Soderberg v. Weisel

Page 839

687 A.2d 839

455 Pa.Super. 158

Carl SODERBERG and Sharon R. Soderberg, h/w v. Lester L. WEISEL and Agnus M. Weisel, h/w, Appellants.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 21, 1996.

Filed Jan. 7, 1997.

[455 Pa.Super. 161] Stephen A. Shelly, Lansdale, for appellants.

Tamara C. Gureghian and Greg B. Emmons, Doylestown, for appellees.

Before CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus, and SAYLOR and HOFFMAN, JJ.

OPINION

CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus:

This is an appeal from a final decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The majority of the facts relevant to a determination of this appeal are not contested. The parties agree that an easement by prescription exists consisting of an access lane on property owned by Carl and Sharon Soderberg ("The Soderbergs"). ¹ Appellants, Lester L. Weisel and Agnus M. Weisel ("The Weisels"), use the easement for ingress and egress of farm equipment to their farm from Sleepy Hollow Road in Milford Township, Bucks County. The Weisels' farm is located adjacent to the Soderbergs' residence. The easement runs east and then north from Sleepy Hollow Road, traversing first the Mancini's parcel (over which the Weisels have an express right-of-way created by deed) then through the Soderbergs' parcel, passing directly next to the Soderbergs' home. Because large farm equipment was operated so close to their home and because they had young children, the Soderbergs became concerned that an accident might occur. Consequently, the Soderbergs proposed a relocation of the easement to the north of their home so as to reduce the risk of an accident. The Weisels rejected the Soderbergs' proposed relocation of the easement. The Soderbergs brought this action to quiet title, or in the alternative, to relocate the easement. After two hearings, the trial court entered an adjudication order and decree nisi. The court found, inter alia, that the Weisels possessed and enjoyed prescriptive easement rights over the Soderbergs' land, the Soderbergs were entitled to relocate the easement, and the Weisels were required to pay one half the relocation costs. Post-trial motions were filed and denied and a final decree was entered. This appeal followed. The Weisels present three questions for our consideration:

1. After a lower court finds that a party possesses prescriptive rights to an access way, can the court then order the relocation of that access way thereby terminating that party's original prescriptive rights?

2. Was the evidence sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that the access way represented a dangerous situation and continuing interference with the Soderbergs' quiet enjoyment of their land?

3. Can a court acting in equity direct the Weisels to contribute one-half the cost of relocating the access way?

Preliminarily, we note that appellate review of an equity matter is limited to a determination of whether the chancellor committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Marchetti v. Karpowich, 446 Pa.Super. 509, 667 A.2d 724 (1995); Purdy v. Zaver, 398 Pa.Super. 190, 580 A.2d 1127 (1990). The scope of review of a final decree in equity is limited and will not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by the evidence or demonstrably capricious. Sprankle v. Burns, 450 Pa.Super. 319, 675 A.2d 1287 (1996); Hostetter v. Hoover, 378 Pa.Super. 1, 547 A.2d 1247 (1988). However, "conclusions of law or fact, being derived from nothing more than the chancellor's reasoning from underlying facts and not involving a determination of credibility of witnesses are reviewable." Sprankle, 450 Pa.Super. at 322, 675 A.2d at 1288 (quoting Krosnar v. Schmidt Krosnar McNaughton Garrett Co., 282 Pa.Super. 526, 534, 423 A.2d 370, 374 (1980)).

The Weisels' first two arguments assert that the trial court lacked the authority to order relocation of the easement because the relocation unreasonably interferes with their use and enjoyment of the easement. The Weisels' first argument actually raises two issues. First, may a prescriptive easement be relocated without the consent of both the landowner and the easement holder? And second, assuming that the law permits such relocation, does a court acting in equity have the power to order a relocation?

A prescriptive easement is a right to use another's property which is not inconsistent with the owner's rights and which is acquired by a use that is open, notorious, and uninterrupted for a period of twenty-one (21) years. Waltimyer v. Smith, 383 Pa.Super. 291, 556 A.2d 912 (1989). "A prescriptive easement, once acquired, may not be restricted unreasonably by the possessor of the land subject to the easement." Palmer v. Soloe, 411 Pa.Super. 444, 601 A.2d 1250 (1992). See Matakitis v. Woodmansee, 446 Pa.Super. 433, 667 A.2d 228 (1995) (erection of gate should not be restrained unless it is unreasonable interference with the easement, or completely denies rights of the user).

