Case Law Smallwood v. State

Smallwood v. State

Document Cited Authorities (18) Cited in (93) Related

Rachel Simmonsen, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Brenda Gruss, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.

Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Hotten, J.

We consider whether a petition filed under § 8–301 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("Crim. Proc.") of the Maryland Code, provides relief to a Petitioner who alleges "newly discovered evidence" that he was erroneously deemed criminally responsible during his 1985 reverse waiver hearing, when he should have been deemed not criminally responsible ("NCR").

On October 22, 1984, then fifteen-year-old Dameron Smallwood ("Petitioner") fatally stabbed Madge K. Gibson ("Ms. Gibson") in her Baltimore County apartment. Petitioner was charged as an adult, but sought to be tried as a juvenile. At a reverse waiver hearing,1 held February 6– 7, and March 8, 1985, several psychiatric experts testified regarding Petitioner's amenability to treatment and opined that he was not "legally insane" at the time of the crime. The circuit court denied Petitioner's request to transfer the case back to juvenile court. Petitioner was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder and other related charges following a not guilty, agreed statement of facts proceeding, and sentenced to life in prison.

Twenty-six years later, the psychiatrist who originally examined Petitioner concluded her original diagnosis was incorrect. The psychiatrist now opined that Petitioner should have been deemed NCR at the time of his 1985 proceedings. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for "writ of actual innocence" under Crim. Proc. § 8–301, alleging that this revised expert opinion constituted "newly discovered evidence" that generated a "substantial or significant possibility that the result [of Petitioner's 1985 proceeding] may have been different."

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the Circuit Court for Baltimore County's denial of Petitioner's petition for a writ of actual innocence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of our discussion, the events giving rise to our inquiry revolve around three events: (1) the reverse waiver hearing held on February 6, 7 and March 8, 1985; (2) the plea agreement proceeding where Petitioner pled not guilty on an agreed statement of facts held on March 13, 1985; and (3) the motions hearing relative to the petition for writ of actual innocence held on November 2, 2012.

According to Dr. Ellen McDaniel's ("Dr. McDaniel's") original January 24, 1985 psychiatric report, her testimony from Petitioner's 1985 reverse waiver hearing, and her deposition testimony from November 17, 2011, Petitioner grew up in a highly abusive, toxic domestic environment that greatly impacted his mental development. Petitioner's father was an alcoholic, and his mother was "an extremely bizarre, at times explosive woman" who suffered from severe mental illness. As a child, Petitioner was verbally and physically abused by his mother. She once beat Petitioner and his siblings so badly that they required hospitalization. She also threatened "to beat [Petitioner] on the head and watch his brains flow out." By the age of ten, Petitioner had lived in three foster homes, which were also abusive settings, and attended several different schools. Petitioner also spent two years in a residential psychiatric facility for children, before returning to live with his mother. During this time, Petitioner and his brother slept on the floor, and did not have sufficient clothing to wear to school.

In the week prior to Ms. Gibson's death, Petitioner was suspended from school for talking back to a teacher. Petitioner's mother became angry and refused to let him leave the house for several days. She also screamed, nagged, and yelled at him repeatedly throughout the weekend. At one point, she told him "she was going to cut [him] up and put [him] in a bag and throw [him] in the dumpster."

On the morning of October 22, 1984, Petitioner's mother finally let Petitioner leave the house to purchase cat food. While Petitioner was out, he continued to hear her voice, screaming, like a "buzzing in his ear," and began fantasizing.2

After purchasing the cat food, Petitioner went to his old neighborhood and the apartment building where he had previously lived with his mother. Petitioner knocked on the door of one of the apartments and a woman answered. Petitioner asked if the "man of the house was home," but when the woman's husband came to the door, Petitioner mumbled about being at the wrong house and left.

Petitioner then knocked on Ms. Gibson's door, and announced he had a package to deliver that required Ms. Gibson's signature. When Ms. Gibson opened the door, while on the phone with her daughter, Petitioner stabbed her ten times.3 Thereafter, Petitioner fled, and was observed disposing of a bloody, brown paper bag, and several articles of clothing disappeared from his person. Ms. Gibson later died from her injuries.

I. Reverse Waiver Hearing

After Petitioner was indicted for first-degree murder and related offenses, his attorneys petitioned for a reverse waiver hearing to transfer Petitioner's case from adult to juvenile court. During the reverse waiver hearing, held on February 6, 7 and March 8, 1985, Petitioner's attorneys first called Dr. Lawrence Donner ("Dr. Donner"), a psychologist, to testify about his diagnoses of Petitioner. Dr. Donner testified that he diagnosed Petitioner with: (1) major depression, recurrent, and (2) an identity disorder. Dr. Donner defined "identity disorder" as:

a condition which if not treated develops into a borderline personality, which indicates that an individual who is rather extremely unpredictable, may have explosive rage attacks, has problems about their own identity because they have never had a role model to identify with, have marked changes in their mood have [a] poor notion of who they are.

Dr. Donner also explained that a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder was excluded as to Petitioner because

[t]here is a problem with diagnostic impressions, and that is his age. He fits very well a diagnosis of borderline personality, but because of his age one cannot make that diagnosis in view of that diagnosis involves the fact that he suffers from, what I see as major depression, recurrent, that he has been depressed much of his life and that he suffers from an identity disorder.
* * *
You cannot make the diagnosis of borderline personality until an individual is 18 years of age because they are still malleable, still plastic. But if [Petitioner] had the same features that he has now at 18 years of age there is no question in my mind a diagnosis—I would diagnose him as a borderline personality just by virtue of age.

