State v. Farish

499 P.3d 622

STATE of New Mexico Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.John FARISH, Defendant-Petitioner.

No. S-1-SC-36638

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: September 13, 2021

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Steven James Forsberg, Assistant Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM for Respondent

BACON, Justice.

{1} This case reminds us that not all vehicles on New Mexico's roads and highways are in perfect condition. Specifically, this case asks whether a tail lamp with multiple bulbs violates NMSA 1978, Section 66-3-901 (1985, amended 2018)¹ when one bulb in a tail lamp is not illuminated but the tail lamp otherwise complies with the Motor Vehicle Code. The Court of Appeals majority held that such a tail lamp does violate Section 66-3-901, reasoning that if each bulb in a tail lamp is not fully operational, then the tail lamp is not "in good working order and adjustment" as Section 66-3-901 requires. See State v. Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 17-19, 410 P.3d 239. We disagree.

{2} Instead, we hold that tail lamps do not violate Section 66-3-901 when the tail lamps comply with the specific statutory equipment requirements set out in NMSA 1978, Sections 66-3-801 to -888² (1953, as amended through 2019). In reaching our conclusion, we examine the plain language of Section 66-3-901, including the meaning of "good working order," considered in light of the Motor Vehicle Code's purpose to promote public safety before applying the general/specific law of statutory construction to interpret Section 66-3-901 as it relates to other specific statutory requirements for motor vehicle equipment.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} Bernalillo County Sheriff's Deputy Peter Martinez stopped Defendant John Farish in April 2012 on the basis that Defendant's tail lamp was defective. Deputy Martinez testified that, at the time of the stop, Defendant's right tail lamp was "working properly" but the large upper bulb in the left tail lamp was not illuminated. Deputy Martinez charged Defendant with operating a vehicle with defective equipment under Section 66-3-801(A) (1991)³ and driving under the influence (first offense) contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (2004, amended 2016). Defendant was convicted of both charges in metropolitan court, and on appeal, both the district court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. See Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 1, 410 P.3d 239.

{4} At each level of these proceedings, Defendant has argued that Deputy Martinez did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him because the facts and circumstances of this case do not support a conclusion that he was breaking the law or had broken the law at the time he was stopped, rendering the stop unconstitutional and the resulting evidence inadmissible. See State v. Neal , 2007-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 18, 21, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (holding that reasonable suspicion requires "particularized suspicion, based on all the circumstances that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking, or has broken, the law"); State v. Santiago , 2010-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 144, 231 P.3d 600 (noting that the federal and state constitutions generally require suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence).

{5} Following a bench trial, the metropolitan court rejected Defendant's argument and determined that Defendant violated Section 66-3-801 without referencing another specific section of the Motor Vehicle Code or finding that the vehicle was unsafe. The district court rejected the metropolitan court's reasoning, concluding that a per se violation of Section 66-3-801(A) for defective tail lamps requires a reference to Section 66-3-805 (1978),⁴ which sets out the number, location, color, and visibility requirements for tail lamps. After considering Deputy Martinez's testimony, the district court determined that Section 66-3-805(A) did not provide a basis for a reasonable suspicion because Deputy Martinez was always within five hundred feet of Defendant's vehicle, the distance from which a tail lamp must be visible. Section 66-3-805(A). Instead, the district court concluded that Deputy Martinez had a "reasonable suspicion [for the stop] on another basis" under Section 66-3-805(C).

{6} In a split decision, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court and held that Defendant did not violate Section 66-3-805(C) because there was insufficient evidence that the tail lamps did not comply with the requirements of Section 66-3-805, see Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 9, 11, 410 P.3d 239, and further held that Defendant did not violate Section 66-3-801 because there was no evidence that the condition of the vehicle was unsafe, see Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 19, 410 P.3d 239. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals majority concluded that Defendant violated Section 66-3-901, determining that Section 66-3-901 imposes independent operational and safety requirements beyond those of Section 66-3-801 and Section 66-3-805. Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 18, 410 P.3d 239. Section 66-3-901 states,

No person shall drive or move on any highway any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer or pole trailer or any combination thereof unless the equipment upon every vehicle is in good working order and adjustment as required in the Motor Vehicle Code and the vehicle is in such safe mechanical condition as not to endanger the driver or other occupant or any person upon the highway.

