State v. Meger

901 N.W.2d 418

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant,

v.Brian William MEGER, Respondent.

A15-1823.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: September 20, 2017

Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, and Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, First Assistant Scott County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota, for appellant.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

OPINION

MCKEIG, Justice.

In State v. Her , 862 N.W.2d 692, 696-700 (Minn. 2015), we held that the fact that a defendant was a risk-level-III offender at the time of the offense must be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a court may impose a 10-year period of conditional release as part of a sentence for failing to register as a predatory offender. The issue here is whether Her applies retroactively to sentences that were imposed and became final before Her was decided. In a motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, respondent Brian William Meger argued that his 10-year conditional-release term was illegal because Her applied retroactively to his sentence. The district court granted Meger's motion and vacated the conditional-release term. The court of appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that Her announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure that does not apply to the collateral review of Meger's sentence, we reverse.

FACTS

Respondent Brian William Meger was required to register as a predatory offender because of a conviction of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct in 1995. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b (2016). In 2005, the State charged Meger with failing to register as a predatory offender, Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subds. 3(b), 5 (2016). A person convicted of failing to register as a predatory offender is subject to a 10-year period of conditional release if the offender was a risk-level-III offender at the time of the offense.¹ See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a (2006). Although the probable cause portion of the complaint stated that Meger was a risk-level-III offender, the complaint made no reference to conditional release or Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a.

Following a plea agreement, Meger pleaded guilty to failure to register as a predatory offender in exchange for a 20-month sentence, a downward durational departure. On September 7, 2006, the district court accepted Meger's guilty plea and sentenced him to 20 months in prison. In January 2007, the court received a letter from the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) inquiring whether the court intended to add a 10-year conditional-release term to Meger's sentence based on Meger's risk-level-III status, Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a. In an order signed on January 29, 2007, the district court amended Meger's sentence by adding a 10-year conditional-release term.

Meger served his 20-month prison sentence, and then remained in prison for approximately 6 additional years because the State could not find appropriate housing for him on conditional release. In June 2014, Meger filed a motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, requesting that his conditional-release term be vacated because a jury had not found that he was a risk-level-III offender at the time he failed to register. The district court denied the motion. Two weeks later, we held in State v. Her , 862 N.W.2d 692, 696-700 (Minn. 2015), that the Sixth Amendment prohibits a court from imposing a 10-year conditional-release term upon a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a, unless the offender admits or a jury finds that he or she was a risk-level-III offender at the time of the failure to register. Meger immediately moved for reconsideration based on our decision in Her.

The district court granted Meger's motion to reconsider and his motion to correct his sentence. The court applied Her retroactively, and determined that the conditional-release term was unlawful under Her because Meger's risk-level status was based solely on "unestablished, extra-judicial facts" contained in a DOC letter provided after he had been sentenced. The court did not impanel a sentencing jury given the "far from ideal" procedural practices in Meger's case, the substantial time Meger had already served in prison during his conditional-release term, and concerns of complications caused by double jeopardy. The district court vacated Meger's conditional-release term and imposed his original 20-month sentence, the maximum sentence contemplated at the time of the plea agreement. Because Meger had already served that sentence, the district court ordered his immediate release from custody.

The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Her applies retroactively because it was "merely an application of the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right that governed the Minnesota Supreme Court's previous decisions in" State v. Jones , 659 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 2003), and State v. Grossman , 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2001), and U.S. Supreme Court Sixth Amendment precedent. State v. Meger , No. A15-1823, 2016 WL 3961841, at *3 (Minn. App. July 25, 2016).

Relying on Reynolds v. State , 874 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. App.), aff'd , 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016), which was pending before us at the time, the court of appeals held that the district court did not err in construing Meger's motion as a motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Meger , 2016 WL 3961841, at *4. In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the State "ha[d] limited itself to arguing for only plea withdrawal as a remedy because it failed to brief or argue for any other remedy that the postconviction court could have granted Meger," and that "the [district] court did not abuse its discretion in vacating Meger's conditional-release term and modifying his sentence to the maximum sentence allowable under the plea agreement." Id. at *4.

The State filed a petition for review. We granted review and stayed our consideration of this appeal, then lifted the stay after deciding Reynolds v. State , 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016).²

ANALYSIS

At issue is whether Her applies retroactively to Meger's amended sentence, which was final when Her was decided.³ Meger filed a motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, which authorizes a district court "at any time" to "correct a sentence not authorized by law." Meger argues that if our holding in Her applies retroactively to his amended sentence, his 10-year conditional-release term was not authorized by law because he did not admit, and a jury did not find, that he was a risk-level-III offender at the time that he failed to register. But Meger also acknowledges that if Her does not apply retroactively, his conditional-release term was lawful at the time and his Rule 27.03 motion should be denied.

Whether a rule of federal constitutional law applies retroactively to criminal convictions that were final when the rule was announced is a legal question that we review de novo. Campos v. State , 816 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn. 2012). In deciding the retroactive effect of a rule of federal constitutional law, we follow the retroactivity standards established in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).⁴ Campos , 816 N.W.2d at 488.

Under Teague , "we first ask whether the rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure is new, or whether it is merely a predictable extension of a pre-existing doctrine." Campos , 816 N.W.2d at 488 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Old rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure apply both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although a new rule may apply retroactively in collateral proceedings under two "narrow" exceptions, id. , Meger does not argue that either exception applies here. Thus, it is undisputed that Meger may benefit from our holding in Her only if Her was an "old rule," rather than a "new rule," under Teague .

"A Supreme Court ‘holding constitutes a new rule within the meaning of Teague if it breaks new ground, imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, or was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.’ " Campos , 816 N.W.2d at 489 (quoting Graham v. Collins , 506 U.S. 461, 467, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) ). A holding is "not so dictated [by precedent] ... unless it would have been ‘apparent to all reasonable jurists.’ " Chaidez v. U.S. , 568 U.S. 342, 347, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary , 520 U.S. 518, 528, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) ). We have stated that it is not enough that a holding "is logically an extension of some precedent, as that is true of virtually all recently announced rules."

State v. Houston , 702 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 2005). Rather, the test is whether "reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at the time his conviction became final ‘would have felt compelled by existing precedent’ to rule in his favor." Graham , 506 U.S. at 467, 113 S.Ct. 892 (quoting Saffle v. Parks , 494 U.S. 484, 488, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) ). In other words, a decision announces a new rule if "the outcome ... was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." Butler v. McKellar , 494 U.S. 407, 415, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990). The Teague doctrine serves to "validate[ ] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions." Id. at 414, 110 S.Ct. 1212.

A holding, however, does not pronounce a new rule under Teague if it is "merely an application of the principle that governed a prior decision to a different set of facts." Chaidez , ...