State v. Gaston

250 A.3d 137

STATE of Maine

v.Noah GASTON

Docket: Cum-20-199

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: March 10, 2021

Decided: April 29, 2021

Robert Andrews, Esq. (orally), Portland, and James M. Mason, Esq., Brunswick, for appellant Noah Gaston

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

JABAR, J.

[¶1] In the early morning hours of January 14, 2016, Alicia Gaston died after Noah Gaston shot her with a shotgun. In November 2019, a jury found Gaston guilty of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A § 201(1)(A) (2021), and the court (Cumberland County, Murphy, J. ) later entered a judgment of conviction on the verdict, sentencing Gaston to forty years in prison. We affirm the conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury rationally could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Ouellette , 2019 ME 75, ¶ 11, 208 A.3d 399.

[¶3] Noah Gaston stated that in the early morning hours of January 14, 2016, he heard a walkie-talkie-type noise that he thought came from intruders in the home. He checked on his two-year-old son, who was sleeping in the bed he and his wife shared; came out of his bedroom on the second floor; checked on his eight- and nine-year-old daughters, who were sleeping in their own rooms; and, while standing at the top of the stairs, he fired his shotgun once at a person located on the stairs.

[¶4] That person was his wife, Alicia Gaston. Gaston called 9-1-1, stating that he had just killed his wife, and the 9-1-1 dispatcher told him to start CPR. The police officers arrived on scene at 6:17 a.m. Alicia Gaston died from a gunshot injury to her abdomen and hand.

[¶5] On March 10, 2016, a grand jury indicted Gaston on one count of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), and one count of manslaughter,¹ 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2021).² Gaston pleaded not guilty to both counts.

[¶6] In a pretrial motion in limine, Gaston sought to claim a religious privilege, M.R. Evid. 505, to exclude from the evidence at trial statements that he made to two church leaders who picked him up from the police station on the day of the shooting. The State opposed the motion in limine, arguing that the church leaders were not clergy and, even if they were, Gaston had waived the privilege because he later disclosed the statements to third parties. On January 28, 2019, the court held a hearing on the motion at which the two church leaders testified regarding their conversation with Gaston, and the court took the matter under advisement.

[¶7] While the motion in limine was under advisement, the State reported to Gaston and the court that it had obtained a recording of a conversation between Gaston and a visitor at the jail. At a hearing on February 8, 2019, the State summarized that conversation as follows:

Mr. Gaston recounts to [the visitor] that they have now had the [motion in limine] hearing, that [the church leaders] have testified, and [Gaston] says essentially that I had a conversation with [the church leaders], that it was in the car, not at the church as one [of the church leaders] said. And Mr. Gaston affirms that he said to [the church leaders on the day of the shooting], "That's what I have to say." He claims in the conversation with [the visitor] that he then said immediately after that something about the children but that when he said "That's what I have to say," he meant it in a sarcastic way and that they completely misconstrued the meaning of what he said.

The State contended that Gaston had waived his religious privilege by disclosing to the visitor at the jail the contents of his conversation with the church leaders. Gaston contended that this disclosure did not constitute a waiver because everything he recounted had already been said in open court.

[¶8] The court denied the motion in limine, determining that Gaston could not claim the religious privilege. The court found that the church leaders were individuals with a religious role and status. However, the court found that the statements made to the visitor at the jail constituted a waiver of the privilege because "[Gaston] [was] ratifying the statements he made [to the church leaders] ... and he [was] qualifying them in a way that makes it consistent with his theory that [the shooting] was an accident." See e.g. , State v. Fournier , 2019 ME 28, ¶¶ 24-26, 203 A.3d 801.

[¶9] The court conducted an eight-day jury trial in November 2019.³ The State's witnesses included both of the church leaders, and the following exchange occurred with one of those leaders:

PROSECUTOR: When Mr. Gaston at the church finished telling you his version of the shooting of his wife, did he then say something that was particularly notable to you?

