State v. Ouellette

208 A.3d 399

STATE of Maine

v.Bruce OUELLETTE

Docket: Aro-18-295

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: February 20, 2019

Decided: May 21, 2019

Toby D. Jandreau, Esq., Fort Kent, for appellant Bruce Ouellette

James Mitchell, Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District No. 8, Caribou, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

HUMPHREY, J.

[¶1] Bruce Ouellette appeals from a judgment of conviction for aggravated criminal mischief (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 805(1)(A) (2018), entered by the trial court (Aroostook County, Stewart, J .) following a two-day jury trial. The State purports to cross-appeal from the denial of its motion to correct the sentence because the court did not order restitution pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1323(2), 1325 (2018). M.R.U. Crim. P. 35(a), (g). We affirm the judgment of conviction and do not reach the State's challenge to the denial of its motion to correct the sentence because the State failed to file a notice of appeal from that order and failed to provide the written authorization of the Attorney General. 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(2-B), (5) (2018) ; M.R. App. P. 2A(f)(2), 21(a)-(c).

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury rationally could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perkins , 2019 ME 6, ¶ 3, 199 A. 3d 1174.

[¶3] In October 2016, the Town of Frenchville began preparing a rural section of Pelletier Avenue to be paved. The Town graded the existing gravel roadway, laid geotextile fabric on the graded surface, and then applied a base layer of gravel (larger stone) and a surface layer of gravel (smaller stone). The next step would have been the installation of an asphalt surface.

[¶4] On October 31, 2016, Ouellette drove a tractor along a section of Pelletier Avenue using a harrow that tore the geotextile fabric and mixed the two sizes of gravel together with dirt, rendering that section of Pelletier Avenue unsuitable for paving. The cost to repair the damage was estimated to be approximately $ 52,000.

[¶5] Ouellette was charged by indictment with aggravated criminal mischief,¹ pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 805(1)(A), which provides that "[a] person is guilty of aggravated criminal mischief if that person ... [i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly damages or destroys property of another in an amount exceeding $ 2,000 in value, having no reasonable ground to believe that the person has a right to do so."

[¶6] Prior to trial, the court granted Ouellette's motion in limine to exclude any lay witness testimony about the "title or ownership" of Pelletier Avenue.² During the trial, the jury heard testimony that Ouellette did not own any land along the stretch of Pelletier Avenue that he damaged, that Pelletier Avenue was posted with traffic control and road signage, and that the road was maintained, graded, and plowed by the Town. Further, in accordance with the parties' stipulation, the court instructed the jury that "the property allegedly damaged was the geotextile fabric, base gravel, and surface gravel applied by the Town ... upon Pelletier Avenue." The jury found Ouellette guilty of aggravated criminal mischief.

[¶7] After the jury's verdict, Ouellette filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal³ and argued—for the first time—that the geotextile fabric and gravel had become "fixtures" of the real property of Pelletier Avenue and, because the State did not establish who owned Pelletier Avenue, the State failed to prove that Ouellette damaged the "property of another" within the meaning of 17-A M.R.S. § 805. The court denied the motion, concluding that the parties' stipulation "sufficiently defined" for the jury that the damaged property was the geotextile fabric and gravel; that it was "appropriate for the jury to conclude" that ownership of the road was still in dispute; and that the jury could have concluded that, regardless of who owned the road, the damaged property—the geotextile fabric and gravel, as defined by the parties' stipulation—did not belong to Ouellette.

[¶8] The court sentenced Ouellette to one year in jail with all but ten days suspended, a year of probation, and a $ 3,000 fine. The court declined to order Ouellette to pay restitution, stating on the record that its decision was based on the need to end the contentious litigation surrounding the paving of Pelletier Avenue and that the Town's decision to accept a deed of property from Ouellette in lieu of formal restitution constituted a "bargain[ed] for exchange" that sufficiently compensated the Town. Because the Town voluntarily declined restitution, the State sought restitution on behalf of Aroostook County pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1324(2) (2018). The court denied the State's request. The State filed a motion to correct the sentence pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 35,⁴ arguing that the court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the State's request for restitution as required by 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1323(2), 1325.