{7} The Court of Appeals majority, quoting the record, concluded that because the tail lamp was " ‘not working properly’ " and " ‘was not working at 100 percent’ " and was " ‘not working perfectly,’ " it "was not in good working order," giving Deputy Martinez reasonable suspicion of a violation to support stopping Defendant under Section 66-3-901. Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 18-19, 410 P.3d 239 (brackets omitted). The majority concluded that "[a tail lamp] bulb being burned out means that not all equipment on Defendant's vehicle was in working order, let alone good working order as required by Section 66-3-901." Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 19, 410 P.3d 239.

{8} The Court of Appeals dissent disagreed, concluding that Section 66-3-901 does "not establish an independent criminal basis for vehicle lighting violations under the Motor Vehicle Code" because Section 66-3-901 is a general statute in conflict with Section 66-3-805 that specifically deals with tail lamps. Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 27-28, 410 P.3d 239 (Garcia, J., dissenting) ("Here, the two statutes are factually in conflict because a vehicle with a [tail lamp] bulb that is not ‘in good working order’ in violation of Section 66-3-901 can still emit sufficient lighting from other bulbs to be ‘plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear’ pursuant to Section 66-3-805(A)."); see also NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-10(A) (1997) (Irreconcilable statutes or rules). To resolve the conflict, the dissent applied the general/specific rule of statutory construction to determine that "the more specific statutory provisions [of Section 66-3-805 ] would take precedence over the general statute [ Section 66-3-901 ] so that the two statutes will be harmonized and each is given effect." Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 28, 410 P.3d 239 (Garcia, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority's construction "violates the general/specific rule of statutory construction and effectively makes Section 66-3-805(A) irrelevant and incapable of harmonization with Section 66-3-901 in this case." Farish , 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 29, 410 P.3d 239 (Garcia, J., dissenting).

{9} Defendant petitioned this Court for certiorari on a narrow question: "Can a person violate [ Section] 66-3-901 ... for having tail [lamps] that comply with the specific requirements set out in [ Sections] 66-3-801 to -887?" Defendant argues that the answer is no. Specifically, Defendant argues that Section 66-3-901 "is not violated when the tail [lamp] fulfills the requirements found in the more specific section of the Motor Vehicle Code, [§] 66-3-805(A) (requiring tail [lamps] to be visible from 500 feet)." Defendant argues that his tail lamps were in " ‘good’ working order" as required by Section 66-3-901 because they were functioning according to their nature and purpose by emitting a red light visible from five hundred feet, as required by Section 66-3-805(A).

{10} The State contends that the Court of Appeals majority is correct. The State argues that Deputy Martinez had a reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant under each statute proposed by the courts below— Section 66-3-801, Section 66-3-805(A) and (C), and Section 66-3-901 —as well as Section 66-8-102 (2004) (prohibiting driving under the influence). Alternatively, the State urges this Court to apply the right for any reason doctrine to excuse any reasonable mistake of law Deputy Martinez may have made. However, the question before us is not whether Deputy Martinez had any reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant or whether, as the State contends, Deputy Martinez made a reasonable mistake of law under Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 57, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (holding that a mistake of law can support a reasonable suspicion for a constitutional stop). Rather, Defendant's issue on appeal is limited to the question of statutory interpretation as to the meaning and application of Section 66-3-901 as it relates to the more specific provisions in the Motor Vehicle Code.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

{11} We review issues of statutory construction de novo. State v. McClendon , 2001-NMSC-023, ¶ 2, 130 N.M. 551, 28 P.3d 1092. "When this Court construes statutes, our guiding principle is that we should determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent when it enacted the statute." State ex rel. Brandenburg v. Sanchez , 2014-NMSC-022, ¶ 4, 329 P.3d 654. We first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language. State v. Smith , 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. If ...