State v. R.R.S.

597 S.W.3d 835

STATE of Texas, Petitioner,

v.R.R.S., a Juvenile, Respondent

No. 17-0819

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued January 7, 2020

Opinion delivered: March 27, 2020

Kevin Paul McCary, Amy Suzanne Monsivais, Mark Sanders Burtner, El Paso Assistant County Attorneys, Jo Anne Bernal, El Paso County Attorney, Lucila Lorena Flores-Camarena, El Paso County Attorney's Office, Michael Gomez, Ruben Gabriel Duarte, El Paso County DA'S Office, El Paso, for Petitioner.

Joshua C. Spencer, Attorney & Counselor at Law, P.L.L.C., El Paso, for Respondent.

R. R. S., pro se.

Justice Boyd delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under Texas law, a child younger than fourteen cannot legally "consent to sex" and thus, as a matter of law, cannot commit the offense of prostitution. In re B.W. , 313 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Tex. 2010). But can a child under fourteen commit the offense of aggravated sexual assault? In this juvenile-delinquency case, R.R.S. pleaded "true" to allegations that he sexually assaulted his younger brothers when he was thirteen years old. Based on his admissions and plea, the trial court found him delinquent. But before the disposition hearing, R.R.S. filed a motion to withdraw his plea and requested a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, finding the trial court abused its discretion because R.R.S. was not adequately informed about his potential defenses when he entered his plea, particularly the defense that he could not have committed aggravated sexual assault because he could not legally "consent to sex." 536 S.W.3d 67, 80 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017). We disagree that a child's legal inability to consent to sex renders the child legally incapable of committing aggravated sexual assault. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying R.R.S.’s request to withdraw his plea, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court's judgment adjudicating R.R.S. delinquent.

I.Background

Thirteen-year-old R.R.S. confessed to his mother that he sexually assaulted his five-year-old twin brothers. His mother contacted the police, who notified the Department of Family and Protective Services. The Department interviewed the twins, who confirmed the assaults. The State filed a petition to adjudicate R.R.S. as delinquent, alleging that he committed two acts of aggravated sexual assault on each of his brothers. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a) (defining aggravated sexual assault).

The trial court appointed counsel for R.R.S. Prior to the adjudication hearing, R.R.S. filed a written stipulation admitting to the allegations, waiving his right to trial, and acknowledging his understanding that, in light of his admissions, he could be placed on probation or committed to the custody of the Juvenile Justice Department. At the adjudication hearing, the trial court advised R.R.S. of his rights, and R.R.S. stated that he understood them. When the court asked R.R.S. if he knew what a jury trial was, R.R.S. answered, "It's where the people will have a say on what happened.... Where you have people decide for like if you're guilty or not." R.R.S. confirmed that he did not "want a jury trial," and the court verbally admonished him that he would receive "some type of sanction" if he pleaded "true" to the charges.

R.R.S. pleaded "true" and verbally confirmed that he was pleading "true" because "it is true." He stated that no one forced him to plead true or promised him anything for his plea. He also admitted that he signed the written waiver of his own free will. R.R.S.’s counsel was present throughout the hearing and agreed to his plea and waiver. The trial court accepted R.R.S.’s plea, entered an order finding that R.R.S. had engaged in the conduct alleged, and scheduled a disposition hearing to occur about a month later.

Before the disposition hearing, R.R.S. hired a new attorney, who filed a motion to withdraw the stipulation and requested a new trial so that R.R.S. could "challenge the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence in a Jury Trial." At the hearing on R.R.S.’s motion, his counsel argued that R.R.S.’s stipulation was "per se insufficient" to support the adjudication. He also argued that "mitigating factors" existed that could "reduce [R.R.S.’s] culpability," specifically asserting that R.R.S. was himself a victim of sexual abuse by his father. Counsel admitted that R.R.S. had "just change[d] his mind" about his plea, but asserted that R.R.S. did not fully understand his "alternatives in preparing for trial" or that he could potentially have to register as a sex offender "for the rest of his life." Citing a variety of constitutional protections, counsel urged the court to grant a new trial so that a jury could determine "what [R.R.S.’s] intent was."