[¶9] Ouellette appeals the judgment of conviction, and, in its appellee's brief, the State challenges the court's denial of its Rule 35 motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶10] Ouellette argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and renews on appeal the argument he first made in support of his post-trial motion for acquittal that, because the geotextile fabric and gravel had become "fixtures" of the roadway and ownership of the roadway was in dispute, the State had failed to prove a critical element of aggravated criminal mischief—that Ouellette had damaged the "property of another." See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 805(1)(A), (1-A), 352(4) (2018).

[¶11] When a defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder could rationally find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Woodard , 2013 ME 36, ¶ 19, 68 A.3d 1250 (quotation marks omitted). The jury may draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence, and we will vacate a judgment "only where no trier of fact rationally could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[¶12] An argument is waived when the facts underlying it have been stipulated. See State v. Lockhart , 2003 ME 108, ¶¶ 34-36, 830 A.2d 433. When a stipulation is entered, we "must make our determination on the facts to which the parties have stipulated ...." Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co ., 458 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Me. 1983). Where a defendant stipulates to an element of the crime, the State "is relieved of the burden of introducing evidence other than the stipulation itself to prove that element." Commonwealth v. Ortiz , 466 Mass. 475, 995 N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (2013) ; see also Commonwealth v. Triplett , 398 Mass. 561, 500 N.E.2d 262, 267 (1986) (stating that facts agreed to by stipulation are "no longer ... at issue and must be accepted by the fact finder"). Arguments waived by stipulation are unpreserved, and we review them only for obvious error. Lockhart , 2003 ME 108, ¶¶ 34-35, 830 A.2d 433.⁵

[¶13] Because the parties stipulated at trial to the identity of the "damaged property," Ouellette waived the argument he now makes—that the geotextile fabric and gravel had become a fixture of the real property underlying Pelletier Avenue—and we "must make our determination on the facts to which the parties have stipulated ...." Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 458 A.2d at 1211.

[¶14] On this record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally find and conclude that the State proved each element of the offense of aggravated criminal mischief beyond a reasonable doubt for several reasons. 17-A M.R.S. § 805(1)(A). First, Ouellette stipulated that the "damaged property" was the geotextile fabric and the gravel applied to the road by the Town. Second, the jury heard uncontroverted testimony that the Town owned the fabric and the gravel and that Ouellette damaged it. Finally, based on evidence of the manner in which Ouellette operated the tractor and the estimated cost to repair the damage, the jury rationally could have inferred that Ouellette intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused damage to the fabric and gravel, and that the damage was in excess of $ 2,000. Because we conclude there was no error, much less obvious error, we affirm the judgment.

B. Restitution

[¶15] In its appellee's brief responding to Ouellette's appeal of the judgment of conviction, the State argues that the sentence was illegal because the court failed to properly assess whether restitution should be ordered pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1323(2),⁶ 1325.

[¶16] "In criminal matters, the State is limited to the appeal rights granted by the plain language of [ 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A (2018) ]," State v. Blakesley , 2010 ME 19, ¶ 11, 989 A.2d 746 (quotation marks omitted). In addition to limiting the orders and errors from which the State may appeal, section 2115-A identifies the circumstances in which the State is and is not required to file a notice of appeal and when it is required to obtain the Attorney General's authorization to commence an appeal. 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1)-(3), (5) (2018).⁷ Ordinarily, the State need not file a notice of appeal or obtain the approval of the Attorney General when the defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction and the State alleges that an error "harmful to it was committed prior to trial or in the trial ...." 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(3) (emphasis added); see also State v. Taylor , 2011 ME 111, ¶ 2 n.2, 32 A.3d 440 (challenging the court's admission of defendant's evidence concerning an alternative suspect during trial); State v. Rabon , 2007 ME 113, ¶ 12 & n.4, 930 A.2d 268 (challenging the court's pre-trial determination regarding exigent circumstances for a search). As we have held, section...