State v. Manion

151 Hawai‘i 267

511 P.3d 766

STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Daniel Irving James MANION, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee.

SCWC-19-0000563

Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.

JUNE 3, 2022

AS CORRECTED JUNE 9, 2022

Brian R. Vincent for respondent

Alen M. Kaneshiro for petitioner

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND EDDINS, JJ., WITH EDDINS, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY, WITH WHOM McKENNA, J., JOINS, AND WILSON, J., DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

When evidence is obtained against a criminal defendant in contravention of constitutional protections, such as when police subject a suspect to custodial interrogation without first giving Miranda ¹ warnings as required by article I, section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution, that evidence must be suppressed. Evidence obtained after the illegality, acquired because of officers’ exploitation of that illegality, must likewise be suppressed, as such evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree.

Here, defendant Daniel Irving James Manion was subject to custodial interrogation during a roadside investigation for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). But the evidence gathered after that illegality – specifically, his performance on the standardized field sobriety test (SFST) – was neither testimonial,² nor the fruit of the poisonous tree. The police did not exploit the illegal interrogation because the interrogation did not lead to the discovery of the SFST evidence; the investigation had already been directed to the SFST before any illegality.

Manion's performance on the SFST was accordingly admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings preceding the test.

II. BACKGROUND

A. District Court Proceedings

Manion was arrested in Hawai‘i Kai in the early hours of January 4, 2019, after a resident of the neighborhood heard a car crash into a parked vehicle and called the Honolulu Police Department (HPD). The police arrived to find Manion in the driver's seat of a damaged car, from which a fluid trail led to the damaged parked vehicle. After initial inquiry into whether Manion was hurt, the officer came to suspect he had been driving while intoxicated, administered the SFST on Manion, and arrested him.

Manion was charged with OVUII in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a)(1) (2020)³ in the District Court of the First Circuit.⁴ Manion moved to suppress any statements he made during the encounter with police that led to his arrest for lack of Miranda warnings. The district court held a hearing on the motion in which three HPD officers involved in the investigation, along with the Hawai‘i Kai resident who heard the crash, testified as to the following facts (as found by the district court in its written order):

1. On January 4, 2019, at approximately 4:40 a.m., while patrolling the Hawai‘i Kai area, [HPD] Officer Corey Morgan ("Officer Morgan") responded to a report of a motor vehicle collision at Kealahou Street and K[i]p[u]kai Place. While other officers went to locate the vehicle that reportedly had been struck, Officer Morgan went to locate the "unit 1" vehicle that reportedly caused the crash, which the caller said might be on K[i]p[u]kai Place.

2. On K[i]p[u]kai Place, Officer Morgan found a white Hyundai with extensive and severe front-end damage. Defendant was the lone occupant of the Hyundai and was seated in the driver's seat. Officer Morgan observed a fluid trail from Defendant's Hyundai leading to the parked vehicle that was struck on Kealahou Street less than two blocks away.

3. Officer Morgan approached Defendant and asked if he was okay, if he was injured, if he needed an ambulance, and where was he coming from. This initial exchange was brief – lasting a few seconds - as Officer Morgan tried to determine if Defendant needed medical attention. Defendant responded that he was okay. He also explained that after a "rough day," he had gone to [Sandy Beach, also known as Sandy's,] and drank a "40" and was heading home. Defendant further explained that he was texting and that is what caused the accident, not his prior drinking.

4. During this brief encounter, Officer Morgan observed Defendant to have red and watery eyes and a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath.

5. Believing, upon observing the indicia of alcohol, that he had probable cause to arrest Defendant for [OVUII], Officer Morgan asked Defendant if he would be willing to participate in a [SFST]. Defendant agreed and stepped outside of his vehicle. Defendant was not free to leave.

6. Officer Morgan would not have administered the SFST without first asking Defendant if he agreed to participate in the SFST and receiving Defendant's "yes" answer.

7. Prior to administering the SFST, Officer Morgan asked Defendant questions referred to as the Medical Rule Out ("MRO") questions, including whether Defendant was taking any medications or whether he was under the care of a doctor or dentist. Officer Morgan asked the questions to rule out causes, other than alcohol, that could affect Defendant's performance on the SFST. Defendant answered "no" to the MRO questions.

