State v. Gray

174 Wash.2d 920

280 P.3d 1110

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.William Adam GRAY, Petitioner.

No. 86359–8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 24, 2012.

Decided July 19, 2012.

Maureen Marie Cyr, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Kristin Ann Relyea, James Morrissey Whisman, King County Prosecutor's Office, Prosecuting Atty. King County, King Co. Pros./App. Unit Supervisor, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

FAIRHURST, J.

[174 Wash.2d 922]¶ 1 RCW 9.94A.753(1) requires a court to “determine the amount of restitution due at the sentencing hearing or within one hundred eighty days.” RCW 9.94A.753(4) authorizes a court to modify the amount of restitution “during any period of time the offender remains under the court's jurisdiction.” At issue in this case is whether RCW 9.94A.753(4) permits a court to modify a restitution order more than 180 days after sentencing to include expenses that were incurred before the trial court issued its original restitution order. We hold that the plain language of RCW 9.94A.753(4) clearly authorizes courts to make such modifications. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 William Adam Gray shot Vita M. Moimoi and Sanelive S. Hikila at close range. Moimoi suffered a serious leg wound and Hikila bled to death. Although Gray fled the scene, he was soon identified and charged with second degree felony murder, first degree assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Gray remained at large for almost two years before his apprehension and arrest. Gray pleaded guilty to first degree manslaughter and second degree assault.

¶ 3 At a sentencing hearing held on June 5, 2009, the State requested restitution in an amount to be determined after the victim's assistance unit (VAU) had computed the appropriate amount. The court agreed, and Gray waived his right to be present at any future hearing.¹ On June 10, 2009, VAU sent a letter to Hikila's mother, Salome Hikila, asking if the family sought any restitution reimbursement. VAU received no response from Hikila's family but received information from the crime victims compensation program (CVCP) that it had expended $6,730.82 for Hikila's funeral expenses. The State pursued the amount sought by CVCP, and on August 6, 2009, the court ordered Gray to pay CVCP $6,730.82.²

¶ 4 In early April 2010, Salome Hikila called CVCP to inquire about restitution. She said she did not receive VAU's letter, but the family had incurred additional funeral expenses amounting to $15,253.32. This amount included $2,386.00 for a headstone; $6,500.00 for funeral items; $504.16 for memorial placement and a flower vase; and $5,863.16 for internment right, opening and closing costs, and the outer burial container. All of the expenses were documented.

¶ 5 On May 4, 2010, the State moved to modify the original restitution order to include the family's unreimbursed funeral costs. Citing State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d 256, 226 P.3d 131 (2010), the State argued that the order could be modified under RCW 9.94A.753(4). Gray did not dispute the amount of the modification but did dispute the timeliness of the State's motion. The trial court noted that in Gonzalez the restitution amounts sought in the modification were incurred after the six month time period but found that we did not limit our holding to that circumstance. The trial court granted the State's motion and entered a modification order awarding an additional $15,253.32 directly to Salome Hikila.

¶ 6 Gray appealed to Division One of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision holding that the plain language of the statute permits an increase based on newly available information, whether or not the expenses were incurred before the original restitution order was entered. State v. Gray, noted at 162 Wash.App. 1013, 2011 WL 2184261. Gray petitioned this court for discretionary review, and we granted review. State v. Gray, 172 Wash.2d 1023, 268 P.3d 225 (2011).

II. ISSUES

¶ 7 A. Does the plain language of RCW 9.94A.753(4) authorize a court to modify a restitution order to include expenses that were incurred prior to the issuance of the order?

¶ 8 B. Do Gray's arguments overcome the plain language of RCW 9.94A.753(4)?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 A court's decision to impose restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Davison, 116 Wash.2d 917, 919, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991). A court abuses its discretion only when its order is manifestly unreasonable or untenable. State v. Enstone, 137 Wash.2d 675, 679–80, 974 P.2d 828 (1999).

