Starr v. Ariz. Bd. of Fingerprinting

252 Ariz. 42

497 P.3d 991

Sandra K. STARR, Appellant,

v.ARIZONA BOARD OF FINGERPRINTING, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0432

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Division One.

FILED August 5, 2021

Burns, Nickerson & Taylor, PLC, Phoenix, By Neal C. Taylor, Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, By Eric Schwarz and Dena R. Benjamin, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court's opinion, in which Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop¹ joined.

McMURDIE, Judge:

¶1 Sandra K. Starr appeals from the superior court's dismissal of her appeal from the Arizona Board of Fingerprinting's ("Board") refusal to consider whether she is eligible for a fingerprint clearance card. We affirm the superior court's dismissal and hold: (1) the Board lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review a determination by the Department of Public Safety's Fingerprinting Division ("Department") that Starr is ineligible to receive a fingerprint clearance card; and (2) Starr may seek review of the Department's criminal offense determination under Arizona's Administrative Procedure Act because the time to seek review has not begun to accrue.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 After being offered a promotion that required a background clearance in 2016, Starr applied to the Department for a fingerprint clearance card. The Department denied Starr's application but informed her she might be eligible to apply for a "good cause exception" with the Board, a separate body independent of the Department. The Department based its denial on Starr's felony conviction in 2002 for abandoning or endangering a child under Texas Penal Code § 22.041. The Department classified her conviction as child neglect, which made her eligible to apply to the Board for a good cause exception. A.R.S. § 41-1758.03(C)(48). Starr did not challenge the Department's classification of her conviction, nor did she seek a good cause exception with the Board.

¶3 In 2017, Starr again applied for a fingerprint clearance card, and the Department again denied her application based on the Texas conviction. This time the Department classified the Texas conviction as child abuse, which per se rendered her ineligible to apply for a good cause exception. See A.R.S. § 41-1758.03(B)(10). Starr nevertheless applied for a good cause exception with the Board. The Board responded that she was ineligible to apply for a good cause exception based on the Department's classification of the Texas conviction as child abuse. Starr did not attempt to challenge either the Department's classification or the Board's response.

¶4 In 2019, after earning a new degree and starting a new career, Starr still needed a background clearance, so she applied a third time for a fingerprint clearance card from the Department. The Department again denied her application based on the Texas conviction, which it again classified as child abuse. Starr applied once more for a good cause exception with the Board. And the Board again informed her she was ineligible to apply for a good cause exception due to the Department's classification of her offense as child abuse.

¶5 Starr filed a judicial review action in the superior court under the Administrative Review Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-901 to -914, challenging the Board's 2019 refusal to consider her application for a good cause exception or review the Department's classification of the Texas conviction. In a final Rule 54(c) judgment, the superior court dismissed Starr's complaint, finding that it did not have jurisdiction because Starr was effectively seeking review of decisions issued in 2017, which she failed to appeal timely. Starr appealed to this court, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-913. See Svendsen v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div. , 234 Ariz. 528, 533, ¶ 13, 323 P.3d 1179, 1184 (App. 2014) ; see also Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, LLC, 240 Ariz. 420, 431, ¶ 23, 380 P.3d 659, 671 (App. 2016).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Starr argues she was entitled to a hearing before the Board to determine whether the Department correctly classified her Texas conviction. Starr asserts the Board is more suited to determine whether the conviction is similar to child neglect or child abuse because it can consider more information than the Department. In Starr's view, the Board's authority to review the classification stems from the relevant statutes: (1) a requirement in A.R.S. § 41-1758.01(A)(4) that the Department inform every applicant that they can apply for a good cause exception with the Board; and (2) the requirement in A.R.S. § 41-619.55(C) and (E) that individuals seeking a good cause exception demonstrate they have no offense in their records that would render them ineligible for a fingerprint clearance card. Starr concludes that without this avenue for review of the Department's classification through the Board, she is left with no meaningful due process or remedy to address the Department's asserted error.

¶7 After examining the statutory scheme, we conclude the superior court correctly dismissed Starr's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, albeit for different reasons than the court expressed.

A. The Board Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Review the Department's Classification of Starr's Texas Conviction under A.R.S. § 41-1758.03(B).