The trial court denied R.R.S.’s motion and rescheduled the disposition hearing. Prior to that hearing, the juvenile probation department issued a pre-disposition report recommending that the court place R.R.S. on intensive supervised probation until his eighteenth birthday. The report explained that, according to R.R.S. and his mother, R.R.S.’s father (who himself was sexually abused by a family member when he was five) repeatedly sexually abused R.R.S. from the time R.R.S. was five until he was seven, separated from R.R.S.’s mother, and committed suicide about two years before R.R.S. assaulted his brothers. According to R.R.S., he was "very close to his father before his death" and was "curious" and "thinking about his own sexual abuse that his father imposed on him" while he was assaulting his brothers. R.R.S. expressed that he was "sorry for his actions because his brothers did not deserve what he did to them, as well as, what it has caused his family."

At the disposition hearing, the juvenile probation officer testified that, according to R.R.S.’s mother, she and R.R.S. were appealing the adjudication "not because they're denying the offense or the need for the juvenile to get help to address this sexual behavior[ ], but because [of] the long-term effect this type of adjudication is going to have on her son." R.R.S.’s mother testified that R.R.S. "kind of goes off of [her] guidance" and that she would not have advised R.R.S. to proceed with the stipulation had she known "how the law could be applied or how testimony could be presented under the law." She confirmed her belief that R.R.S. was "not fully informed of what ... the consequences would be in the future."¹ At the end of the hearing, the State joined R.R.S.’s request that the court defer any decision on whether he be required to register as a sex offender until he completed probation and treatment and turned eighteen. Consistent with the State's recommendation, the trial court ordered R.R.S. to serve intensive supervision probation until his eighteenth birthday and deferred any decision on sex-offender registration.

The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying R.R.S.’s motion to withdraw his stipulation and for a new trial. According to the court of appeals, the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that R.R.S.’s plea was "knowing and voluntary." 536 S.W.3d at 80. In particular, the court reasoned that R.R.S.’s counsel should have advised R.R.S. that he had a defense to the charges because, as a child under fourteen, he could not legally "consent to sex." Id. at 78 (citing B.W. , 313 S.W.3d at 821 ), 80. Although the court acknowledged that B.W. involved a charge of prostitution, not aggravated sexual assault, it reasoned that B.W. ’s holding was broad enough to apply to any "offense that includes consent to sex as one of its essential elements." Id. at 78 (citing B.W. , 313 S.W.3d at 824 ). The court concluded that R.R.S. should have been informed of this defense "and other pertinent defensive theories applicable to his circumstances." Id. at 80. Because he was not, he "misunderstood defenses he could assert that he nonetheless waived when he pled true and judicially confessed to committing the underlying sexual assault offense." Id. The court remanded for a new trial so the parties could "address directly, in the first instance, the question of whether the holding of In re B.W. extends to the offense of aggravated sexual assault." Id.

We granted the State's petition for review.

II."Consent to Sex"

The decision whether to allow a juvenile to withdraw a "true" plea after a delinquency adjudication rests within the trial court's sound discretion. Jackson v. State , 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) ; In re S.L.L. , 906 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (juvenile delinquency case). When, as here, the trial court properly admonished the juvenile at the beginning of the adjudication hearing,² the juvenile bears the burden of proving that, despite the court's admonishments, he did not fully understand the consequences and was misled or harmed "such that the plea was rendered involuntary." Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion here because R.R.S. was never advised of his potential defense under B.W. The State argues that the court of appeals erred because B.W. does not provide a defense to charges of aggravated sexual assault.³ We agree with the State.

The juvenile involved in B.W. was arrested when she offered to engage in sexual conduct with an undercover police officer in exchange for twenty dollars.

B.W. , 313 S.W.3d at 819. After discovering that B.W. was only thirteen years old, the State initiated a juvenile proceeding to declare her delinquent for engaging in prostitution. B.W. pleaded true to the allegations, the trial court found her delinquent, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. We reversed, holding that B.W. could not have committed the offense of prostitution because "in Texas, ‘a child under fourteen cannot legally consent to sex.’ " Id. at...