State v. Morris

259 P.3d 116

687 Utah Adv. Rep. 43

2011 UT 40

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner,

v.Vance MORRIS, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 20090835.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 22, 2011.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, Walter J. Bird, Monticello, for plaintiff.Ronald J. Yengich, Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice NEHRING, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This appeal concerns the constitutionality of a police officer's actions during a traffic stop. Specifically, we consider what an officer must do when he stops a driver based on an objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation has occurred, but before approaching the driver the officer learns he was mistaken about the grounds for the stop. We hold that when an officer acting in good faith is reasonably mistaken about the grounds for a traffic stop, he may initiate contact with the driver to explain his mistake and to end the stop, but may not detain the driver any further. If during this brief encounter new reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arises, the officer may respond accordingly.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On the night of June 12, 2007, Vance Morris was driving a black Mazda on a two-lane highway in San Juan County, Utah. Some distance behind Mr. Morris, Highway Patrol Trooper Travis Williams was also traveling on the highway.

¶ 3 As Trooper Williams approached Mr. Morris's car, he noticed the car bumping the white fog line on the side of the road. Suspecting that the driver may be impaired, Trooper Williams began to record the driving pattern from his dashboard video camera.

¶ 4 A few minutes later, Trooper Williams noticed that the Mazda did not have a visible license plate. At this point, Trooper Williams decided it was necessary to make a traffic stop. But as Mr. Morris pulled to the side of the road, Trooper Williams realized that he was mistaken. Although Mr. Morris did not have a current license plate, Trooper Williams's spotlight illuminated a valid temporary registration tag clearly displayed in the Mazda's rear window.

¶ 5 In spite of observing a valid temporary tag, Trooper Williams stepped out of his car and approached Mr. Morris's vehicle. When Mr. Morris rolled down his window, Trooper Williams noticed Mr. Morris was smoking a freshly lit cigar. As Mr. Morris spoke, Trooper Williams smelled, through the cigar smoke, the odor of an alcoholic beverage.¹

¶ 6 Mr. Morris volunteered to provide his license and registration and asked the officer if he also needed his insurance information. Trooper Williams responded affirmatively. At this point, Trooper Williams walked toward his patrol car to examine the documents. He then returned to Mr. Morris's car and asked him to exit his vehicle. Trooper Williams administered field sobriety tests and ultimately determined that Mr. Morris was driving under the influence of alcohol.

¶ 7 Another officer arrived on the scene. Trooper Williams arrested Mr. Morris and transported him to the county jail. The other officer conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Mr. Morris was formally charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with an open container of alcohol.

¶ 8 Mr. Morris filed a motion to suppress the evidence collected from the search. Mr. Morris argued that when the officer spotted the temporary registration tag in the window, his reasonable suspicion dissipated and any further detention of Mr. Morris violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Mr. Morris's motion. Although the district court noted, “it [was] debatable whether Mr. Morris's driving pattern justifie[d] a traffic stop,” it concluded that “[Trooper] Williams was justified in stopping the vehicle because the plate was not visible to him until after he signaled [Mr.] Morris to stop.” The district court reasoned that once Trooper Williams initiated the stop, “it was reasonable for him to contact the driver, explain the [mistaken] basis for the stop, and then release the driver.” Once the “brief contact generated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, further detention was justified.”

¶ 9 The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision. First, the court of appeals concluded that the driving pattern clearly did not justify the stop. Second, the court of appeals concluded that once Trooper Williams spotted Mr. Morris's valid temporary registration tag, the Trooper lost the reasonable suspicion that justified the traffic stop and any contact or further detention of Mr. Morris was unreasonable. Although the court of appeals recognized its holding may result in potential “motorist confusion,” it found that neither “individual bewilderment” nor “police politeness” were a “significant enough concern to ‘outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected,’ including the right to be free from unwarranted police detention, no matter how brief.” ²

¶ 10 The State filed a petition for certiorari on this issue, and we granted it. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code section 78A–3–102(5) (Supp.2010).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 “On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness,” giving no deference to its conclusions of law.³ When a district court denies a defendant's motion to suppress, we “disturb[ ] the district court's findings of fact only when they are clearly erroneous.” ⁴

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 The question on certiorari is whether the court of appeals erred when it reversed the district court's denial of Mr. Morris's motion to suppress. Mr. Morris urges us to affirm the decision of the court of appeals. According to Mr. Morris, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights because it involved “an investigatory detention that was lacking in reasonable suspicion from the outset,” and that even if the initial contact between Trooper Williams and Mr. Morris was justified, it “exceeded a simple explanation of the lack of a legal basis for the detention.” In other words, Mr. Morris contends that Trooper Williams had no lawful basis to approach Mr. Morris and that his decision to do so was both unreasonable and unconstitutional. Mr. Morris further argues that even if it was reasonable for the officer to explain his mistake, the stop still violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer detained Mr. Morris longer than necessary, collected his identification and registration, and conducted field sobriety tests.

¶ 13 Although the State concedes that Trooper Williams's reasonable suspicion was dispelled before he made contact with Mr. Morris, the State argues that it was reasonable for the officer to interact with the driver to explain his mistake. The State also contends that Trooper Williams regained reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he made contact with Mr. Morris and detected a “whiff” of alcohol emanating from the car. The State argues that these new circumstances allowed the Trooper to continue the detention to investigate further.

¶ 14 We conclude that the State is correct and therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals. Although we appreciate the court of appeals' effort to vigilantly protect the constitutional rights of our citizens, we also conclude that the court of appeals misapplied the Fourth Amendment's command that searches and seizures be reasonable. As we discuss in more detail below, we first conclude that Trooper Williams's stop was justified at its inception. Next, we conclude that, in light of the factual circumstances that followed, Trooper Williams's further detention of Mr. Morris was also a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

I. TROOPER WILLIAMS'S TRAFFIC STOP AND FURTHER DETENTION OF MR. MORRIS WAS A REASONABLE SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

¶ 15 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects our citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” ⁵ Motor vehicle stops constitute “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment and thus must be reasonable in scope to be upheld.⁶ To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be “justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” ⁷ During a lawful traffic stop, “ ‘[t]he temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.’ ” ⁸ “[W]ithout additional reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded.” ⁹ But if “during the scope of the traffic stop, the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion.” ¹⁰ We conclude that Trooper Williams's traffic stop was both justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place.

A. Trooper Williams's Traffic Stop Was Justified at Its Inception Because the Stop Was Initiated Based on Objective Reasonable Suspicion That a Traffic Violation Had Occurred

¶ 16 Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may stop a vehicle only if the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the driver or a passenger is engaged in criminal activity.¹¹ Although to be lawful, reasonable suspicion must be based on “ ‘specific and articulable facts and rational inferences,’ ” ¹² “[a] police officer need not actually observe a violation” to make a stop.¹³ “Instead, ‘as long as an officer suspects that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic ... regulations, the police officer may legally stop the...