order that included the precise date and time block that the requested work was scheduled to be performed, the specific Technician identified by technician number who was assigned to perform the work, the name, address and account number of the customer, the precise work location, the particular work to be performed for the customer, the supplies that the Technician needed to bring to complete the work, and the point value assigned for the work that the customer requested. Id. ¶ 62. The work order was produced through Cox's proprietary database known as ICOMS and assigned to M + M via ICOMS and into a workforce management system known as ETA. Id. ¶¶ 65-66, 68. Cox granted M + M access to ICOMS and ETA and gave M + M a series of technician identification numbers that M + M would assign to each Technician. Id. ¶ 67.

The plaintiffs, like all Technicians, were required to use the ETA system to electronically notify M + M and Cox when they commenced work for a customer and when they completed the work and the specific work they performed. Id. ¶ 108. At the end of the day, Technicians checked in with M + M to see if there were any additional work orders for that day. Id. ¶ 109.

The parties dispute that the Technicians were required to show up to M + M's Warwick facility at 7:30 a.m. Monday through Saturday. (ECF No. 139 ¶ 128.) It also is disputed that the Technicians were required to collect all of their equipment and supplies from M + M's Warwick warehouse. Id. ¶ 136.

M + M assigned the plaintiffs work on weekdays according to two-hour time blocks beginning at 8:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. and ending at or about 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. (ECF No. 132-2 ¶ 106.) M + M disputes, however, that the plaintiffs were assigned to all blocks each day as well as the plaintiffs’ assertion that they often worked twelve-hour days up to six days a week. (ECF No. 139 ¶¶ 129-30.)

C. Supervision and Control

M + M required the plaintiffs to perform their work according to guidelines and specifications established by Cox. (ECF No. 132-2 ¶ 41.) M + M and Cox monitored the plaintiffs’ performance of work through inspections and customer feedback to ensure that it was performed in accordance with those guidelines. Id. ¶¶ 46-52. Inspection results and feedback were used to train Technicians at the M + M mandatory weekly meetings at its Warwick facility. Id. ¶ 50. Further, M + M used this information to provide a ranking of each Technician's performance level compared to other Technicians. Id. ¶ 52.

M + M also had a system of "back charging" in place where M + M could deduct an amount from a technician's paycheck for improper or incomplete work. Id. ¶ 60. Though it had the ability to do so, M + M maintains that it never actually back charged any of these plaintiffs. (ECF No. 139 ¶ 153.)

M + M supplied and mandated the type, style, and color of the plaintiffs’ uniforms and required the display of M + M and Cox's business names on the plaintiff's uniforms and vehicles. (ECF No. 132-2 ¶¶ 75-77, 79, 81.) M + M also provided the plaintiffs with certain supplies and equipment necessary to perform the work. Id. ¶¶ 118-19. The plaintiffs, however, provided their own vehicles, some additional tools, and, during the period they were classified as independent contractors, liability insurance. Id. ¶ 123.

The plaintiffs did not negotiate, bid on, refuse, or select the work assignments issued by M + M. Id. ¶ 114.

D. Compensation Scheme

The plaintiffs did not negotiate their own rates and pay structure with M + M nor were they able to submit a bid for performance of the work.³ Id. Instead, the plaintiffs were each paid fixed, per-task rates for the assigned work completed, based upon a task-based system of compensation.

In 2011, the compensation scheme was based on monetary values assigned to each discrete task assigned to and properly completed by the plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 140. Beginning sometime in 2012, Cox assigned a certain "point" value to each discrete task completed by the plaintiffs, based upon the average amount of time that it was estimated to take a technician to complete a particular job. Id. ¶ 141. The parties dispute whether a "point" was equal to five minutes of work performed. (ECF No. 139 ¶ 142.) Nevertheless, the plaintiffs were paid weekly based on the number of points earned from completing assigned tasks multiplied by the dollar value M + M assigned to a point. (ECF No. 132-2 ¶ 147.)

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment's role in civil litigation is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Garside v. Osco Drug. Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment can be granted only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. "A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party. A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law." Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000).

When examining cross-motions for summary judgment the applicable standard does not change, and the Court must "consider each motion separately, drawing all...