CHURCH LEADER: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: After he told you his version of the shooting, what was the notable thing that he said to you?

CHURCH LEADER: Ah, he said that – well, we asked him if there was anything else that he wanted to tell us and he said no, and that this was the only story that he could tell if he wanted to see his children again.

...

PROSECUTOR: ... Did [the other church leader] say anything to [Mr. Gaston] after [Mr. Gaston]’s statement about this is the only thing I can say?

CHURCH LEADER: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: What did [the other church leader] say to [Mr. Gaston]?

CHURCH LEADER: "Is there another story you could tell?"

PROSECUTOR: And did Mr. Gaston answer ...?

CHURCH LEADER: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: What did he say?

CHURCH LEADER: He said, no, that's – that's what happened.

[¶10] At the close of the evidence, the State and Gaston discussed the court's proposed jury instructions and verdict form.⁴ Gaston contended that "in the case of an intentional or a knowing murder where depraved indifference is not charged, the intent has to be specific both to the idea of killing and to the idea of a specific person. It can't be just someone who ends up dying." The State responded that the statute requires only the death of another human being.

[¶11] The court added Alicia Gaston's name in the instructions where appropriate, but the court was not persuaded by Gaston's argument that the State had to prove, as an additional element, that the defendant intended to kill the person whom he had, in fact, killed. The following instructions were given to the jury:

The law of the State of Maine provides that: A person is guilty of murder if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being. In order for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Noah Gaston committed the crime of murder, the State must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the following three facts: First, that another person, Alicia Gaston, is dead; Second, that Noah Gaston caused her death, which means that Ms. Gaston's death would not have occurred but for Mr. Gaston's conduct; and, Third, that Mr. Gaston acted either intentionally or knowingly when he caused Alicia Gaston's death. A person causes death "intentionally" if it is his conscious object to cause another person's death. On other hand, a person causes death "knowingly" if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause another person's death.

The jury returned a guilty verdict on one count of murder and found "that the crime of murder was committed with a firearm against a person."

[¶12] After the verdict, Gaston renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal and made a motion for a new trial based on his argument that the State was required to prove an intent to kill a specific person. The court denied both motions, stating that "any rational fact-finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gaston acted intentionally or knowingly when he caused the death of Alicia Gaston" considering that from the testimony a "rational jury could have unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gaston actually knew that the person coming up the stairs was in fact his wife, Alicia Gaston, when he discharged a shotgun into her abdomen when standing in relatively close proximately to her." The court also determined that the jury instructions were appropriate.

[¶13] On June 17, 2020, Gaston filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing on the ground that the COVID-19 restrictions imposed to protect the health and safety of those involved in a hearing unfairly restricted his due process rights. The court denied the motion after considering the need to balance access to courtrooms with the health and safety of participants; the four years that had passed since the events; and Gaston's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

[¶14] At the sentencing hearing, the court set the basic sentence at thirty-five years. The court described the slaying of Alicia Gaston as a "completely unprovoked, impulsive act of domestic violence," but placed it in the "lower quartile of basic sentences."

[¶15] The court identified Gaston's lack of a criminal record, his actions when the EMTs arrived, and his childhood experiences as mitigating factors. The court stated that it did not consider Gaston's "failure to be a good provider" or whether or not he had genuine remorse; however, the court did consider Alicia Gaston's conscious pain and suffering and the profound impact on Alicia Gaston's family. The court ultimately determined that "particularly given the victim impact in this case ... the aggravating factors do outweigh the mitigating factors, resulting in a final sentence of 40 years to the Department of Corrections."

[¶16] Gaston appealed his conviction and the sentence, and the Sentence Review Panel granted his application for review of his sentence. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2115, 2151 - 2157 (2021) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20; State v. Gaston , No. SRP-20-200 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Aug. 12, 2020).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶17] Gaston challenges the court...