Smoler v. Bd. of Educ. for W. Northfield Sch. Dist. #31

524 F.Supp.3d 794

Dana SMOLER, Plaintiff,

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR WEST NORTHFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT #31, West Northfield School District #31, Nancy Hammer, Jeffrey Steres, Daphne Frank, Robert Reiss, and Bob Spector, Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-00493

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 5, 2021

Steven Earl Glink, Northbrook, IL, for Plaintiff.

Albert Lynn Himes, Darcee Corinne Williams, Scariano, Himes and Petrarca, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JORGE ALONSO, United States District Judge

In her amended complaint, Plaintiff Dana Smoler brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Defendants, the West Northfield District #31, the Board of Education for West Northfield District #31, and the five individual members of the Board of Education.¹ Defendants now move to dismiss Smoler's amended complaint in its entirety. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion [17].

BACKGROUND

The Court takes the following facts from Smoler's Amended Complaint, which are accepted as true for purposes of deciding the instant motion. Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park , 734 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2013).

Smoler was formerly a "tenured PE / Wellness teacher" at Winkelman School, which is part of the West Northfield School District #31 ("the District"). The District is governed by the Board of Education for West Northfield School District #31 ("the Board"). The Board is made up of five elected board members ("the Board members"). Among other things, the Board is responsible for hiring and firing teachers at Winkelman School.

Although the Amended Complaint is vague on detail, apparently, Smoler had some "unprofessional, negative interactions" with one of her colleagues regarding certain "minority students." In November 2018, Smoler met with the school's assistant principal to discuss the situation. Smoler told the assistant principal that she had tried to deal directly with her colleague but her colleague's responses left her feeling "abused and humiliated." Smoler alleges she never filed a formal written complaint with any administrator or the Board about the matter.

Nevertheless, school administrators launched an internal investigation based on what Smoler had told the assistant principal and eventually reported the results of the investigation to the Board. At a school board meeting on January 24, 2019, the Board discussed the matter in a closed session. Then, in an open session, the Board unanimously passed a resolution to issue Smoler a "Notice of Remedy" ("NTR"). The NTR states that Smoler's claims were fully investigated, and it was determined that the colleague acted professionally at all times. The NTR further states that Smoler "falsely reported that [she was] emotionally abused, bullied and harassed" by her colleague and that Smoler was observed crying about the situation in the hallway during school hours. The NTR concludes this conduct was unprofessional and provides specific actions Smoler would be required to take; the NTR further provides that Smoler's failure to comply with the required actions "may result in discipline, up to and including termination."

Smoler alleges that Defendants never told her about the investigation, its conclusions, or any accusations made against her prior to the Board issuing the NTR. Relatedly, Smoler alleges that Defendants never invited her or any member of her union to attend the January 2019 Board meeting.

In April 2019, Smoler went on leave for severe anxiety, and in July 2019,² Smoler resigned her position at the school. Smoler alleges she resigned because her working conditions had become intolerable. Smoler says that, after the Board issued the NTR, the defendants did a number of things, including (1) shunning and ostracizing Smoler; (2) changing her performance evaluation process; (3) taking away her keys and her access to the district's network; (4) falsely accusing her of making negative comments about the school's principal; and (5) falsely telling others that Smoler went on leave because she was pregnant.

In January 2020, Smoler filed the instant suit. In her amended complaint, Smoler brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for various violations of her civil rights (Counts I, III and IV), as well as state law claims for defamation (Count II) and breach of contract (Count V). Defendants now move to dismiss Smoler's amended complaint in its entirety.

LEGAL STANDARD

"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted." Richards v. Mitcheff , 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim[s] showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under federal notice-pleading standards, a plaintiff's complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts must] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but [they] need not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’ " Alam v. Miller Brewing Co. , 709 F.3d 662, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

Defendants’ arguments for dismissal vary by defendant. The Court first addresses the parties’ arguments relating to West Northfield School District #31, then the arguments relating to the individual Board members, and finally, the arguments relating to the Board.

I. Claims against Defendant West Northfield School District #31

Defendants argue that the District should be dismissed because it is not a proper party. More specifically, Defendants contend that dismissal is appropriate because, under Illinois law, a school district does not have the capacity to sue or be sued. (Memo. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 6, ECF No. 18.) Smoler responds that the District does have the capacity to sue or be sued here, but Smoler consents to dismissing the District as a defendant, in light of the fact that she also names the Board as a Defendant. (Resp. at 4-5, ECF No. 20.)

The Court looks to Illinois law to determine whether a school district has the capacity to be sued here. See DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage Cty. , 209 F.3d 973, 977 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) ). The Illinois School Code states a school district's board of education has the capacity to sue or be sued. 105 ILCS 5/10-2. Relying on this provision, Illinois courts have held that while a school board is a proper defendant, a school district is not, unless another provision of the school code or another statute specifically authorizes a school district to sue or be sued. See Veazey v. Bd. of Educ. of Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227 , 2016 IL App (1st) 151795, ¶ 27, 406 Ill.Dec. 79, 59 N.E.3d 857, 865 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) ; see also Bd. of Educ. of Bremen High Sch. Dist. No. 228 v. Mitchell , 387 Ill. App. 3d 117, 120, 899 N.E.2d 1160, 1162, 326 Ill.Dec. 509 (2008) ("[O]ur courts have defined a school district as a geographical area that generally lacks the capacity to sue unless expressly authorized by statute to do so.").

Citing Mitchell and a couple decisions from this district applying Illinois law, Defendants argue that "the School District's legal identity is the Board of Education" and that only the Board may sue and be sued. (ECF No. 18 at 3.) Again, the Court understands Defendants to argue that the District lacks the legal capacity to be sued. Some courts in this district have dismissed defendant school districts, or have approved of a plaintiff voluntarily dismissing a defendant school district, on this basis. See e.g., Peoples v. Oswego Cmty. Sch. Dist. , No. 19-cv-000568, 2020 WL 1330652, at *3 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2020) (noting that school board, as opposed to school district, was proper defendant where plaintiff brought § 1983 claims and state law tort claims); see also Snow v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201 , No. 16-CV-2685, 2016 WL 5391222, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2016) (dismissing school district where plaintiff brought Title VII claims); Matavka v. Bd. of Educ. of J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201 , No. 15 C 10330, 2016 WL 4119949, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016) (approving of voluntary dismissal where plaintiff brought § 1983 and Title VII claims); Klean v. Bd. of Educ. of Proviso Twp. Sch. Dist. 209 , No. 08 C 6233, 2010 WL 3732218, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2010) (dismissing school district where plaintiff brought § 1983 and Title VII claims).

To be clear, Illinois law does not say that a school district categorically lacks the capacity to sue or be sued; again, a school district can sue or be sued if a statute expressly permits it. Mitchell , 387 Ill. App. 3d at 120, 326 Ill.Dec. 509, 899 N.E.2d 1160 ; see also Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303 , 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015) (leaving open the question of whether a school district itself is amenable to suit but observing that it had dealt with claims against school districts in the past and that the federal statutory claim plaintiff advanced would seem to expressly permit suing a school district). However, in response to Defendants’ motion, Smoler does not point to a portion of the Illinois School Code or any other statute that permits her to sue the school district...