IV. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 “A court's authority to order restitution is derived solely from statute.” Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d at 261, 226 P.3d 131.RCW 9.94A.753 governs the amended restitution order in this case.³

[174 Wash.2d 925]¶ 11 RCW 9.94A.753 grants trial courts “broad power” to order and modify restitution. Enstone, 137 Wash.2d at 679, 974 P.2d 828. It also sets certain limits. Under RCW 9.94A.753(1), a court ordering restitution must issue its order within 180 days of sentencing. The time limit is mandatory unless extended for good cause. State v. Krall, 125 Wash.2d 146, 148–49, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994). If an offender objects to the restitution amount, the court must hold a hearing and accurately determine the amount within the allotted time. State v. Ryan, 78 Wash.App. 758, 761–63, 899 P.2d 825 (1995).⁴ Once a court has ordered restitution, it may modify its order “as to amount, terms, and conditions during any period of time the offender remains under the court's jurisdiction.” RCW 9.94A.753(4). A court may modify the total amount of restitution more than 180 days after sentencing. Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d at 266, 226 P.3d 131.

¶ 12 Gray contends that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by modifying its restitution order to include funeral expenses incurred prior to the issuance of the original order. According to Gray, once the 180 day time limit has expired, the State may not seek to increase restitution by any amount it could have proved within the time limit. The State contends that Gray's interpretation conflicts with the plain language of the text and neglects the legislature's clear desire for defendants to pay restitution.⁵ To resolve this case, we consider the statutory text and Gray's arguments.

A. The plain language of RCW 9.94A.753(4) clearly authorizes a court to modify the amount of restitution beyond the 180 day deadline

¶ 13 The meaning of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Breazeale, 144 Wash.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001). In interpreting a statute, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Statutory interpretation begins with a statute's plain meaning. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wash.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). Plain meaning “is to be discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” State v. Engel, 166 Wash.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). If the statute is unambiguous after a review of the plain meaning, the court's inquiry is at an end. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). A statute is ambiguous when it is “ ‘susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,’ but ‘a statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable.’ ” Estate of Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc., 166 Wash.2d 489, 498, 210 P.3d 308 (2009) (quoting State v. Hahn, 83 Wash.App. 825, 831, 924 P.2d 392 (1996)).

¶ 14 Gray does not point to any language in RCW 9.94A.753(4) to support his claim. According to Gray, the legislature must have intended to limit a court's authority to modify restitution orders beyond the 180 day deadline. He argues that a broad reading of RCW 9.94A.753(4) would defeat the purpose of section .753(1). He also argues that penal statutes must be strictly construed, Blanchard Co. v. Ward, 124 Wash. 204, 207, 213 P. 929 (1923), and ambiguous statutes must be interpreted in favor of the defendant, State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 601, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). He concludes that the legislature granted courts authority to modify the restitution amount “only to address factors that did not exist at the time of the initial award.” Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 5.

¶ 15 RCW 9.94A.753(4) expressly grants courts authority to modify the amount of restitution after 180 days, and we have held that courts may modify the total amount of restitution after 180 days. Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d at 266, 226 P.3d 131. Only one sentence in the modification provision limits a court's discretion; ⁶ a “court may not reduce the total amount of restitution ordered because the offender may lack the ability to pay the total amount.” RCW 9.94A.753(4). This language indicates the legislature knows how to limit a court's discretion to modify restitution and the legislature did not intend to limit a court's discretion in the way that Gray suggests. The text simply does not impose the limit Gray seeks. “Where the Legislature omits language from a statute, intentionally or inadvertently, this court will not read into the statute the language that it believes was omitted.” State v. Moses, 145 Wash.2d 370, 374, 37 P.3d 1216 (2002).

B. Gray's arguments cannot overcome the plain language of the text

¶ 16 To circumvent the statute's plain language, Gray advances a series of policy and case-based arguments. But none of Gray's arguments overcome the plain language of the text.

1. Finality

¶ 17 Gray first argues that a court's unfettered authority to modify restitution defeats the purpose of finality. He asserts that the general purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), chapter ...