Sovie v. Town of North Andover

742 F.Supp.2d 167

Donna SOVIE, Plaintiff,

v.TOWN OF NORTH ANDOVER, North Andover School Committee and Stephen M. Fortado, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2008–10346–RBC.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Oct. 7, 2010.

James L. Ackerman, Stephanie L. Moon, Wadland & Ackerman, Andover, MA, for Plaintiff.Gregor A. Pagnini, Leonard H. Kesten, Brody, Hardon, Perkins, & Kesten LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 29)COLLINGS, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

On February 29, 2008, plaintiff Donna Sovie (“Sovie” or “plaintiff”) filed the present action based on diversity jurisdiction. (# 1, ¶ 3) Sovie subsequently filed an amended complaint on March 6, 2008(# 3), and the Defendants Town of North Andover, North Andover School Committee, and Stephen M. Fortado (“the defendants”) filed their answer to the amended complaint on April 2, 2008.(# 8) On May 10, 2010, the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (# 29), along with a memorandum of law in support of the motion (# 30), a Statement of Undisputed Facts (# 31), exhibits (# 32–42), and the Affidavit of Gregor A. Pagnini. (# 43) On June 14, 2010, the plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (# 46) (later re-filed with leave as # 56), along with a Response to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts (# 47), the Affidavit of Stephanie L. Moon with exhibits (# 48), and the Affidavit of Donna Sovie with exhibits (# 50). On June 22, 2010, defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (# 54) On July 27, 2010, the defendants filed the Affidavits of Stephen Fortado (# 58) and Daniel O'Connor (# 59) with exhibits. This Court must now resolve the issues presented in the defendants' motion for summary judgment.¹

II. Factual Background

The undisputed facts are that on or about January 29, 2007, Sovie entered into an employment agreement with the Town of North Andover Public Schools. (# 47 ¶ 1) Sovie was hired as a Payroll Coordinator for the period of January 29, 2007 through June 30, 2008, with the possibility of renewal upon completion of the contract. (# 47 ¶ 2) In a section entitled “Dismissal, Demotion, or Suspension,” the contract states: “The Superintendent may suspend, demote or dismiss the Coordinator in accordance with the applicable provisions of Massachusetts General Laws.” (# 47 ¶ 3) At the time of Sovie's employment, Dr. Daniel O'Connor (“O'Connor”)—the individual who interviewed and hired Sovie—was the Interim Superintendent of Schools in North Andover and Sovie's sole and direct supervisor. (# 47 ¶¶ 4–5, 7–8) Soon after Sovie began her employment as Payroll Coordinator, O'Connor received several complaints regarding payroll issues. (# 47 ¶ 8)

On April 23, 2007, defendant Stephen Fortado (“Fortado”) began working as the interim business administrator for the town's school system. (# 47 ¶ 11) Fortado states (and Sovie disputes) that in his first week as business administrator, Fortado received numerous complaints about Sovie's job performance. (# 47 ¶ 12) Fortado states that he communicated these complaints to O'Connor; O'Connor then terminated Sovie's employment on April 30, 2007. (# 47 ¶¶ 15, 17)

Several weeks after Sovie was terminated, O'Connor requested that certain employees, including Fortado, create an internal memorandum outlining the reasons for Sovie's termination. (# 47 ¶ 18, 20) Fortado prepared such a memorandum and sent it to O'Connor. (# 47 ¶ 20) Plaintiff brings this action, claiming breach of the employment contract by the town of North Andover and the North Andover School Committee due to the plaintiff's unlawful termination, and claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendant Fortado based on the statements made in an internal memorandum to O'Connor. (# 3)

III. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The purpose of summary judgment is “to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Rojas–Ithier v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico, 394 F.3d 40, 42 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of asserting the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and “support[ing] that assertion by affidavits, admissions, or other materials of evidentiary quality.” Mulvihill v. Top–Flite Golf Co., 335 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2003) (citation omitted). “Once the moving party avers the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the nonmovant must show that a factual dispute does exist, but summary judgment cannot be defeated by relying on improbable inferences, conclusory allegations, or rank speculation.” Fontánez–Núñez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 447 F.3d 50, 54–55 (1st Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In determining whether summary judgment is proper, “a court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir.2006) (citation omitted). Thus, Rule 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “ ‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no “genuine issue for trial.” ’ ” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

B. The Claims

1. Count One—Breach of Contract against Defendants Town of North Andover and North Andover School Committee.

The defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted on Count I for breach of contract because the plaintiff was an employee at-will, and therefore could be terminated with or without reason. (# 30 at 4) Conversely, the plaintiff argues that her termination required “just cause” because the contract was for a definite time period. (# 56 at 5) It is clear that the contract was for a definite term—from January 29, 2007 to June 30, 2008—which, under Massachusetts law, creates a “just cause” requirement for termination. Goldhor v. Hampshire College, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 716, 722, 521 N.E.2d 1381, 1385 (1988) (“[A]n employee with a contract for a term certain may only be terminated prior to the expiration of that term for justifiable cause.”); see also Lemire v. Silva, 104 F.Supp.2d 80, 95 (D.Mass.2000). However, the contract must be viewed as a whole in order to determine whether Sovie's termination required “just cause.” J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 795, 494 N.E.2d 374, 378 (1986) (“A contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions. ‘[E]very phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed, and must be given meaning and effect, whenever practicable, when construed with all the other phraseology contained in the instrument ...’ ”) (quoting Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 501, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original)).

The Court must also consider the contract provision under “Dismissal, Demotion, or Suspension” which states that “[t]he Superintendent may suspend, demote or dismiss the Coordinator in accordance with the applicable provisions of Massachusetts General Laws.” (# 48, exh. 1) The applicable law is Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71 § 42, which states that “subject to the provisions of this section, the superintendent may dismiss any employee of the school district.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71 § 42. The section, in reference to non-teaching employees, does not mention either “at-will” or “for-cause.” Id. The remainder of the section deals specifically with teachers, which is not applicable here, because the plaintiff was a non-teaching employee.

The Court finds that, after considering the contract as a whole, the plaintiff's termination required “just cause.” The statute in question does not state that dismissal of a non-teaching employee requires “just cause” nor does it state that employment is at-will. It simply states that the superintendent has the authority to dismiss employees. This broad language leaves room for employment contracts to contain additional requirements before the superintendent can dismiss an employee, without violating the statute. As a result, the inclusion of a specific period of time in the plaintiff's contract overcame any at-will presumption and imposed the “just-cause” requirement embodied in the common law. The reference to Massachusetts General Laws does not affect this conclusion.²

Having found that the plaintiff's termination required “just cause” under the employment contract, the Court must determine whether the defendants are entitled to summary judgment applying this standard. Although the plaintiff argues otherwise, it is clear that the standard set out in Klein v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 204, 208, 517 N.E.2d 167, 169 (1987), is the applicable and controlling standard for “just cause” under Massachusetts law. See Joyal v. Hasbro, Inc., 380 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S....