Dr. Donner also opined that Petitioner did not suffer from a mental disorder that caused him to be "legally insane," specifically stating that:

[ ] I am airing conservatively[.] [I]t's conceivable he was having a psychotic episode, but I am not testifying to that effect. I cannot say that that didn't happen, but I am not testifying that it did. [Petitioner] has difficulty distinguishing at times between reality and fantasy. I am not here to testify that he was psychotic at the time, but I cannot say that he wasn't psychotic.

Dr. Donner concluded that, without treatment, Petitioner had "a good chance of becoming a borderline personality." Dr. Donner recommended that Petitioner be waived to juvenile court so he could be admitted into a secure treatment facility.

Petitioner's attorneys then called Dr. McDaniel to testify regarding her diagnoses of Petitioner and the January 24, 1985 psychiatric report she authored regarding his mental status. Dr. McDaniel concluded that Petitioner was "definitely suffering from a mental disorder[,]" and "his problems were intimately tied up [with] the crime." Dr. McDaniel also found that Petitioner had been "absorbed" in his "Jack the Ripper fantasy" when he attacked Ms. Gibson, see supra n. 2, but noted that Petitioner told her Ms. Gibson's "screams ‘made me snap out of it. I realized that what I was doing was wrong.’ " Dr. McDaniel also noted several times in her report that Petitioner appeared "depressed" during her interviews with him. Ultimately, Dr. McDaniel concluded in her report that

[Petitioner] is an emotionally disturbed fifteen year old boy who lives a great portion of his life in fantasies. He has suffered through significant trauma during his childhood; including physical and emotional abuse, constant separations and abandonments by family members, and institutionalization in foster homes and a psychiatric facility. The content of his fantasies partially reflects his rage and feelings of helplessness that have developed over years of repeated severe stress. These fantasies also protect him from feeling despair by endowing him with superpowers which enable him to avoid oppression by adults and win admiration. I do not find him psychotic because he does not demonstrate the thought process disturbance, the paranoid ideation, or the extreme mood swings that are symptoms of psychotic illness. However, [Petitioner's] contact with reality is tenuous and when under stress, he withdraws into his daydreams for comfort and escape.

During the reverse waiver hearing, Dr. McDaniel acknowledged she had difficulty diagnosing Petitioner due to his age because he was "emotionally still in the process of changing," and she "could not pigeonhole him into a diagnosis[.]" On that basis, Dr. McDaniel chose diagnostic categories that were flexible, but not necessarily the most "accurate reflections of what[ ] [was] going on." Ultimately, Dr. McDaniel diagnosed Petitioner with: (1) atypical conduct disorder of...

5 cases
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2017
Smith v. State
"...certain convicted persons to petition for a writ of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. See Smallwood v. State , 451 Md. 290, 313–20, 152 A.3d 776 (2017) (setting forth the legislative history of CP § 8–301 ). CP § 8–301 states, in pertinent part, as follows:(a) A person ch..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2018
Grimm v. State
"...witness's credibility, and make decisions based on its impression of an expert witness's credibility. In Smallwood v. State, 451 Md. 290, 309 n.15, 152 A.3d 776, 786 n.15 (2017), this Court rejected a defendant's contention that this Court should review a trial court's ruling on a petition ..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2020
Faulkner v. State
"...makes a threshold showing that he or she may be actually innocent, "meaning he or she did not commit the crime." Smallwood v. State , 451 Md. 290, 323, 152 A.3d 776 (2017). The second requirement ensures that petitioners exercise diligence to locate evidence of innocence. A petitioner need ..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2019
Smith v. State, 619
"...Md. at 509. Accord Smith, 233 Md. App. at 411. We review the court's decision in this regard for an abuse of discretion. Smallwood v. State, 451 Md. 290, 308-09 (2017). See also Jackson, 164 Md. App. at 712-13 (the "ultimate review" of whether newly discovered evidence merits a new trial is..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2017
State v. Ebb
"...that was either non-biological, 3 or discovered after the one year limitation in Maryland Rule 4–331. See Smallwood v. State , 451 Md. 290, 313–20, 152 A.3d 776, 789–93 (2017) (discussing Crim. Proc. § 8–301's legislative history). Crim. Proc. § 8–301 contains specific pleading requirements..."

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5 cases
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2017
Smith v. State
"...certain convicted persons to petition for a writ of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. See Smallwood v. State , 451 Md. 290, 313–20, 152 A.3d 776 (2017) (setting forth the legislative history of CP § 8–301 ). CP § 8–301 states, in pertinent part, as follows:(a) A person ch..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2018
Grimm v. State
"...witness's credibility, and make decisions based on its impression of an expert witness's credibility. In Smallwood v. State, 451 Md. 290, 309 n.15, 152 A.3d 776, 786 n.15 (2017), this Court rejected a defendant's contention that this Court should review a trial court's ruling on a petition ..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2020
Faulkner v. State
"...makes a threshold showing that he or she may be actually innocent, "meaning he or she did not commit the crime." Smallwood v. State , 451 Md. 290, 323, 152 A.3d 776 (2017). The second requirement ensures that petitioners exercise diligence to locate evidence of innocence. A petitioner need ..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2019
Smith v. State, 619
"...Md. at 509. Accord Smith, 233 Md. App. at 411. We review the court's decision in this regard for an abuse of discretion. Smallwood v. State, 451 Md. 290, 308-09 (2017). See also Jackson, 164 Md. App. at 712-13 (the "ultimate review" of whether newly discovered evidence merits a new trial is..."
Document | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland – 2017
State v. Ebb
"...that was either non-biological, 3 or discovered after the one year limitation in Maryland Rule 4–331. See Smallwood v. State , 451 Md. 290, 313–20, 152 A.3d 776, 789–93 (2017) (discussing Crim. Proc. § 8–301's legislative history). Crim. Proc. § 8–301 contains specific pleading requirements..."

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Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

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  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

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