It is generally true that easements may not be modified, changed, altered, or relocated without the consent of both the dominant and servient estates. Pennsylvania Water and Power Co., v. Reigart, 127 Pa.Super. 600, 605, 193 A. 311, 314 (1937); see also Woessner v. Wible, 107 Pittsb. Leg. J. 323 (1959) (declaring that the right of an owner of an easement of way cannot, without the consent of the person having easement, change its location). However, there is no per se prohibition against a landowner relocating a prescriptive easement unless such action completely denies the easement holder the intended use of the original easement. Palmer, supra. Rather, courts employ the test of whether the relocation will unreasonably interfere with the easement holder's use and enjoyment of his right of way. Id. What constitutes unreasonable interference on the part of the servient owner depends upon the owner and his desired use, as well as the disadvantage to the owner of the easement. Id.

Our court has indicated that it would permit a servient estate to relocate a prescriptive easement where the resulting easement is as safe as the original location, the relocation results in a relatively minor change, and landowner's reasons for moving the easement are substantial. See Palmer, supra ² (safety, reason for relocation, and degree of change, should all be considered in determining whether relocation unreasonably interferes with the easement holder's use and enjoyment of his easement); Flaherty v. DeHaven, 302 Pa.Super. 412, 448 A.2d 1108 (1982) (right-of-way may not be blocked by land owner, even when easement holder has other means of access over land subject to the right-of-way, where the alternate access was not as safe as the original easement); see also Stoner v. Kuester, 66 York Leg. Rec. 49 (1952) (concluding that land owner's movement of prescriptive easement was valid because only minor changes were made and that the point of beginning and terminus were almost exactly the same). We, therefore, conclude that Pennsylvania law permits a minor, safe relocation of prescriptive easements that does not unreasonably interfere with an easement holder's use and enjoyment. Palmer, supra; Flaherty, supra; Stoner, supra.

The Weisels, however, contend that prescriptive easements are akin to boundary disputes, which are resolved under either a theory of adverse possession or consentable line, a theory separate and distinct from traditional adverse possession. See Niles v. Fall Creek Hunting Club, 376 Pa.Super. 260, 267-68, 545 A.2d 926, 930 (1988) (en banc ); see also Plott v. Cole, 377 Pa.Super. 585, 593-95, 547 A.2d 1216, 1221 (1988). In that regard, the Weisels point out that if a boundary line is established by consent or adverse possession, then such line may not be unilaterally relocated. See Plauchak v. Boling, 439 Pa.Super. 156, 653 A.2d 671, 675 (1995) (holding that neighbors who consent to a property line may not unilaterally relocate such boundary to conform with their respective deeds). We disagree.

A prescriptive easement differs from land acquired by adverse possession, because an adverse possessor acquires the land in fee, whereas the prescriptive easement holder is only entitled to an easement-like use. Newell Rod and Gun Club, Inc. v. Bauer, 409 Pa.Super. 75, 78-79, 597 A.2d 667, 669 (1991); see also O'Hara v. Richardson, 46 Pa. 385, 390-91 (1863) (one who occupies land adversely for the statutory period gains an absolute, marketable title); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 303 Pa. 422, 428-29, 154 A. 492, 494 (1931) (title acquired by adverse possession extinguishes all prior claims). Moreover, when a consentable line is established, the land behind such a line becomes the property of each neighbor regardless of what the deed specifies. Id. In essence, each neighbor gains marketable title to that land behind the line, some of which may not have been theirs under their deeds.

In the case of prescriptive easements, however, the dominant estate never holds title to the easement. Accordingly, prescriptive easements differ from boundaries by consentable line. Because an estate which gains a prescriptive easement over another's land does not have exclusive title in fee over the right-of-way, Plauchak, supra; Newell, supra, if the relocated easement is practically the same in both safety and ease of use to the dominant estate, and the landowner has articulated substantial reasons for the relocation, it is fair and just to refrain from moving the easement back to its original location. ³

Having concluded that we can deny relief to an easement holder whose easement has been unilaterally relocated, Palmer, supra, we must now determine whether a court, through the use of its equitable powers, may compel the relocation of an easement. Our research has uncovered only one Pennsylvania case which has spoken on this issue. In Brown v. Howell, 8 North. Co. R. 181 (1901), a Court of Common Pleas explained that...