State v. Ohl

411 Mont. 52

521 P.3d 759

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Dylan Mikkel OHL, Defendant and Appellant.

DA 21-0242

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: October 12, 2022

Decided: December 13, 2022

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Carolyn M. Gibadlo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christine Hutchison, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Kirsten Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, Matt Jennings, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana

Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Dylan Mikkel Ohl (Ohl) appeals his conviction and judgment of guilty for the offense of escape.

¶2 We affirm.

¶3 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in denying Ohl's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.

Issue Two: Whether the District Court erred in declining to instruct the jury on criminal contempt as a lesser-included offense to escape.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 In May 2019, the State petitioned to revoke Ohl's suspended sentence on a prior conviction. Ohl admitted the violations and the District Court held a dispositional hearing on June 17, 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court allowed Ohl to appear remotely. The District Court imposed a new sentence of two years with the Department of Corrections (DOC), and ordered him to report to his probation officer in two days. At the State's request, the court clarified that "technically, I don't have any control over you anymore because you're now in the custody of the Department of Corrections," stating that Ohl was "at this point now, committed to the Department of Corrections." The probation officer averred that "[i]f you could just have him show up into the office by 5:30, I can meet him there." Ohl objected to the new deadline, and asked for an additional two days, to which the court responded "if I had the ability to do that, I would. But, unfortunately, I don't. So I'm gonna ask you to meet [the probation officer]." Ohl did not report to his probation officer, and was arrested several months later.

¶5 The State charged Ohl with felony escape on June 18, 2020. Prior to trial, Ohl filed an unopposed motion to include a jury instruction for criminal contempt as a lesser-included offense. After the close of the State's evidence at trial, Ohl moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence, arguing that his actions did not meet the statutory definition of escape.¹ The District Court ultimately denied both of Ohl's motions. The jury returned a guilty verdict and the court sentenced Ohl to six years at the Montana State Prison, all suspended. Ohl appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 We review denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence de novo for correctness. State v. McWilliams , 2008 MT 59, ¶ 37, 341 Mont. 517, 178 P.3d 121 ; State v. Swann , 2007 MT 126, ¶ 17, 337 Mont. 326, 160 P.3d 511. We review a trial court's refusal to give an instruction on a lesser-included offense for an abuse of discretion. State v. Denny , 2021 MT 104, ¶ 13, 404 Mont. 116, 485 P.3d 1227. However, whether an offense is lesser included is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Molenda , 2010 MT 215, ¶ 3, 358 Mont. 1, 243 P.3d 387.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in denying Ohl's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.

¶8 Ohl argues that the District Court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence by misinterpreting the relevant charging statute for the crime of escape. To succeed on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, a defendant must show that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could not find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cybulski , 2009 MT 70, ¶ 42, 349 Mont. 429, 204 P.3d 7 ; § 46-16-403, MCA. Ohl was charged with escape under § 45-7-306, MCA. Section 45-7-306(2), MCA, provides in relevant part that a "person subject to official detention commits the offense of escape if the person knowingly or purposely eludes official detention or fails to return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited time." "Official detention" is defined to include "placement of a person in the legal custody of a municipality, a county, or the state as a result of ... a conviction for an offense or of having been charged with an offense." Section 45-7-306(1)(a), MCA. Neither "legal custody" nor "elude[ ]" are defined under Title 45, MCA.

¶9 Ohl maintains that, despite his failure to report to his probation officer, he remained in the "legal custody" of the State, as his "legal status" as a DOC commit did not change. Ohl points to a Youth Court Act provision under Title 41, MCA, defining "legal custody," for purposes of that Act, as a type of "legal status."² See § 41-5-103(30)(a), MCA (defining "legal custody" as a "legal status created by order of a court" giving a person certain specified rights and duties). Ohl contends that he did not (and, in fact, could not) elude "placement ... in the legal custody" of the DOC because he never changed his legal status from that of a DOC commit following the District Court's pronouncement of revocation of his suspended sentence.