8. Officer Morgan would not have administered the SFST without first asking the MRO questions.

9. The SFST consists of three tests that are administered in a particular order - Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus ("HGN") first, Walk and Turn ("W&T") second, and One Leg Stand ("OLS") third.

10. Prior to beginning the tests, Officer Morgan told Defendant he would be judged on how well he follows the instructions for each of the three tests. Before administering each of the three tests, Officer Morgan instructed Defendant on how to perform the test. Each time after instructing Defendant, Officer Morgan asked Defendant if he understood the instructions and whether he had any questions. For each of the three tests, Defendant indicated he understood the instructions and he had no questions.

11. Officer Morgan would not have administered each of the three tests if he had not received Defendant's responses that he understood the instructions for the tests and had no questions.

12. After Officer Morgan obtained Defendant's agreement to participate in the SFST, Defendant's responses to the MRO questions, and Defendant's affirmative responses that he understood the instructions for each of the three tests, Officer Morgan had Defendant perform the HGN, W&T, and OLS.

13. Following the SFST, HPD Officer Landon Miyamura ("Officer Miyamura") offered Defendant the Preliminary Alcohol Screening and then arrested Defendant for OVUII.

14. At the main station, Officer Miyamura administered the intoxilyzer test to Defendant. Upon completion of the test, Officer Miyamura showed Defendant the print-out from the intoxilyzer, pointed out Defendant's breath-test result, and stated, "This is your result." Defendant responded: "That's impossible, I only had one ‘40’ and two fireball shots in three hours."

15. At no point in time did either officer tell Defendant he had the right to remain silent and anything he said could be used against him. Defendant was never advised of any of his Miranda rights.

The district court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Manion was subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The court first determined that Manion was not in custody during the initial exchange with Officer Morgan, and accordingly, Manion's statements "admitting to drinking a ‘40’ at Sandy's and then explaining that his texting, as opposed to drinking, caused the accident" were admissible. However, the district court concluded Manion was in custody after that initial exchange, and that he was subjected to custodial interrogation when Officer Morgan (1) asked Manion if he would be willing to participate in the SFST, (2) asked him the medical rule-out questions, and (3) asked him whether he understood the SFST instructions or had any questions about the tests. As a result, the district court concluded that Manion's "performance on the SFST is inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree."⁵

B. Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) Proceedings

The State appealed, and the ICA affirmed in part and vacated in part in a memorandum opinion. As relevant here, the ICA concluded that Manion was in custody based on the State's concession at the motion to suppress hearing. Namely, "that Officer Morgan had probable cause to arrest Manion for OVUII after their initial exchange and before Officer Morgan asked Manion if he would participate in the SFST."⁶ The ICA next determined that "the defendant's performance on the [S]FST did not constitute an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings" pursuant to our decision in Uchima, 147 Hawai‘i at 84-85, 464 P.3d at 872-73, in which we held that the SFST was nontestimonial. Likewise, the ICA relied on Uchima to hold that "[a]sking Manion whether he was willing to participate in the SFST, whether he understood the instructions to the SFST, and whether he had any questions did not implicate his right to self-incrimination and did not constitute interrogation[.]"

However, the ICA followed its published opinion in State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 147 Hawai‘i 92, 101-03, 464 P.3d 880, 889-91 (App. 2020), and held that the medical rule-out questions were interrogation. The ICA did not address the argument that the SFST was the fruit of the medical rule-out questions.

C. Supreme Court Proceedings

Both the State and Manion filed applications for writ of certiorari seeking review of the ICA's memorandum opinion. We rejected the State's application and accepted Manion's.⁷ Manion asks this court to consider whether the ICA erred by "failing to suppress all evidence and statements obtained after the Medical Rule-Out [ ] questions as the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree[.]’ " He also urges us to revisit our recent holding in Uchima, 147 Hawai‘i at 84-85, 464 P.3d at 872-73, that "the SFST does not seek ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ " arguing that Uchima’s reliance on State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw....