State v. Deedy

407 P.3d 164

STATE of Hawai'i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Christopher DEEDY, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

SCAP-15-0000440

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

DECEMBER 14, 2017

Thomas M. Otake and Davis L. Livingston, Honolulu, for petitioner.

Donn Fudo, Honolulu, for respondent.

RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ., WITH NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the orders of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court) denying defendant Christopher Deedy's motions to dismiss with prejudice the charges against him. The motions sought to preclude a third trial in this case based on federal and state constitutional grounds, state statutory provisions, and the inherent power of the trial court. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the course of their altercation on November 5, 2011, Christopher Deedy fatally shot Kollin Elderts (the deceased) at a fast food restaurant in Waikiki. Deedy was indicted by a grand jury on November 16, 2011, charging him with murder in the second degree (Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 706-656 (1993 & Supp. 1996) and 707-701.5 (1993) ) and carrying or use of firearm in the commission of a separate felony ( HRS § 134-21 (Supp. 2006) ). The first trial was conducted from July to August 2013. At the settling of the jury instructions, the circuit court noted that both parties had asked that a manslaughter instruction not be given and indicated that, from what the court recalled, it "didn't think there was any evidence to support manslaughter anyway." The circuit court thereafter instructed the jury only on the charged offenses. The jury was deadlocked and unable to reach a verdict, and the circuit court found manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.

A second trial was conducted a year later.¹ At the close of the evidence, the parties objected to submitting instructions on the included offenses of reckless manslaughter, assault in the first degree, and assault in the second degree on the grounds that there was no evidentiary basis to instruct on these offenses. The circuit court overruled the parties' objection and concluded that there was a rational basis in the evidence to give jury instructions on reckless manslaughter and the assault offenses. After six and a half days of deliberation, the jury acquitted Deedy of second-degree murder. The jury was deadlocked on all of the included offenses. The circuit court thereafter entered a not guilty verdict on the second-degree murder count and concluded that Deedy could be retried on the included offenses on which the second jury was hung.

On November 26, 2014, Deedy filed a motion to dismiss the case under the United States Constitution, a motion to dismiss under State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 647 P.2d 705 (1982), a motion to dismiss under the Hawai'i Constitution, and a motion to dismiss under HRS §§ 701-109 to 701-111. The State opposed Deedy's dismissal motions. After Deedy filed an omnibus reply, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court orally ruled against Deedy on his motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Moriwake and later issued a written order denying the motion that set forth findings of facts and conclusions of law. The circuit court, by minute order, also denied Deedy's other dismissal motions and later issued written orders denying these motions.

The circuit court approved Deedy's request to file an interlocutory appeal of the court's denial of Deedy's dismissal motions. Deedy timely filed a notice of appeal, and the appeal was transferred to this court.

II. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

Deedy contends that a third trial in his case is barred based on multiple grounds: (1) principles of double jeopardy under the state and federal constitutions; (2) statutory provisions under the Hawai'i Penal Code that preclude further prosecution; (3) the circuit court's abuse of its discretion in failing to exercise its inherent authority to dismiss the case with prejudice; and (4) his immunity from State prosecution under the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution. Deedy urges this court to vacate the circuit court's orders, hold one or more of his constitutional or other claims meritorious, and remand this case for entry of dismissal with prejudice. The State counters that Deedy's arguments are without merit and also contends that Deedy has waived his claims by raising them in an untimely manner.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Double Jeopardy

Whether double jeopardy principles require the dismissal of a criminal charge is "a question of constitutional law that we review under the right/wrong standard of review." State v. Deguair, 136 Hawai'i 71, 85, 358 P.3d 43, 57 (2015) (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 15, 904 P.2d 893, 900 (1995) ).

B. Statutory Construction

Statutory construction "presents questions of law that are reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard." State v. King, 139 Hawai'i 249, 253, 386 P.3d 886, 890 (2016) (quoting State v. Lei, 95 Hawai'i 278, 281, 21 P.3d 880, 883 (2001) ).

C. Moriwake Analysis

A trial court's application of State v. Moriwake to a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hinton, 120 Hawai'i 265, 278-80, 204 P.3d 484, 498-99 (2009).

The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. The burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant, and a strong showing is required to establish it.

State v. Deguair, 136 Hawai'i 71, 84–85, 358 P.3d 43, 56–57 (2015) (quoting Hinton, 120 Hawai'i at 273, 204 P.3d at 492 ).

D. Supremacy Clause Immunity

"Supremacy Clause immunity dismissals present a mixed question of law and fact and are reviewed de novo." Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Waiver and Forfeiture

As a preliminary matter, the State asserts that Deedy has waived or forfeited claims based upon his double jeopardy and federal immunity motions because the motions were filed well after the conclusion of the second trial. As support for its position, the State relies upon Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 12 (2015), which provides, inter alia, that motions regarding "defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution" must be raised prior to trial and "within 21 days after arraignment unless the court otherwise directs." HRPP Rule 12(b)(1), (c) (emphasis added).² Failure by a party to file pretrial motions in compliance with subsections (b) and (c) of HRPP Rule 12"shall constitute waiver thereof," subject to the court's authority to "grant relief from the waiver." HRPP Rule 12(f).

HRPP Rule 12(b)(1), however, does not apply in this case because the second retrial was not an "institution of [a] prosecution." "A prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is found or a complaint filed, or when an arrest warrant or other process is issued, provided that such warrant or process is executed without unreasonable delay." HRS § 701-108(5) (1993 & Supp. 2006). Thus, a retrial is a continuation of a prosecution that was already instituted, State v. Mundon, 129 Hawai'i 1, 14 n.22, 292 P.3d 205, 219 n.22 (2012) (citing United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 276 (7th Cir. 1992) ), and HRPP Rule 12(b)(1) is accordingly not applicable to a retrial.

Further underscoring the rule's inapplicability is its requirement that "[p]retrial motions and requests must be made within 21 days after arraignment unless the court otherwise directs." HRPP Rule 12(c). Arraignment takes place at the commencement of a prosecution, and no new arraignment is had after a mistrial and before a retrial. See HRPP Rule 5(b) (2008); HRPP Rule 10 (2008). It would therefore not be possible to comply with the HRPP Rule 12(b)(1) deadline for pretrial motions if its requirements were imposed on motions concerning issues relating to a retrial. Accordingly, HRPP Rule 12(b)(1) does not apply to motions filed with respect to a retrial, and we therefore consider the merits of all the contentions that Deedy has asserted in his appeal.

B. Double Jeopardy Principles Under the State and Federal Constitutions

Deedy contends that a third trial is barred by the double jeopardy clauses of article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.³ The double jeopardy clause of the State and federal constitutions "forbid[ ] a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding." State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai'i 128, 140, 938 P.2d 559, 571 (1997) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) ). "Double jeopardy protects individuals against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense." Id. at 141, 938 P.2d at 572 (quoting State v. Ontiveros, 82 Hawai'i 446, 450, 923 P.2d 388, 392 (1996) ).

Deedy raises three arguments to support his constitutional double jeopardy claims: (1) the State abandoned reckless manslaughter and the assault offenses by its trial strategy; (2) the circuit court's ruling in the first trial with respect to the submission of jury instructions on the included offenses constituted an acquittal of the reckless manslaughter and the assault offenses; and (3) even assuming that double jeopardy has not attached, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a third trial.

1. Quitog Abandonment of Reckless Manslaughter and the Assault Offenses

Deedy contends that the State abandoned the reckless manslaughter and assault offenses and is thus barred from retrying him for these offenses under the principles enunciated in State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai'i 128, 938 P.2d...