¶10 Ohl's preferred interpretation of the escape statute would essentially make § 45-7-306(2), MCA, meaningless and without effect, rendering it virtually impossible to commit escape by fleeing detention. Under Ohl's view that escape requires effecting a change in legal status, prison inmates who scaled the prison walls would not have committed an escape—their legal status as a ward of the state would remain unchanged. We will not adopt such an absurd and unreasonable result where reasonable interpretation will avoid it. See § 1-3-233, MCA.

¶11 Here, a "contrary intention plainly appears" to application of the Youth Court Act definition of "legal custody" to the escape statute. See § 1-2-107, MCA. We interpret words and phrases "according to the context" and, operating under the presumption that the Legislature does not pass meaningless legislation, "avoid any statutory interpretation that renders any sections of the statute superfluous and does not give effect to all of the words used." Belk v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality , 2022 MT 38, ¶ 23, 408 Mont. 1, 504 P.3d 1090 (citing State v. Berger , 259 Mont. 364, 367, 856 P.2d 552, 554 (1993) ); State v. Brendal , 2009 MT 236, ¶ 18, 351 Mont. 395, 213 P.3d 448 ; § 1-2-101, MCA (preferring a construction that "if possible ... will give effect to all" statutory provisions); § 1-2-106, MCA. Statutory interpretation "must be reasonable," § 1-3-233, MCA, and "should not lead to absurd results if a reasonable interpretation would avoid it." State v. Harrison , 2016 MT 271, ¶ 10, 385 Mont. 227, 230, 383 P.3d 202 (citing State v. Sommers , 2014 MT 315, ¶ 22, 377 Mont. 203, 339 P.3d 65 ).

¶12 The escape statute's legislative history is illuminative. See Stockman Bank of Mont. v. Mon-Kota, Inc. , 2008 MT 74, ¶ 17, 342 Mont. 115, 180 P.3d 1125 ("When the legislative intent cannot be readily derived from the plain language, or when it is helpful to determine the correct interpretation of the statute, we ... look to legislative history."). Prior to 1997, the escape statute provided that a "person subject to official detention commits the offense of escape if he knowingly or purposely removes himself from official detention or fails to return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited time." Section 45-7-306(2), MCA (1995). "Official detention" was defined as:

imprisonment which resulted from a conviction for an offense, confinement for an offense, confinement of a person charged with an offense, detention by a peace officer pursuant to arrest, detention for extradition or deportation, placement in a community corrections facility or program, supervision while under a supervised release program, participation in a county jail work program under 7-32-2225 through 7-32-2227, or any lawful detention for the purpose of the protection of the welfare of the person detained or for the protection of society.

Section 45-7-306(1), MCA (1995).

¶13 During the 1997 Legislative session, House Bill 43 (HB 43), amending the escape statute, was introduced at the request of the DOC. See H.B. 43, 55th Leg. 219 (Mont. 1997). The DOC presented testimony before the House Judiciary Committee arguing that two recent Supreme Court rulings had necessitated amending the escape statute. See Hearing on H.B. 43 Before the H. Jud. Comm., 55th Leg. Reg. Sess. Ex. 2 (Mont. 1997). In State v. Nelson , 275 Mont. 86, 910 P.2d 247 (1996), Montana State Prison inmates were performing work on the Deer Lodge golf course under minimal, non-direct supervision by a civilian golf-course employee when they became drunk and took a golf-course-owned vehicle to Helena to purchase more alcohol, where they were apprehended. The Supreme Court overturned the resulting felony convictions, holding that the Deer Lodge golf course was not on the list of places constituting "official detention" under § 45-7-306, MCA (1993), from which an inmate could commit felony escape. Nelson , 275 Mont. at 95-96, 910 P.2d at 253. In State v. Roberts , 275 Mont. 365, 369, 912 P.2d 812, 815 (1996), the Court held that a prisoner's failure to return from furlough did not constitute an escape because the furloughed defendant similarly was not in any of the enumerated locations from which a defendant could commit felony escape. The DOC advocated for amendment of the definition of "official detention" to replace the laundry list of locations with the "placement ... in legal custody" language to avoid prison officials needing to "study the statute before they dare take an inmate anywhere outside the prison walls to determine if the place where th...