¶8 We determine subject-matter jurisdiction and questions of statutory interpretation de novo . Lay v. Nelson , 246 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 8, 436 P.3d 496, 498 (App. 2019) (subject-matter jurisdiction); BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC , 236 Ariz. 363, 365, ¶ 7, 340 P.3d 1071, 1073 (2015) (statutory interpretation). We are not bound by the superior court's legal conclusions and may affirm the court if it reached the correct result even if it did so for different reasons. Collins v. State , 166 Ariz. 409, 413, n.1, 803 P.2d 130, 134 (App. 1990).

¶9 In reviewing the statutes governing fingerprint clearance cards, our objective is to "effectuate the legislature's intent," and the best indicator of that intent is their plain language. SolarCity Corp. v. ADOR , 243 Ariz. 477, 480, ¶ 8, 413 P.3d 678, 681 (2018). "When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent because its intent is readily discernible from the face of the statute." State of Netherlands v. MD Helicopters Inc. , 248 Ariz. 533, 538, ¶ 13, 462 P.3d 1038, 1043 (App. 2020) (quoting Estate of Braden ex rel. Gabaldon v. State , 228 Ariz. 323, 325, ¶ 8, 266 P.3d 349, 351 (2011) ).

¶10 When interpreting the language of statutes, we construe the words and phrases "according to the common and approved use of the language." A.R.S. § 1-213. "Statutory terms, however, must be considered in context." Estate of Braden , 228 Ariz. at 325, ¶ 8, 266 P.3d at 351. We must also construe statutory provisions "in light of their place in the statutory scheme so they may be harmonious and consistent." State v. Flynt , 199 Ariz. 92, ¶ 5, 13 P.3d 1209 (App. 2000) (citation omitted) (quotations omitted). When statutes relate to the same subject matter—that is, when they are in pari materia —they should be "construed together ... as though they constituted one law." State ex rel. Larson v. Farley , 106 Ariz. 119, 122, 471 P.2d 731, 734 (1970). In such situations, "legislative intent ... must be ascertained not alone from the literal meaning of the wording of the statutes but also from the view of the whole system of related statutes." Id.

1. Under the Statutory Scheme Governing Fingerprint Clearance Cards, the Board Does Not Have Authority to Review the Department's Classification of Offenses.

¶11 In Arizona, for many designated occupations or professions, an individual who seeks employment must acquire a fingerprint clearance card. See A.R.S. § 41-1758.01(A)(1) (listing the statutes requiring fingerprint background checks and fingerprint clearance cards). There are two types of fingerprint clearance cards: (1) standard fingerprint clearance cards, A.R.S. § 41-1758.03 ; and (2) "level 1" fingerprint clearance cards, A.R.S. § 41-1758.07. Two distinct, independent entities are vested with the statutory authority over the administration and issuance of fingerprint clearance cards: the Department and the Board. See A.R.S. § 41-1758.01 (establishing the fingerprinting division within the Department of Public Safety); A.R.S. § 41-619.52(A) (establishing the Board).

i. The Department's Statutory Duties

¶12 The Department's relevant duties are outlined in A.R.S. §§ 41-1758 to -1758.08. Under these statutes, the Department is responsible for determining an applicant's eligibility for either type of fingerprint clearance card and issuing it.

¶13 An individual seeking a fingerprint clearance card must provide a completed application along with fingerprints and a fee to the Department, which then conducts a state and federal criminal history records check. A.R.S. § 41-1758.02. Upon receiving the individual's criminal history records, the Department compares the individual's arrest records to two lists of criminal offenses. A.R.S. § 41-1758.03(B), (C) ; see also A.R.S. § 41-1758.07(B), (C) (same for level 1 fingerprint clearance card). The Department must also consider whether any out-of-state offenses contained in the arrest records are "the same or similar" to those listed in subsections B and C of A.R.S. §§ 41-1758.03 and -1758.07. Based on the results of these comparisons, the Department must make one of four decisions.

¶14 First, if the Department finds the individual is not "awaiting trial" and has not "been convicted of committing or attempting, soliciting, facilitating or conspiring to commit" any of the offenses on either list, the Department must issue the person a fingerprint clearance card. A.R.S. §§ 41-1758.03(A), -1758.07(A). Second, if the Department finds an offense that is the same or similar to one...