State v. Maloney

168 Idaho 936

489 P.3d 847

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Daisha Lynn MALONEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 47365

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, December 2020 Term.

Opinion Filed: June 28, 2021

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant Daisha Lynn Maloney. Brian R. Dickson argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent State of Idaho. John C. McKinney argued.

STEGNER, Justice.

Daisha Lynn Maloney (Maloney) appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine. An officer with the Twin Falls Police Department stopped the car Maloney was driving after determining that the vehicle's registration had expired. During this traffic stop, the officer asked if Maloney would consent to a search of the vehicle. She agreed. As Maloney and her passenger exited the vehicle, Maloney took her purse with her.

The search of the vehicle yielded a "one-hitter" marijuana pipe which contained residue. The officer told Maloney he needed to search her purse, which was no longer in the car, based on what had been discovered in the vehicle. The officer found two pipes containing white crystal residue. Maloney was charged with possession of methamphetamine.

Maloney filed a motion to suppress the evidence that had been found in her purse, which the State opposed by arguing that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied. Maloney contended that the automobile exception only applied to containers inside the vehicle once probable cause arose, and did not extend to her purse, which was outside the vehicle when the officers found the marijuana pipe. The district court agreed with the State that the automobile exception applied and denied Maloney's motion. Maloney then entered a conditional guilty plea reserving her ability to appeal the suppression issue, and after judgment was entered, she filed a timely appeal. For the reasons set out below, we reverse the district court's denial of Maloney's motion to suppress, and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 6, 2018, Maloney was driving in Twin Falls, Idaho, with a female passenger, when her car was pulled over by a Twin Falls police officer. The basis for the stop was an expired registration. The officer was aware that the license plate of the vehicle had recently been called in several times in relation to purported marijuana use at a local park. Prior to the stop, the officer had requested a drug canine unit, but one was not available, so the officer requested another officer assist him. In addition to the expired registration, Maloney was unable to provide proof of insurance.

While the second officer wrote the citation and ran a check for warrants, the first officer spoke with Maloney about the reports involving the vehicle's presence at the local park associated with purported drug activity. Maloney's ex-husband¹ used the vehicle as well and was known to the first officer, who was also aware that he was at the time incarcerated in the Twin Falls County Jail for possession of methamphetamine.

The second officer informed the first that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Maloney's passenger for a traffic violation. At this point, the first officer asked Maloney for permission to search the vehicle. She agreed and exited the vehicle. As she left, Maloney took her purse with her. Maloney and her passenger were permitted to walk to the shade of a tree nearby during the search, as it was a hot day.

During the search, the first officer discovered a "one-hitter" pipe used for marijuana which was located in a bag in the back of the car.² He found the pipe in a bag that also contained a wallet and other items that belonged to Maloney's ex-husband. According to the first officer, he had already decided not to charge Maloney with possession of marijuana or paraphernalia based on the "one-hitter" because "there was a high probability that the pipe belonged to" Maloney's ex-husband. Nevertheless, he informed Maloney that because he had found the pipe in the vehicle, he could now search Maloney's purse.³ She did not give consent for her purse to be searched.

A search of Maloney's purse yielded two additional pipes as well as a small amount of a crystalline substance the first officer believed to be methamphetamine.⁴ The first officer then placed Maloney under arrest for possession of methamphetamine.

Maloney filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse. In particular, Maloney argued that the pipes containing the methamphetamine had been discovered during a warrantless search of her purse, which was not in the car when the "one-hitter" was discovered, and that there was no exception to the warrant requirement to render the search reasonable.

At the hearing, both Maloney and the officer testified and were cross-examined. After the testimony, Maloney argued that at the outset, the officer conducted a consent search of the vehicle , and that consent did not extend to the purse because Maloney had removed it from the vehicle. Maloney then argued that discovery of the "one-hitter" did not provide probable cause to search Maloney's purse because the officer believed that the "one-hitter" belonged to her incarcerated ex-husband, as evidenced by his decision not to charge her with possession of either marijuana or paraphernalia.

The State argued that the automobile exception applied to allow the search of Maloney's purse, even though the purse had been removed from the vehicle prior to probable cause developing to search the vehicle.⁵ The State contended that if "the [c]ourt has to engage in an inquiry of the precise time when probable cause developed and where all the items were in the vehicle at the time probable cause developed, [it] really guts the automobile exception to search containers under this doctrine."

The district court denied Maloney's motion to suppress in an oral ruling from the bench. The district court initially articulated its findings of fact, finding in particular that (1) the traffic stop was initiated with probable cause; (2) the officer obtained consent for the search of the vehicle; and (3) at the time consent to search was given, Maloney and her purse were both inside the vehicle. The district court then found that when the "one-hitter" was discovered, probable cause developed to continue to search the car, and the officer no longer had to rely on Maloney's consent. The district court reviewed the cases relied on by both the State and Maloney, and observed,

The [c]ourt does reject the notion that if a defendant immediately removes items from a vehicle, that those items are then exempt from the vehicle exception to the warrantless search rule. Such a ruling would necessarily result in absurd results where defendants are bailing out the car [sic] and grabbing everything they can to take with them out of the car prior to a search and then claiming that those items were on their person prior to a personal – or prior to probable cause being determined.

The district court went on to describe the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, stating, "[i]f probable cause justifies a search of the lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search .... [T]he [c]ourt does find that objects that were in the car at the time of the lawful stop are certainly subject to the vehicle exception rule whether or not the defendant exited the car with those items or whether or not those items remain in the car." The district court concluded that because the purse was a container that could have contained further drugs, there was probable cause to search it for drugs once the "one-hitter" was found in the car.

Maloney entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to appeal the district court's ruling. The district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. Maloney was later placed on probation.

Maloney timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Mullins , 164 Idaho 493, 496, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018) (quoting State v. Watts , 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) ). "When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. (quoting State v. McNeely , 162 Idaho 413, 414–15, 398 P.3d 146, 147–48 (2017) ).

State v. Phipps , 166 Idaho 1, 4, 454 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2019).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Maloney argues that for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to apply to the search of her purse, the purse had to be inside the vehicle when probable cause developed. The automobile exception enables an officer to search closed containers in the car once probable cause arises. Maloney acknowledges that this Court has not addressed this particular issue, but points to decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals and several other jurisdictions which have rejected the automobile exception when probable cause does not arise until after the container has been removed from the vehicle. In response, the thrust of the State's argument is that the container only needs to be in the vehicle at the time a traffic stop of that vehicle is initiated, and that the district court's reasoning is one of "common sense" to prevent the absurd result where defendants remove containers with them as they exit a vehicle in order to insulate the contents of those containers from search.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. CONST. amend IV.

"Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment

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